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Child care subsidies and the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) are vital 
government tools for increasing employment and reducing poverty among low-income 
families.  This dissertation, therefore, explores many features of these policies, including 
their evolution, correlates of participation, and impacts on employment.   
 Chapter 1 provides an overview of child care subsidies and the EITC, focusing on 
recent policy developments, labor supply incentives, and a critical review of the empirical 
employment literature. 
 Chapter 2 explores why, despite substantial growth in funding, participation in 
child care subsidy programs remains comparatively low.  Results suggest that although 
30 percent of households with children are eligible for child care subsidies, take-up is 14 
percent.  The low take-up rate is driven by several factors: eligible non-recipients differ 
from recipients in ways that make subsidies unnecessary or undesirable; the practice by 
states to trade-off generosity in eligibility for additional generosity in benefits; and the 
practice by states to ration benefits according to specific household characteristics. 
  
 Chapter 3 examines the effects of child care costs and net-of-taxes wages on the 
employment of single mothers.  Although a substantial literature estimates separately the 
impact of prices and taxes, no study has created a modeling framework that accounts for 
both factors simultaneously.  Merging empirical techniques from previous child care and 
EITC studies yields employment elasticities of -0.174 and 0.711, respectively.  An 
implication of this finding is that price-effects are considerably smaller than those 
reported elsewhere, while tax-effects accord with previous estimates.  Results also 
suggest that single mothers became less responsive to prices and more responsive to taxes 
throughout the 1990s, especially after expansions to subsidy programs and the EITC.   
 Chapter 4 investigates heterogeneous employment effects of social policy reforms 
across varying economic conditions.  Allowing the effects of policy reforms on single 
mothers to vary with the economy leads to several interesting results.  Policy “carrots” 
are more likely to reveal heterogeneous effects at low intensity work margins, while 
policy “sticks” show significant variation at increasingly demanding margins.  However, 
all policies produce the largest employment effects in favorable economic conditions, 
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CHAPTER 1: OVERVIEW OF CHILD CARE SUBSIDY POLICY                    
AND THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT 
1.1 Introduction to Child Care Subsidies and the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) 
 
Child Care Subsidies  
 
Prior to the 1980s, child care legislation was severely hampered because of a 
belief that a growing child care industry would lead to a “soviet-style system of 
communal child-rearing.”1  Opposition typically focused on the federal government’s 
intrusion in marriage and the family and the notion that women should stay home to care 
for their children.  However, employment data released during the mid-1970s suggested 
for the first time that a majority of women with children were in the labor force.  This 
trend led to two important policy developments during this period.  Congress in 1974 
passed Title XX of the Social Security Act, which provided funds for a range of social 
services, including child care.  States are allocated entitlement funds on the basis of 
population and are given wide latitude on the services provided and the groups to whom 
those services are directed.  Child care accounts for the largest share of Title XX 
spending, at 13 percent, but federal allocations have declined over time (Committee on 
Way and Means, 2000).  The other development, as shown in Figure 1.1, was the 1976 
and 1981 amendments to the Dependent Care Tax Credit (DCTC).  Originally a tax 
deduction, the DCTC was first changed to a non-refundable tax credit, meaning that only 
families with positive tax liability could claim the benefit.  The maximum credit amount 
was then increased to $2,400 for one child and $4,800 for two children, and Congress 
                                                 
1 This is a quote taken from an anonymous leaflet entitled “Raising Children—Government’s or Parent’s Rights?”  The leaflet was 
part of a smear campaign aimed at derailing the Child and Family Services Act.  The leaflet and other material associated with the 




altered the benefit schedule so that the credit rate declined with income (but remained 
constant for AGI above $28,000).  
The late-1980s and early-1990s marked a period of heightened interest in child 
care policy, largely due to the work requirements mandated by the 1988 Family Support 
Act (FSA).  In fact, the FSA created the first federal child care entitlements through Aid 
to Families with Dependent Children Child Care (AFDC-CC) and Transitional Child 
Care (TCC).  The AFDC-CC program guaranteed child care benefits so that welfare 
recipients could participate in the JOBS program, which enrolled able-bodied individuals 
into employment and job training activities.  The TCC was an open-ended entitlement 
that subsidized child care costs for up to 12 months after leaving welfare.  Families were 
required to pay fees on a sliding scale basis established by each state.   
Child care subsidy policy was expanded once again in 1990 with the passage of 
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA90).  It created the landmark Child Care 
and Development Block Grant (CCDBG), which aimed to directly subsidize child care 
costs and increase quality.  Parents were able to spend CCDBG funds on a range of 
providers, including relatives and neighbors, as long as these services met local standards 
and licensing requirements.  Eligibility was set at 75 percent of a state’s median income 
(SMI), and qualifying children had to be under age 13.  Federal allocations for the 
CCDBG totaled $2.5 billion over three years.  The 1990 OBRA also created the At-Risk 
Child Care (ATCC) program, which provided a capped entitlement of $1.5 billion over 
five years for families at risk of becoming welfare dependent.   
The barrier to employment posed by child care costs gained increased prominence 
in the wake of historic welfare legislation passed in 1996.  The Personal Responsibility 
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and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) eliminated the legal entitlement to 
cash welfare and child care assistance for low-income families.  Congress repealed Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), which was the primary public assistance 
program for 60 years, and replaced it with Temporary Assistance to Needy Families 
(TANF).  The legislation imposes strict work requirements on recipients, places a 60-
month lifetime limit on welfare, sanctions families that fail to comply with work 
activities, and devolves to states substantial authority to develop their own reform 
approaches.   
Due to its strong work mandates, the 1996 PRWORA restructured the federal 
government’s role in providing child care assistance (see Figure 1.1 for a summary).  
Congress repealed the AFDC-CC, TCC, and ARCC programs, and along with CCDBG 
money, consolidated these funding streams into a single Child Care and Development 
Fund (CCDF).  There are three primary elements to CCDF funding.  Each state receives a 
pre-determined share of federal mandatory funds, which are not subject to annual 
appropriations.  States also qualify for matching grants, provided they meet certain 
Maintenance of Effort (MOE) requirements (i.e. maintain or exceed pre-CCDF 
spending).  Finally, the legislation authorizes nearly $1 billion in discretionary money 
that does not require a state match (Long & Clark, 1997).  Overall, PRWORA allocated 
$21 billion for child care over a seven year period, 70 percent of which must be used to 
subsidize costs for families receiving TANF or transitioning from welfare into work 
(Greenberg, Lombardi, & Schumacher, 2000).   
Eligibility for CCDF funds is set at 85% of the state median income (SMI), 
although states are able to establish a lower ceiling.  States are given substantial 
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flexibility in designing their subsidy systems, including being able to transfer up to 30 
percent their TANF block grant to the CCDF, setting reimbursement and co-payment 
rates, and defining work activities.  However, PRWORA stipulates that states must spend 
no less than four percent of their CCDF allocation on quality improvement activities.  
Furthermore, a market rate survey must be conducted every two years so as to ensure that 
subsidy families have “equal access” to high-quality providers.  Results from the survey 
are used to set payment rates at or greater than the 75th percentile of what the local market 
is charging.  The law also suggests that co-payments are considered affordable if families 
do not spend more than 10 percent of their income on child care. 
Granting states flexibility through the CCDF has led to substantial variation 
across subsidy regimes.  As Table 1.1 shows, very few states use the proposed federal 
income eligibility ceiling of 85 percent of SMI: it ranges from 39 percent in Illinois to 85 
percent in Georgia, Mississippi, and Texas.  The interaction of income eligibility limits 
with states’ median incomes has led to dramatic variation in the maximum income at 
which families can quality for child care subsidies, from $18,000 in Missouri to $48,000 
in Connecticut.  As previously mentioned, states are given broad authority to determine 
other components of eligibility, including the types of income that should be counted 
toward or excluded from eligibility.  For example, 16 states currently exempt income 
from the EITC when calculating a family’s eligibility for child care subsidies.  Table 1.2 
also suggests that states determine fees in a number of ways, including flat rates, percent 
of cost, percent of reimbursement rates, and percent of income.  Providers may set 
differential reimbursement rates depending on the mode of care (center-based versus 
family-based) and the age of the child (infant versus pre-school), but it must do so at the 
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75th percentile of the price distribution in the local market.  The reimbursement rates in 
Table 1.1 are based on services for pre-school age children in center-based settings for 
the state’s largest urban area.   
Much of the variation across CCDF regimes is driven by the amount of money 
allocated to each state.  Table 1.2 shows these figures.  The first column includes only the 
federal allocation to each state through the mandatory, discretionary, and matching 
mechanisms.  The mandatory component is determined through a formula that accounts 
for the size of each state’s population under age 13 and for the income level. Recall that 
states may transfer up to 30 percent of their TANF funding to the CCDF, and as shown in 
the second column, states have done so to varying degrees.  Similarly, there is significant 
variation in the MOE levels that states must meet in order to qualify for federal matching 
grants.  However, many of these differences are due to differential child care 
expenditures that existed before the creation of the CCDF.  It is also interesting to note 
that Head Start and the CCDF are currently the two largest child care programs in terms 
of overall expenditures, but Head Start is better funded with respect to dollars per 
recipient, at around $5,759 (Blau, 2000).  CCDF dollars per child is $3,500, and as Table 
1.2 shows, states are serving children at approximately the same level.   
Data on subsidy take-up are starting to emerge from various sources.  Although it 
appears that states are serving a large number of children in any given month, as shown 
in Table 1.3, and the number of subsidy recipients has grown dramatically over time (1.8 
million in 2001 compared to 1.0 million in 1996), recent evidence suggests that 12 
percent to 15 percent of eligible children currently receive assistance (ACF, 1999).  
Findings from a U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) (1999) study confirm this, 
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estimating that states are serving no more than 15 percent of the CCDF-eligible 
population.  Furthermore, Schumacher and Greenberg (1999) determine that less than 
half of employed welfare leavers receive subsidies.  However, those receiving assistance 
are using subsidies in a variety of child care modes, and not surprisingly, there is 
substantial variation across the states.  For example, Table 1.3 shows that while only six 
percent and nine percent of subsidy recipients in Connecticut and Massachusetts, 
respectively, use them for family-based providers, this mode predominates in Oregon and 
Indiana (76 percent and 58 percent, respectively).  Overall, however, families appear to 
be using subsidies for center-based providers at a higher rate than for family-based 
providers, 58 percent compared to 31 percent.   
The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) 
 
The idea behind the EITC emerged during consideration of President Nixon’s 
welfare reform proposal, the Family Assistance Plan (FAP).  The FAP was designed to 
replace AFDC with a federal minimum cash guarantee and was aimed at working poor, 
two-parent families with children.  Although it was never enacted, Senator Russell Long, 
then Senate Finance Committee Chairman, expressed interest in a derivative of the plan 
to assist poor workers by offering wage supplements instead of welfare payments.  The 
EITC was initially conceived as a “work bonus” for the working poor, and it sought to 
offset some of the increase in payroll taxes, which had grown to 5.8 percent by 1973.  
Senator Long stated that the purpose of the work bonus was to “prevent the taxing of 
people onto the welfare rolls.” 2  The 1974 recession provided additional motivation to 
adopt a low-income wage subsidy because Congress was interested in stimulating 
                                                 
2 Long, Russell.  Remarks in the Senate.  Congressional Record.  September 30, 1972.  p. 33010. 
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demand across the earnings distribution.  In response, the Tax Reduction Act of 1975 was 
passed, which refunded $8.1 billion in 1974 individual income taxes and cut 1975 taxes 
by an additional $10 billion.  This legislation established an earned income credit for 
taxpayers with children that was phased in at a rate of 10 percent, up to a maximum credit 
of $400, and then phased out until earnings reached $8,000 (Figure 1.1 provides a 
summary of the major EITC expansions, and Table 1.4 displays the relevant program 
parameters throughout the EITCs history).  The credit is refundable, meaning that if tax 
liabilities are less than the EITC a family can receive a check for the difference from the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS).    
 The EITC received one-year extensions during 1975-1977 until it was made 
permanent under the 1978 Revenue Act.  This legislation also increased the maximum 
credit to $500 and the eligibility limit to $10,000, and it added a plateau region over 
which the maximum credit applied.  Finally, an “advanced payment” option was added in 
1978 that allowed workers to receive their credit incrementally throughout the year. 
 Legislation on the EITC slowed for several years until the passage of the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86).  This law increased the subsidy rate to 14 percent, from 11 
percent, and raised the maximum income to which the subsidy applied, from $5,000 to 
$6,080.  This increased the maximum credit to $851, which was then phased out at a rate 
of 10 percent until earnings reached $15,432.  The EITC received its second major 
expansion through the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (OBRA90).  A 
separate benefit schedule was created for families with more than one child: the subsidy 
rate was set initially at 17.3 percent of earnings up to $7,140, for a maximum credit of 
$1,235.  Families with one child, on the other hand, could claim the EITC at a rate of 
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16.7 percent over the identical earnings range, thereby increasing the maximum credit 
from $953 to $1,192.  Both benefit schedules phased-out between $11,250 and $21,250.  
A third expansion to the EITC occurred when President Clinton signed the Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA93).  It created a third benefit schedule for 
childless tax filers, containing a subsidy of 7.65 percent for the first $4,000 of earnings 
and a maximum credit of $306.  The subsidy rate for families with one child increased to 
34 percent by 1995, while the rate for families with two or more children grew to 40 
percent.  However, to offset some of these increases, the maximum creditable earnings 
amount was lowered from $7,750 in 1994 to $6,160 in 1995 (for families with one child) 
before being raised again in 1996.  The most important result of the 1993 EITC 
expansion was seen in the large increase of the maximum credit, which by 1996 grew to 
$2,152 for families with one child and $3,556 for families with two or more children.  
Finally, the most recent changes to the EITC came in 2001 through President Bush’s 
EGTRRA.  This law took a number of steps to reduce the credit’s implicit marriage 
penalty by creating separate flat and phase-out regions for joint and non-joint tax filers.  
Although the flat region begins at the same earnings level for joint and non-joint filers, 
the maximum credit applies to an additional $1,000 of earnings for joint filers and 
therefore extends the phase-out region by the same amount for these families.  This 
plateau/phase-out differential will grow to $2,000 starting in 2005 and $3,000 starting in 
2007.3 
 Eligibility for the EITC is determined along a number of dimensions.  First, the 
taxpayer must have non-zero earned income from wages or salary, business self-
                                                 
3 Interestingly, the changes to the EITC were not the only EGTRRA provisions directed at low-income individuals.  It also decreased 
the lowest income tax bracket from 15 percent to 10 percent, expanded to Child Tax Credit $1,000 and made it refundable for families 
above AGI $10,000, and significantly expanded the DCTC.   
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employment, or farm self-employment.  Second, an individual’s adjusted gross income 
must be below some threshold, which varies by year and the presence and number of 
children.  Until OBRA93 created a small EITC for childless workers, a taxpayer needed 
to have a qualifying child who met age, relationship, and residency tests.  The qualifying 
child must be a child, grandchild, stepchild, or foster child of the taxpayer, under 19 years 
old (under 24 if a full-time student), or permanently disabled, and lives with the taxpayer 
for the entire tax year.4  An individual becomes ineligible for the EITC if aggregate 
income from interest, dividends, and capital gains exceeds $2,600.5   
 As of 2003, a taxpayer with non-zero earnings and one qualifying child is eligible 
to receive a 34 percent wage subsidy on earnings up to $7,490, for a maximum credit of 
$2,547.  The EITC is then phased-out at a rate of 15.98 percent between $13,730 and 
$29,666.  Taxpayers with two or more children receive a 40 percent subsidy on earnings 
up to $10,510, for a maximum credit of $4,204.  The maximum credit is received until 
earnings reach $13,730, at which point the credit is phase-out at a rate of 21.06 percent 
until $33,692.  As previously mentioned, beginning in 2002 there is a larger flat and 
phase-out region for joint tax filers so as to minimize the inherent marriage penalties in 
the EITC.                  
 Table 1.5 displays information on the EITCs expenditures and claimants over 
time.  During the first decade of the program, there was very little variation in the cost.  
Prior to the TRA86 expansion, expenditures on the ETIC were between $1 billion and $2 
billion.  By increasing the subsidy rate and lowering the phase-out rate, however, the 
1986 tax law more than tripled expenditures, from $2 billion in 1986 to $7.5 billion in 
                                                 
4 The Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999 and EGTRRA01made several changes to the definition of a 
qualifying child.  The most important change was increasing the residency requirement of the child from over six months to one year.        
5 EGTRRA01 stipulates that income from employee compensation is to be excluded from the definition of earned income.   
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1990.  Moreover, the 1990 and 1993 expansions produced immediate increases in 
expenditures, bringing the total cost of the program to nearly $32 billion by the end of the 
1990s.  The growth in EITC spending has slowed in recent years, but it is currently the 
most expensive anti-poverty program in the U.S. arsenal.  In fact, nearly two-thirds of 
single mothers experience negative tax liabilities because of the EITC (Eissa, Kleven, & 
Kreimer, 2004).  Table 1.5 also shows the amount of EITC spending on the refunded 
portion of the credit, or the amount paid to individuals in excess of their tax liability.  
Most EITC dollars go toward the refundable portion of the credit, reflecting the fact that 
recipients owe very little, if anything, in federal taxes.  Finally, it is interesting to note 
that the number of claimants has grown in accordance with statutory changes, some of 
which is mechanical (eg., increasing the phase-out range), but program growth is also due 
to business cycle changes and the increased employment rates of single mothers. 
 Data on the characteristics of EITC recipients is difficult to generate, but a few 
studies have matched federal income tax returns with census data.  Liebman (1999a), for 
example, shows that 75 percent of 1990 EITC recipients worked at least 1,000 hours for 
the year and another 60 percent worked over 1,500 hours.  Fully 40 percent of EITC 
recipients were non-Hispanic white, 39 percent were non-Hispanic black, and 20 percent 
were Hispanic.  As expected, education levels are low: over 40 percent of recipients did 
not have a high school diploma and 37 percent received no more than a high school 
education.  Interestingly, public assistance rates were low as well, with only 16 percent 
receiving welfare and 25 percent receiving food stamps.  Take-up rates among eligibles 
appear to be high, and the program is fairly target efficient.  Scholz (1994) uses matched 
federal income tax data with the SIPP and finds that 80 percent to 86 percent of eligible 
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taxpayers received the EITC in 1990.  It is difficult to know how take-up rates changed 
throughout the 1990s, but Hotz and Scholz (2001) offer a few clues.  On the one hand, 
EITC take-up rates might have increased because eligibility levels extend farther into the 
income distribution, where filing propensities are higher.  However, it is well-
documented that record numbers of single mothers entered the labor force throughout the 
1990s, and it could be argued that these individuals file at lower rates (Meyer & 
Rosenbaum, 2000).   
In terms of target efficiency, Scholz and Levine (2000) find that over 60 percent 
of EITC benefits are directed at taxpayers below the poverty line.  Liebman (1998) 
calculates that 40 percent of families below 50 percent of the poverty line receive the 
EITC, while 80 percent of families between 100 percent and 150 percent of the poverty 
line receive the credit.  This appears to be consistent with recent IRS data presented in 
Table 1.6, which shows the distribution of EITC filers and payments across several 
income levels.  Approximately 39 percent of all EITC filers and 26 percent of filers with 
children  are in the subsidy region, and these individuals receive 29 percent of total EITC 
payments.  Another 18 percent of all EITC claimants and 20 percent of claimants with 
children are in the plateau region, and they receive 32 percent of EITC benefits.  Finally, 
43 percent and 52 percent of all recipients and those with children, respectively, are in the 
phase-out region.  Those on the phase-out receive 39 percent of total payments.   
1.2 Behavioral Impacts of Child Care Costs and Subsidies  
 
 This discussion focuses on several economic issues related to child care subsidies.  
First, it reviews arguments justifying government intervention in the child care market, 
with a special emphasis on the cost-effectiveness component.  It then provides a broad 
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economic framework for the employment and educational incentives that arise from 
subsidy programs.6  Finally, it reviews the relevant econometric evidence on the labor 
supply and education effects of child care costs and subsidies. 
Justification for Child Care Subsidies 
 
Scholars and policymakers typically cite four arguments to justify government 
intervention in the child care market (Blau, 2001).  First, subsidies can ameliorate 
shortages for specific types of child care services, such as infant care, night and weekend 
care, and services for handicapped children.  A shortage, in this context, means there is a 
mismatch between the type or quality of services supplied in the market and the price at 
which consumers are willing to pay for such services.  Consumer-side subsidies increase 
purchasing power, thereby bolstering demand for specific services and requiring higher 
quality.  Child care providers should then respond to this additional demand by increasing 
the supply of desired services and raising average quality.   
 A second argument for child care subsidies focuses on imperfections in the 
market stemming from poor information and about child care quality and the positive 
externalities created by high quality care.  Imperfect information deals with the notion 
that consumers are not well-informed about the distribution of child care options.  
Furthermore, consumers know less about child care quality than does the provider.  Since 
child care is an experience good, parents only realize the level of quality after they have 
consumed it.  As Blau (2001) notes, information problems might lead to adverse selection 
of providers because child care in general is a low-wage occupation.  If workers who 
receive high wage offers outside the child care industry are less likely to be child care 
                                                 
6 A formal economic model of labor supply and educational attainment will be specified in a later section.  This discussion is merely 
to set the stage for the literature review.  
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providers and if these outside wage offers are positively correlated with child care 
quality, then adverse selection would ensue.  The externality argument focuses on the 
presumption that parents do not fully recognize the positive benefits to children and 
society from choosing high-quality care.  For example, child development experts argue 
that such services are correlated with improved intellectual development and academic 
achievement, while reducing the incidence and societal costs of crime, illegitimacy, and 
teenage childbearing (Barnett, 1992; 1995; Campbell & Ramey, 1994; Karoly et al., 
1998; Nash, 1997; Vandell & Wolfe, 2000).  The implication here is that if parents are 
not fully aware of the external benefits of high-quality child care or they do not posses 
the financial means to purchase it, then they will not consume the socially optimal 
amount.   
 The third argument in favor of subsidizing child care deals with equity and 
distributional considerations.  Some scholars propose that that child care should be 
viewed as a merit good, suggesting that all families must have equal access to services 
irrespective of their ability to pay for them (Bergman, 1996).  Given the aforementioned 
externalities of high-quality child care, subsidies might be justified not only for low-
income families but also for their high-earning counterparts.  However, one thing to bear 
in mind is a potential equity-efficiency trade-off: if the societal benefits to high-quality 
child care are small or if positive externalities do not extend up the income distribution, 
then it may be more efficient to re-allocate child care dollars to programs with greater 
social and economic benefits. 
 The final argument is that child care subsidies are cost-effective for the 
government.  Proponents argue that child care subsidies help former welfare recipients 
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become economically self-sufficient.  The logic for the argument is as follows: since 
subsidies reduce contemporaneous child care costs, low-income women will be more 
likely to work, thus leading to concomitant growth in human capital over time.  Low-
income women are using subsidies for two primary purposes, both of increase human 
capital: direct work experience and education/job training.  These activities, in turn, could 
lead to rising returns to employment and ultimately economic self-sufficiency.  The 
government may therefore realize long-term net savings because it ceases welfare 
payments to and receives increased tax revenue from individuals who might have 
continued on welfare in the absence of child care subsidies.   
The extent to which child care subsidies are cost-effective depends on a number 
of factors.  Clearly, the number and distribution of recipients, CCDF funding levels, and 
states’ eligibility requirements are critical determinants.  As previously mentioned, 
subsidy regimes vary considerably across the states.  Income eligibility limits are 
particularly important because they determine the reach of potential subsidy effects and 
therefore the cost-effectiveness.  For example, if price and subsidy effects are greatest 
among the lowest earners, then extending eligibility deep into the income distribution 
will decrease average cost-effectiveness.  In addition, higher income eligibility limits 
may reduce cost-effectiveness by picking up windfall beneficiaries—or individuals who 
would work even in the absence of child care subsidies—and so there is little additional 
labor supply generated per subsidy dollar spent.  Another set of factors that should 
influence cost-effectiveness is the extent to which the government saves cash assistance 
(TANF and food stamps) funds and generates additional tax revenue.  This could occur 
when subsidy recipients realize wage growth that makes them ineligible for welfare and 
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brings them into the bottom tax bracket.  Still another cluster of features deals with the 
trade-off between paid and unpaid child care modes.  Child care subsidies are used only 
for paid care, but some families prefer sources of unpaid care.  This would appear to 
increase the amount of employment generated per subsidy dollar spent.  However, a 
decrease in the price of child care should induce some windfall beneficiaries to switch 
from unpaid to paid sources of care, leading to additional government expenditures 
without the attending increase in labor supply.  Finally, average cost-effectiveness 
depends crucially on the relative behavioral distortions associated with labor supply, 
educational attainment, and welfare receipt.  As discussed below, all three outcomes 
should be sensitive to child care costs and subsidies, but the relative size of their 
elasticities will drive the cost-effectiveness analysis.7  Labor supply and education are 
expected to be positively related to child care subsidies, but welfare receipt is ambiguous.  
Subsidies could increase the probability of receiving cash assistance in the shot-run, since 
CCDF rules give priority to families on welfare or attempting to transition from welfare.  
But welfare receipt should decline over time as workers’ earnings exceed TANF 
eligibility limits. 
A Simple Economic Framework for Labor Supply and Child Care Subsidies 
 
Consider the following model of the relationship between child care costs and 
labor supply, as adopted from Blau (2000; 2001), Blau and Robins (1988), and Ribar 
(1995).  The primary motivation for child care expenditures is to allow a parent to enter 
the paid labor force.  Work-related expenses, including child care, may exceed the net 
returns to employment, particularly among low-income families.  The result is that a 
                                                 
7 Research on the optimal design of tax policies, for example, typically finds that the results are particularly sensitive to the size of 
wage and income elasticities (Browning, 1995; Liebman, 1999b).   
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higher price for child care increases the probability that a parent’s net wage is lower than 
the reservation wage (or the lowest wage that an individual would be willing to work for), 
which, according to economic theory, decreases the likelihood of employment.  A 
testable policy implication of this model is that a child care subsidy allows a mother to 
keep more of her market earnings, thereby increasing the incentive to enter the labor 
force.  The model is indeterminate with respect to a subsidy’s effect on the number of 
hours of work, conditional on already being employed. 
 The structure of CCDF subsidies is non-linear, that is, the subsidy rate is greater 
for individuals employed the fewest hours and declines as earnings rise, until workers 
reach the break-even point.  The overall prediction in this case is a positive incentive to 
enter the labor force.  But the non-linearity may have implications for the chosen level of 
employment.  A possible distortion is that workers may reduce their work effort to 
qualify for child care assistance or qualify for a higher subsidy rate.   
 Another issue deals with access to sources of unpaid (or informal) child care, 
including a parent, grandparent (or other relative), neighbor, or babysitter.  Child care 
subsidies reduce the price of services in the formal market but leave unchanged the cost 
of using informal providers.  This is because no money was exchanged in the first place.  
Therefore, subsidies increase the incentive to substitute unpaid care with paid care, and 
this incentive becomes stronger if it is believed that quality is greater in the formal child 
care market.  In other words, it is plausible that subsidies “crowd out” sources of unpaid 
child care, especially in unregulated and informal settings, where it is believed that 
services are of questionable quality.   
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Review of the Econometric Evidence 
 
 Non-experimental evidence on the relationship between child care subsidies and 
women’s work decisions comes from two primary sources: studies on price effects and 
studies of actual subsidy programs.  The former is an indirect approach to estimating a 
subsidy effect, but it can allow useful inferences under certain conditions.  There are, 
however, several things to keep in mind when interpreting these results.  As Blau (2001) 
notes, there could be important unobserved costs associated with obtaining a child care 
subsidy, either from the time it takes to fill out the necessary forms and navigate 
bureaucratic rules or from the stigma involved in participating in welfare programs.8  If 
individuals are in fact sensitive to a participation stigma, then estimated price effects are 
likely overstated relative to subsidy effects.  Another factor to consider is that price 
effects are derived from a linear specification, whereas CCDF subsidies are non-linear.  
While it can be argued that child care costs are comparable to subsidies for deriving 
elasticities at the extensive margin (employment decision), there could be differences if 
the goal is to estimate elasticities at the intensive margin (hours of work), since this is 
where the non-linearities arise.  Finally, price and subsidy effects may diverge because 
the former provides a negative incentive to employment, and the latter provides a positive 
incentive.  Individuals’ labor supply decisions are probably very sensitive to the type of 
incentive structure they face. 
 Nevertheless, this approach has been quite common in the literature, and the 
results are surprisingly uniform.  Table 1.7 presents a summary of empirical work on the 
                                                 
8 See Moffitt (1983) for a discussion of the disutility associated with the stigma attached to welfare participation.  
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effect of child care costs on female labor supply in the U.S.9  Although nearly every study 
finds a negative relationship between the price of child care and maternal employment, 
the range of elasticities is quite large, from 0.06 to -1.36.  However, most studies find 
elacticities that center on -0.35.  Several factors could account for this wide variation.  
Generally speaking, this research spans three decades, uses five different data sets, draws 
dissimilar samples, and employs disparate estimation techniques.  Some studies derive 
elasticities from samples of all mothers, while others disaggregate by marital status.  
Restricting samples to families with children under age six appears to be the most 
common technique, but there are a few studies that examine price effects for children up 
to age 14.  Studies also vary samples by income-level, either restricting inclusion to 
families below the poverty line or including all low-income families.  Measures of the 
child care price variable rely on variation across both geographic areas (provider-
specific) and individuals, and studies vary the unit of time at which costs are determined.  
However, the most likely candidate for the range of elasticities stems from subtleties in 
the specification of the participation equation and the methods used to identify the child 
care price variable.                                                     
The most common methodological approach to examining price effects includes a 
discrete choice participation probit with predicted child care costs and wages as the key 
right-hand-side variables.  However, before estimating the main labor supply equation, 
one must first specify the underlying structural model, which consists of four equations: a 
predicted wage equation, a predicted child care price equation, a conditional employment 
                                                 
9 Michalopoulos and Robins (1999) provide employment estimates from a pooled sample of Canadian and U.S. child care users, 
yielding an elasticity of -0.16.  Powell (1997; 1998) and Cleveland and Hyatt (2003) use only Canadian data.  The first Powell paper 
finds an elasticity of -0.38, while the second estimates elasticities of -0.21 and -0.71 for part-time and full-time work, respectively.  
The Cleveland and Hyatt paper report a statistically significant effect of child care costs on employment for single mothers, but do not 
provide an elasticity.  Finally, a recent paper from Fong and Lokshin (2000) estimate a price elasticity of -0.17 for Hungarian mothers.          
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equation, and a conditional child care mode equation.  The two conditional equations are 
considered reduced form specifications and are used to construct sample selection terms 
in the wage and price equations.  The wage equation is corrected for selectivity on 
employment, while the child care price equation contains selection terms for employment 
and child care mode.  As discussed in more detail below, previous studies rely on either 
functional form or a set of theoretically-defined exclusion restrictions to identify the 
selection equations and the final employment probit. 
The first step in this process involves deriving the fitted values from a selection-
corrected wage equation by ordinary least squares (OLS) regression on the subsample of 
mothers with positive wages.  Selectivity effects are identified through a first-stage 
employment probit in which the number and presence of young children, presence of 
other adults, and unearned income are commonly included in the probit but excluded 
from the wage equation.  The wage equation is ultimately specified as a function of 
human capital variables, previous labor market experience, demographic characteristics, 
and the sample selection term.   
A double sample-selection child care price equation is then estimated by OLS 
from which the fitted values are derived.  Predicted values of child care expenditures are 
calculated to deal with two issues.  First, a corner solution exists, that is, non-zero 
expenditure data are only observed for employed mothers who are using paid sources of 
care.  Second, child care costs may be endogenous if there are unmeasured components 
related to the decision to be employed and use paid sources of care.  The price equation is 
estimated on the subsample of working mothers with positive child care expenditures.  
Selectivity terms in this equation are identified through a first-stage employment probit 
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and paid child care probit.  Common variables to identify the price equation (i.e., 
excluded from it) are the state unemployment rate, AFDC/TANF and food stamp 
benefits, total number of children, disability status, and various functional form attributes.  
The child care price equation is ultimately specified as a function of demographic 
characteristics that influence the type and quality of child care chosen (i.e., presence and 
number of young children), economic variables thought to be correlated with preferences, 
sources of unpaid care, and regional differences in child care services.   
Of the 14 studies detailed in Table 1.7, eight employ the basic approach outlined 
above (Blau & Robbins, 1991; Riber, 1992; Connelly & Kimmel, 2001; Kimmel 1995; 
U.S. Gao, 1994; Connelly, 1992; Han & Waldfogel, 2001; Anderson & Levine, 2000).10  
That is, they estimate reduced form participation probits and include predicted child care 
costs as the key explanatory variable.  Another three studies treat the work decision 
simultaneously with the decision to use a given type of child care (Blau & Robbins, 1988; 
Blau & Hagy, 1998; Ribar, 1995).  This is accomplished by cross-classifying several 
child care modes with the categorical employment decision and estimating multinomial 
logistic regressions.  Ribar’s (1995) work is noteworthy because it specifies a full 
structural model based on utility-maximizing behavior, and it estimates employment, 
child care expenditure, and hours-in-care equations jointly.  The primary motivation for 
specifying a multi-choice dependent variable is that it more accurately classifies the 
choice-set faced by prospective workers.  Changes in the price of child care do not affect 
the work decision independently of other factors, but rather pose families with a number 
                                                 
10 Research in this area was started by Bowen and Finegan (1969), who revealed the importance of child care costs to maternal labor 
supply.  Heckman’s (1974) seminal work established the importance of considering informal arrangements, which typically provide 
care at little or no cost, when estimating the effect of price.  Heckman argues that the decision to purchase care involves not only 
weighing the price and quality of market care, but also considering the identical components of informal.  Therefore, an examination 
of the employment effect of child care costs must take into account the labor supply decisions of the mother and other household 
members jointly.        
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of trade-offs among combinations of employment states and child care modes.  Two 
studies attempt to estimate the labor supply effects of the Dependent Care Tax Credit 
(DCTC) by regressing hours of work on the effective wage rate (Averett, Peters, & 
Waldman, 1997; Michalopoulos, Robins, & Garfinkel, 1992).  Averett, Peters, and 
Waldman (1997) derive an econometric model that exploits the kinked nature of the 
DCTC by incorporating such non-linearities into the budget set.  Michalopoulos, Robins, 
and Garfinkel (1992), on the other hand, specify a full structural model and estimate a 
Stone-Geary utility function.  Interestingly, although both studies examine the identical 
tax credit, they produce markedly different elasticities: the former estimates an elasticity 
of hours worked with respect to child care costs of -0.78, while the latter estimates 
elasticities of essentially zero.                                 
 Although the studies in Table 1.7 employ somewhat different estimation 
strategies, there are a few drawbacks that plague nearly all of them.  First, much of the 
research is conducted on a single cross-section of data, leaving few opportunities to find 
exogenous sources of variation to identify the wage and price variables.  However, one 
promising avenue for research is exemplified in Baum’s (2002) dynamic analysis of 
maternal labor supply following childbirth.11  Using a hazard model for the return to 
work, the author estimates an elasticity with respect to child care costs of -0.59.  Second, 
as Anderson and Levine (2000) and Blau (2001) note, the exclusion restrictions in both 
sample-selection models and the final employment probit vary greatly across the studies 
and often rely on perfunctory assumptions about exogeneity.  Studies that rely solely on 
functional form are even more suspect.  Sensitivity analyses conducted by Kimmel 
                                                 
11 Baum’s (2002) research is similar in spirit to early work by Leibowitz, Klerman, and Waiter (1992), who use NLSY data to study 
women’s work decisions two years after childbirth.  The authors find that larger child care tax credits are associated with higher re-
employment probabilities following childbirth.  However, the authors do not provide an elasticity for their estimate.     
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(1998) show that differences in price elasticities are most likely due to the mix of control 
variables in the final employment probit and how identification is achieved in the cost of 
care equation.  Kimmel does not find substantial differences between switching from 
single and double selection-correction terms, nor do alternative definitions of the price 
variable appear to be important.12  
 Recall that the second approach to evaluating the effect of child care subsidies is 
to examine actual subsidy receipt among low-income families.  Although it is much 
smaller than the body of work on price effects, the subsidy literature is quite diverse.  
Table 1.8 summarizes the empirical research focusing on labor supply and child care 
subsidies.  One of the studies, by Berger and Black (1992), takes advantage of a natural 
experiment by comparing employment rates for women who are receiving subsidies and 
those on the waiting list.  Gelbach’s (2002) creative approach examines a number of 
labor market outcomes among those with children enrolled in public school—an implicit 
100 percent child care subsidy.  The remaining three studies model employment as a 
function of actual subsidy receipt (Meyers, Heintze, & Wolf, 2002; Blau & Tekin, 2001; 
Tekin, 2004).  This research begins by estimating a subsidy equation and then using the 
predicted probability of receipt as the main regressor in the employment equation.  Below 
is a detailed description of each study.   
Using data from two child care subsidy programs in Kentucky, Berger and Black 
(1992) created a natural experiment by comparing employment probabilities for single 
                                                 
12 Anderson and Levine (2000) conduct sensitivity tests of their specification against the one in U.S. GAO (1994).  Differences in the 
elasticities appear to be driven by the choice of variables in the cost of care equation, confirming Kimmel (1998).  However, switching 
from a logarithmic to a level scale for the price variable leads to a nontrivial change in the elasticity.  The authors also vary the 
estimation by marital status, age of the child, skill level, and poverty status.  Larger price elasticities are found for younger children, 
less-skilled workers, and those at or near the poverty line.  Generally speaking, elasticities decline as a function of skill level, but there 
are exceptions.  Anderson and Levine (2000) use three years of SIPP data, allowing them to increase statistical power, conduct 
extensive sub-group analyses, and build in an exogenous time component.  These factors may explain the relative stability of their 
elasticities.      
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mothers who received a subsidy and those on the waiting list.  The two subsidy programs 
were fairly comparable: one provided a $50-per-week subsidy for mothers earning no 
more than 60 percent of SMI, while the other program reimbursed $60 per week for those 
at 80 percent of SMI and below.  Estimates from a participation probit imply that 97.7 
percent of single women receiving subsidies were employed, compared to 85.5 percent 
among those on the waiting list.  One of the drawbacks of this approach, which Berger 
and Black (1992) recognize, is that the subsidy effect could be severely biased if social 
service workers selected recipients on the basis of unmeasured components related to 
employment propensities.  Therefore, the authors look at employment rates for the sub-
sample of subsidy recipients before and after they received the subsidy.  This produced 
an effect of 8.4 percentage points.  However, questions still remain about the extent of 
self-selection into the application process. 
 Gelbach (2002) uses 1980 Census data to examine the implicit child care subsidy 
that operates through free public kindergarten.  As in other studies, subsidy receipt is 
endogenous if the mother has strong, unobserved tastes for work that leads her to enroll 
the child at the earliest possible age.  Gelbach uses a unique instrumental variables 
strategy that exploits natural variation in the child’s quarter of birth.  Quarter of birth is 
likely to be associated with subsidy receipt because state rules mandate that children be 
five years old (by December 31) in order to enroll in a given year.  Therefore, children 
born prior to December 31 (the fourth quarter, for example) are eligible for a child care 
subsidy in that year, while children born after the new-year (the first quarter, for 
example) are not eligible until the following fall.  Gelbach argues that the assignment of 
child care subsidies based on quarter of birth is independent of unobserved work 
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preferences.  Two-state least squares (2-SLS) estimates suggest that access to free public 
kindergarten is associated with an additional four weeks of work, three hours of work per 
week, and a five percentage point increase in the probability of employment.       
 Meyers, Heintze, and Wolf (2002) use data on a sample of California AFDC 
recipients and estimate subsidy effects through a two-stage model.  The first stage models 
the probability of subsidy receipt, conditional on using market child care.  This is done to 
ameliorate the potential endogeneity of subsidy receipt.  Women with strong, unobserved 
tastes for work are more likely to be employed even if subsidies are not available.  
Furthermore, CCDF administrators specifically target welfare recipients, who are 
presumably less-skilled, and so self-selection into a subsidy program could operate 
through administrative rules.  Using the predicted probabilities from the first stage, the 
authors then estimate a binomial participation equation, with subsidy receipt as the key 
right-hand-side variable.  Simulations from the labor supply equation imply that as the 
probability of subsidy receipt goes from 0.10 to 0.60, the employment probability 
increases from 0.30 to 0.81.   
 A similar estimation approach by Blau and Tekin (2001) uses data on a nationally 
representative sample of single mothers with at least one child under age 13.  Like 
Meyers et al. (2002), the authors first estimate a reduced form subsidy equation, 
conditioned on family characteristics and state-level policy variables.  The second-stage 
equation models outcomes such as employment, schooling, and welfare receipt as a 
function of the likelihood of receiving a subsidy.  Child care subsidies are associated with 
a 0.05 to 0.11 percentage point increase in the probability of employment, a 0.08 
percentage point increase in the probability of employment, and a 0.10 percentage point 
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increase in the likelihood increase of receiving welfare.  The last result is not surprising, 
given that CCDF rules give priority to families on welfare or attempting to transition 
from welfare.   
   A number of conceptual and empirical issues are raised by the Meyers et al. 
(2002) and Blau and Tekin (2001) studies.  Ideally, this research would incorporate the 
amount of the child care subsidy into the mother’s budget constraint and then model the 
work decision as a function of those preference parameters.  But data inadequacies have 
stymied such an approach.  Instead, researchers have available an indicator of actual 
subsidy receipt from which they derive predicted probabilities for the entire sample of 
mothers.  At best, this permits an analysis of the work decision based on mothers’ 
expectations about receiving a subsidy, leaving in question the true behavioral impact of 
actual subsidy receipt.  Another issue, highlighted by Blau (2000), deals with 
unavailability of a comparison group, making it difficult to arrive at an unbiased estimate 
of the subsidy effect.  Comparison groups are difficult to find because most low-income 
women face the identical subsidy regime.  To deal with the problem, these studies 
estimate a first-stage subsidy equation in order to ameliorate self-selection into the 
application process.  However, the exclusion restrictions used to identify the subsidy 
effect are not derived from a formal theoretical model, and they are often of questionable 
empirical value.  Even state CCDF rules—such as eligibility limits, fees, and 
reimbursements rates—might not be good sources of exogenous variation because they 
dictate how much a mother can earn to remain eligible for subsidies and therefore 
determine the relative value of her employment (Blau & Tekin, 2001).  Moreover, 
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aggregate state-level variables and state fixed-effects have proved to be weak identifiers 
in individual-level data.   
 There is, however, one other critical drawback that plagues nearly every study in 
this literature, Gelbach’s (2002) work notwithstanding.  The imposition of work 
requirements as a condition for receiving a subsidy make it very difficult to discern 
whether the employment effect is a “real” behavioral response or simply a mechanical 
response to administrative rules.  This problem is evident in Berger and Black’s (1992) 
study of two Kentucky subsidy programs, both of which placed a 20-hour-per-week work 
requirement on subsidy recipients.  But it is also problematic for any study using data in 
the post-PRWORA policy environment, in which work requirements coincide with child 
care subsidy receipt.  The central analytic problem is highlighted in Berger and Black’s 
(1992) research.  Even if we assume that selection bias is purged from the 12 percentage 
point subsidy effect, the estimate likely suffers from what I call “administrative rules 
bias.”  To see how, the reported subsidy effect may usefully be thought of as comprising 
two distinct parts: a behavioral response to reduced child care costs and a mechanical 
response to the work requirement.  It is impossible with their data to determine the 
relative importance of these separate components, but a reasonable conclusion is that the 
authors’ finding is biased upward because some subsidy recipients would not have 
worked in the absence of work requirements.  The problem is apparent again in Blau and 
Tekin’s (2001) finding that child care subsidies are associated with increased welfare 
participation and labor supply.  The former result runs counter to economic theory, not to 
mention the justification for subsidizing child care in the first place.  But it is a 
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reasonable mechanical response, given that welfare recipients have statutory priority for 
CCDF subsidies.  
The presence of work requirements, therefore, makes it difficult to infer a true 
employment effect from child care subsidies.  Researchers cannot be confident that a 
commingling of behavioral responses and administrative rules are not driving the results.  
Blau’s (2000) point of finding good comparison groups becomes even more important in 
this context.  Future work in this area might focus on individuals who are not affected by 
work requirements or components of states’ CCDF plans that differentially affect the 
extent to which individuals are subjected to work requirements. 
1.3 Behavioral Impacts of the EITC 
 
This section discusses two economic issues related to the EITC.  It first reviews a 
simple theoretical framework in which to understand the EITCs labor supply incentives.  
It then summarizes the econometric evidence on labor force participation and hours of 
work.  Much of this discussion attempts to distinguish between labor market incentives 
along the extensive versus intensive work margins and differential incentives for single 
versus married women.   
Work Incentives in the EITC 
 
 As previously stated, one of the primary justifications for expanding the EITC has 
been that it encourages stronger work effort relative to the alternative of an NIT or cash 
assistance programs like AFDC/TANF or food stamps.  However, the credit creates a 
complicated set of work incentives that varies by work and marital status and the number 
of children in the household.  The EITC can usefully be thought of as three separate 
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programs (Browning, 1995).  The phase-in range, with its negative MTR, operates likes a 
wage subsidy by increasing workers’ net-of-tax wages.  The plateau range, where the 
credit rate is zero for each additional dollar earned, acts like a lump sum transfer.  
Finally, the phase-out range is essentially a negative income tax because of the way it 
gradually phases out benefits as earnings rise.   
Generally speaking, economic theory predicts that the credit will increase labor 
supply along the extensive work margin.  Eligibility for the program is confined to those 
with positive earnings, and recipients experience an expanded budget set that makes work 
look more attractive at every wage level.  In other words, the increased effective wage 
rate for EITC recipients previously not working leads to only a positive substitution 
effect.  However, theory predicts that although participation decisions will remain 
unchanged among taxpayers already working, hours of work will decline.13  For example, 
taxpayers in the plateau region would work in the absence of the EITC, and so its 
introduction does not alter the value of their time in the labor market.  What changes is 
the size of the EITC benefit, which leads to a negative income effect.  Since the empirical 
evidence suggests that leisure is a normal good, taxpayers in the plateau region are 
expected to reduce hours of work.  Consider next recipients in the phase-out region: 
families with one child experience a 34 percent implicit tax on earnings, while those with 
two children experience a tax of 40 percent.  This produces negative income and 
substitution effects, leading to a reduction in hours of work.  Furthermore, since the EITC 
produces a nonconvexity in the budget constraint, workers above the break-even point 
may reduce their work effort in order to become eligible for the program.  Overall labor 
                                                 




supply effects are driven largely by the relative elasticities at the extensive and intensive 
margins and the distribution of taxpayers along the three segments.   
 The discussion thus far assumes that individuals are filing tax returns separately.  
However, married households often file joint returns, and therefore the AGI for 
calculating taxes becomes the sum of both spouses’ earnings.  This has important 
implications for the labor supply incentives faced by primary and secondary earners, as 
noted by Eissa and Hoynes (1998).  Suppose for illustrative purposes that the husband in 
this model is the primary earner and the wife is the secondary earner.  The labor supply 
incentives faced by the husband are essentially identical to those faced by single 
taxpayers.  Wives, on the other hand, face a more complicated set of employment 
decisions.  These individuals are de facto EITC recipients if they remain out of the labor 
force and the husband’s earnings are within the eligibility limits.  As Eissa and Hoynes 
(1998) explain, if the husband earns $11,650 (in 1997), which places him near the 
beginning of the phase-out region, the family receives an EITC worth $3,656 (for two 
children) if the wife remains out of the labor force.  If she decides to work, however, the 
family’s credit will be reduced by $0.21 for each additional dollar she earns, until the 
family’s income reaches $29,290.  The implicit tax on the wife’s earnings coupled with 
social security and state taxes can move her total MTR into a region that provides strong 
incentives to remain out of the labor force.  Therefore, the so-called “marriage penalty” 
embedded in the EITC essentially rewards secondary earners for remaining out of the 
labor force.14  However, recent changes to the credit, through the EGTRRA01, should 
                                                 
14 Alm and Whittington (1995) and Feenberg and Rosen (1995) address marriage penalties in the federal income tax code generally.  
Research by Dickert-Conlin and Houser (1998) and Holtzblatt and Rebelein (1999) examine marriages penalties in the EITC 
specifically.  The latter studies found that higher EITC benefits lead to higher female headship rates among white women but lower 
rates among black women.           
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mitigate the effects of the marriage penalty by extending the plateau and phase-out 
regions for couples filing joint tax returns.         
Review of the Econometric Evidence 
 
 The empirical literature on the labor supply effects of the EITC is small relative to 
that of child care subsidies, but its methods are quite diverse.  It is similar in tradition to 
earlier research on income taxation and labor supply (Burtless & Hausman, 1978; 
Hausman, 1980, 1985; McCurdy, 1992; McCurdy, Green, & Paarsch, 1990; Moffitt, 
1984; Triest, 1992).15  The majority of this work, which yields reduced form estimates, 
focuses on evaluating major changes to the EITC embedded in tax laws.  The goal has 
been to identify a population most likely affected by the EITC and then compare this 
group’s work effort before and after the EITC expansion, relative to the change in some 
comparison group.  Another cluster of studies estimating “quasi-structural” models 
combines some of the most attractive aspects of reduced form methods by exploiting the 
EITCs differential treatment of families over time, while also specifying the variables 
that affect the work decision.  A third group comprises more traditional “structural” 
methods that specify a formal labor supply model from which the parameters of the 
budget constraint emerge. 
 Table 1.9 summarizes the three major approaches to evaluating labor supply 
effects of the EITC.  The first four studies use reduced form methods; the next two use 
quasi-structural methods; and the last two studies use a structural approach.  The studies 
by Ellwood (2000), Hotz, Mullin, and Scholz (2003) and Meyer and Rosenbaum (1999; 
2001) concentrate on labor supply effects along the participation margin, while Dickert, 
                                                 
15 For reviews of this literature, see Heckman (1993) and Killingsworth and Heckman (1986). 
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Houser, and Scholz (1995), Keane (1995) and Keane and Moffit (1998) estimate hours-
of-work equations.  With the exception of Eissa and Hoynes (1998), all studies focus on 
single mothers.  Each study will be discussed in detail below, but it is important to note 
that even though there is substantial methodological diversity in these studies, they come 
to a fairly consistent result: the EITC has a positive and economically large effect on 
employment for single women with children. 
 EITC effects derived from reduced form approaches attempt to exploit a specific 
expansion of the tax credit.  The expansion has historically occurred in the context of a 
larger tax law.  Nevertheless, the basis for this approach is to observe participation rates 
for a sample of individuals most likely affected by an EITC expansion (eg., single 
mothers with less than a high school education) before and after the passage of the law.  
However, since these studies do not follow the identical sample over time, a comparison 
group is chosen to net out influences from underlying economic trends or policy shocks.  
A difference-in-differences estimator is used to compare employment changes for the 
sample of single mothers before and after the EITC expansion, relative to changes in a 
comparison group.  Identification of the EITC effect is based on the fairly restrictive 
assumption that economic conditions or other policy changes do not differentially affect 
the two groups.16  The studies reviewed here predominately use a sample of single 
women without children as the comparison group, although some researchers use samples 
of low-skilled single women without children or single mothers with more than a high 
school education.17  Given the restrictive nature of the identifying assumptions, most 
                                                 
16 Difference-in-differences approaches have been criticized for being atheoretical and unable to provide estimates of economically 
interesting parameters, such as elasticities (Heckman, 1996).  
17 To use these groups as comparisons, one must make the assumption that marital status and fertility decisions are made exogenously 
to changes in the EITC.   
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researchers use multiple control groups and ultimately pin the credibility of their results 
on estimating similar labor supply effects across the various groups.   
 Eissa and Liebman (1996) use CPS data from 1985-1987 and 1989-1991 to 
examine the employment response of single mothers to the 1986 EITC expansion.  The 
EITC changes were embedded in the large TRA86, which altered several other 
components of the tax code, including an increase in the standard deduction and 
dependent deduction.18  The authors use several comparison groups to identify the effect 
of the EITC expansion and estimate a number of difference-in-differences probit models.  
They find that the 1986 EITC changes increased labor force participation among single 
mothers with children by 2.8 percentage points.  Furthermore, the expansion increased 
labor supply by 6.1 percentage points for a low-education sub-sample.  The authors do 
not find statistically discernible effects for hours worked among those already in the labor 
force.   
 Eissa and Hoynes (1998; 2004) use the 1985-1997 waves of the CPS to 
investigate the labor supply response of married couples with children to the 1993 EITC 
expansion.  Like previous expansions, this one was embedded in a larger tax law, the 
OBRA93.  The authors first employ a difference-in-differences framework to estimate 
labor supply effects at the participation margin, using married couples without children as 
the comparison group.  They then estimate a number of standard labor supply models that 
account for several variables of interest in the budget set, including a net-of-taxes wage 
rate.  Two dependent variables are modeled: the binary work decision and hours-of-work, 
conditional on already being employed.  The primary source of identifying variation 
                                                 
18 Increasing both deductions was particularly beneficial to single mothers (head of household filers) because they increased the 
income level at which these families jumped from the first to the second tax bracket.  
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comes from the differential tax treatment of families of different sizes over time, 
especially the three EITC expansions between 1986 and 1993.  To estimate the hours-of-
work equation, the authors rely on two sets of instrumental variables for net wages.  
Results from the difference-in-differences model suggest that the 1993 EITC expansion 
reduced participation rates for married women with children by 3.1 percentage points.  
This finding is largely consistent with simulations based on the employment probit, 
which implies that the three EITC expansions reduced labor supply among married 
women by 1.2 percentage points.  The hours-of-work equation yields widely divergent 
results, most likely stemming from weak instruments and the inability to account for 
nonlinearities in the tax structure.   
    There are three important concerns with the use of difference-in-differences 
estimators for modeling labor supply effects of the EITC.  First, changes to the credit 
have historically been included in a large tax law, thus making it difficult to separate 
labor supply effects due to the EITC from those due to other tax changes.  Furthermore, 
EITC expansions involved multiple, simultaneous changes that affected the phase-in rate, 
maximum credit, and the phase-out rate.  For example, changes to the EITC through 
TRA86 increased the subsidy rate from 11 percent to 14 percent (thereby increasing the 
maximum credit) and lowered the phase-out rate from 12 percent to 10 percent.  It would 
have been beneficial for Eissa and Liebman (1996) to examine those individual 
parameters, but it is not possible to do so in a difference-in-differences framework.  
Second, the use of all single mothers as a treatment group is questionable because not all 
such women receive the EITC, nor are all of them eligible for the program.  The problem 
is highlighted by Liebman (1999a), which finds that just 50 percent of 1990 EITC 
 
 34
eligibles are either formerly or never married.  Therefore, it is conceivable that some 
proportion of labor supply effects are due to changes in a subset of the treatment group 
that is irrelevant to the analysis.  It would be ideal to construct a data set that merges 
employment information with tax returns, but to date only one such study exists (Hotz, 
Mullin, & Scholz, 2003).  A final concern with these studies is whether the use of single 
women without children is an appropriate comparison group.  Critics argue that 
employment rates are so high for these women that it is unlikely they would respond to 
changes in economic or policy conditions at all (or in the same way that single mothers 
would).  However, nearly every study in this cluster uses alternative definitions of the 
basic comparison group to test the robustness of its findings.  The group comprised of 
low-income or low-skilled single women appears to be the most promising.  
 As previously stated, a second class of studies employs quasi-structural methods 
to estimate labor supply effects of the EITC.  This work, which is exemplified by Meyer 
and Rosenbaum (1999; 2001), keeps in place the basic comparison of single mothers to 
women without children and attempts to identify labor supply effects through their 
differential tax and welfare treatment.  Identifying variation also comes from cross-state 
variation in tax and welfare systems, in addition to federal and state changes over time.  
Finally, authors use state- and year-specific interactions with the presence of children.  
However, these models are also structural in that they draw from economic theory to 
suggest parameterizations of policy and budget constraint variables that enter the work 
decision.  This approach allows researchers to generate wage and income elasticities and 
to conduct the appropriate policy simulations.  Key variables in the labor supply equation 
typically include net wages, non-labor income, AFDC/TANF benefits, food stamp 
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benefits, probability of welfare receipt, local labor market conditions, and a full set of 
demographic controls.  Labor supply effects of the EITC are usually inferred through the 
net wages variable.  Several studies focus almost exclusively on participation at the 
extensive margin (Eissa & Hoynes, 1998; Meyer & Rosenbaum; 1999; 2001), while 
others examine labor supply models of the intensive margin (Dickert, Hauser, & Scholz, 
1995; Hoffman & Seidman, 1990; U.S. GAO, 1993).   
 Dickert, Houser, and Scholz (1995) use a sample of married and single women 
from the 1990 SIPP to examine the effects of net wages on moving from 0 to 20 (or 40) 
hours of work per week. The authors’ net wages variable accounts for implicit taxes 
through benefit reduction rates and the EITC’s phase-in/-out regions and for explicit 
taxes through Social Security, federal income, and state income taxes.  Labor supply 
models estimated jointly with program participation imply that a 10 percent increase in 
net wages increases the probability of working by two percentage points for single 
parents.  Net wages is positively associated with labor supply in two-parent families but 
only significantly so for secondary earners.  Simulations based on the regression models 
suggest that the OBRA93 EITC expansion increased single parents’ participation 
probability by 3.3 percentage points, while leading to a decline in work effort among 
secondary earners.   
 Meyer and Rosenbaum’s (1999; 2001) work on the labor supply effects of the 
EITC and welfare programs had a dramatic effect on the literature.  The authors use CPS 
data for the years 1984-1996 to examine employment changes for single mothers relative 
to women without children.  The time period covered in this analysis allows the authors 
to exploit the three major expansions to the EITC, changes in cash assistance programs, 
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and cross-state variation in these components during a given year.  The EITC-effect is 
embedded in an “Income Taxes if Work” variable, which sums the taxes a woman would 
pay in a given year and state and for a given number of children.  An employment probit 
is estimated as a function of federal/state taxes; AFDC, food stamp, and Medicaid 
benefits; and job training and child care expenditures.  The authors find that a $1,000 
reduction in taxes increases the employment probability by 4.2 percentage points for 
single mothers.  In fact, simulations imply that the EITC accounts for 62 percent of their 
relative employment increase between 1984 and 1996 and 37 percent of the increase 
between 1992 and 1996. 
 Several aspects of the Meyer and Rosenbaum (1999; 2001) papers are 
noteworthy.  First, as previously stated, the combination of reduced form and structural 
methods allows the sources of identifying variation to be explicitly stated, while 
maintaining the framework of traditional labor supply models.  Second, the extensive 
time period over which data are collected allows the authors to model a sufficiently large 
number of tax and welfare policy changes with better precision.  In addition, most 
previous work attempts to isolate the effects of one or two programs, whereas Meyer and 
Rosenbaum (1999; 2001) estimate nearly every major program in the U.S. arsenal.  This 
allows for a more accurate picture of the work incentives faced by single mothers and 
reduces the potential bias from omitted variables.  Third, by discretizing the hours and 
wage distributions into a large number of cells, the authors are able to capture complex 
non-linearities in tax and welfare programs.  Finally, the authors’ findings appear to be 
robust to changes in the definition of the dependent variable, the sample composition, 
 
 37
sources of identifying variation, the time period of the analysis, and the model’s 
functional form.   
 The final cluster of studies on the EITC uses fully structural methods to arrive at 
labor supply estimates.  This research accounts for the non-linear or kinked nature of tax 
and transfer programs.  Much of it attempts to build upon earlier work by Burtless and 
Hausman (1978), Hausman (1980; 1985), Heckman and MaCurdy (1982), and Moffitt 
(1986; 1990).  Labor supply in these models is usually defined as a continuous hours-of-
work variable, but more recent work has dichotomized the hours’ decision into part-time 
and full-time work statuses.  Two important difficulties plague analyses involving kinked 
budget constraints.  The first issue deals with the potential non-linear response of 
individuals to changes in the budget constraint.  Second, and more important analytically, 
observationally-equivalent individuals no not reside on the same point of the constraint, 
even if they are faced with the identical budget set.  This means that these individuals 
likely respond differently to changes in the budget constraint (Moffitt, 1990).  Sources of 
unobserved heterogeneity therefore need to be accounted for in the model by allowing 
some part of the error term to vary across individuals.   
 Two primary estimation approaches have been used in the literature to deal with 
the above issues.  Given the endogeneity of net wages and virtual income, the first 
method uses an instrumental variables strategy to construct an alternate wage based on 
the MTR workers would face if they worked 40 hours per week.  While this and related 
approaches (see Hausman, Kinucan, & McFadden, 1979) account for endogenous after-
tax wages, they do not exploit the non-linearities in federal income taxes or transfer 
programs.  The second approach, which deals explicitly with sources of non-linearity, is 
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commonly called the dual error term model.  As its name suggests, two sources of 
random error are allowed. One error term accounts for unobserved preferences for work 
across individuals, while the second is the optimization error, which picks up sources of 
measurement error.  Conceptually, this method estimates the utility-maximizing choice of 
hours on each budget segment and the kink points by generating a probability for the 
observed hours of work and then choosing the set of parameters that maximizes this 
probability.  A unique feature of this model is it allows researchers to simulate behavioral 
changes due to specific tax or policy shifts.                                 
 The EITC literature contains two papers that use fully structural methods (Keane, 
1995; Keane & Moffitt, 1998).  These authors define a sample of single women from the 
1984 SIPP to estimate a labor supply equation jointly with welfare and food stamp 
participation.  The authors examine three participation outcomes—non-work, part-time 
work, and full-time work—across three public assistance programs—AFDC, food 
stamps, and housing vouchers.  The method of simulated maximum likelihood is used to 
analyze a wide range of policy reforms, including a reduction in the AFDC phase-out 
rate, wage and fixed cost subsidies, and expansions to the EITC.  The authors find that a 
30 percent EITC phase-in rate applied in 1984 would increase employment among single 
mothers by 8.4 percentage points from a base of 65.5 percent.  Moreover, a 40 percent 
EITC phase-in rate would lead to a 10.1 percentage point increase in employment.  Even 
though such expansions would reduce welfare and food stamp participation rates, the 
authors conclude that the EITC is less cost-effective at encouraging employment than 
subsidizing the fixed costs of working or providing work subsidies, simply because the 

















Alabama 43 19,020 $5 / week $73 / week $99.00 / week Yes 
Alaska 62 38,928 $13 / month $766 / month $880.00 / month No 
Arizona 54 24,156 $1 / day $10 / day $23.20 / day No 
Arkansas 60 23,520 0% of fee  100% of fee $17.00 / day No 
California 75 35,100 $2 / day $11 / day $27.59 / day No 
Colorado 62 32,916 $6 / month $560 / month $28.00 / day No 
Connecticut 75 47,592 2% of inc 10 % of inc $135.00 / week No 
Wash, DC 80 41,640 $0 $13 / day $23.55 / day No 
Delaware 53 29,280 1% of cost 80% of cost $86.25 / day No 
Florida 63 29,268 $0.80 / day $11 / day $90.00 / week Yes 
Georgia 85 42,828 $0 $45 / week $80.00 / week Yes 
Hawaii 80 39,288 0% 20% of reim $425.00 / month No 
Idaho 51 20,472 7% of cost 100% of cost $396.00 / month No 
Illinois 39 21,816 $4.33 / month $186 / month $24.34 / day No 
Indiana 57 26,484 $0 9% of inc $33.00 / day Yes 
Iowa 47 22,680 $0 $12 / day $10.50 / half-day No 
Kansas 49 27,060 $0 $243 / month $3.12 / hour No 
Kentucky 55 24,144 $0 $11 / day $20.00 / day Yes 
Louisiana 60 24,924 30% of cost 70% of cost $15.00 / day No 
Maine 85 36,456 2% of inc 10% of inc $150.00 / week Yes 
Maryland 40 25,140 $4 / month $146 / month $433.00 / month Yes 
Massachusetts 50 28,969 $0 $120 / month $31.50 / day No 
Michigan 47 26,064 5% of reim 30% of reim $2.25 / hour No 
Minnesota 75 42,012 $5 / month $741 / month $55.00 / day Yes 
Mississippi 85 30,156 $10 / month $180 / month $77.00 / week Yes 
Missouri 42 17,784 $1 / day $4 / day  $15.30 / day No 
Montana 51 21,948 $10 / month $263 / month  $17.25 / day Yes 
Nebraska 53 25,260 $48 / month $214 / month $21.00 / day Yes 
Nevada 75 37,476 0% of benefit 85%  $30.00 / day No 
New Hampshire 62 31,776 $0 $0.50 / week $24.40 / day No 
New Jersey 61 36,570 $0 $294 / month $121.40 / week Yes 
New Mexico 78 29,256 $0 $205 / month $386.48 / month Yes 
New York 61 29,256 Varies Varies $45.00 / day Yes 
North Carolina 75 34,224 10% of inc 10% of inc $477.00 / month Yes 
North Dakota 69 29,556 20% of reim 80% of reim $100.00 / week No 
Ohio 57 27,060 $1 / month $203 / month $113.00 / week No 
Oklahoma 53 23,232 $0 $263 / month $13.00 / day Yes 
Oregon 60 27,060 $43 / month $399 / month $372.00 / month No 
Pennsylvania 58 29,256 $5 / week $70 / week $28.00 / day No 
Rhode Island 60 32,917 $0 14% of inc $140.00 / week No 
South Carolina 47 21,948 $3 / week $11 / week $83.00 / week Yes 
South Dakota 44 21,948 $10 / month 15% of inc $2.15 / hour No 
Tennessee 60 26,208 $1 / week $47 / week $90.00 / week No 
Texas 85 38,052 11% of inc 11% of inc N.A. No 
Utah 56 26,928 $10 / week $255 / week $3.00 / hour No 
Vermont 77 31,032 0% 90% of reim $20.81 / day No 
Virginia 50 27,060 10% of inc 10% of inc $161.00 / week No 
Washington 63 32,916 $15 / month $50 / month $26.50 / day No 
West Virginia 75 28,296 $0 $5.75 / child $18.00 / day Yes 
Wisconsin 51 27,060 $4 / week $55 / week $5.50 / hour Yes 
Wyoming 58 27,060 $0.40 / day $4 / day $2.43 / hour No 
Source: ACF (2004) Child Care and Development Fund Report of State Plans FY 2004-2005 and ACF (2003) Child Care and 
Development Fund Report to Congress. 
Notes: 1 Expressed as a percent of state median income (SMI).  Income eligibility figures come from FY2002-2003 CCDF State 
Plans and are based on a family of three (two children).  2 Fee assumes full-time care for a 3-person family.  Fees are based on a 
family of three with no infants or children with special needs.  If states have differential fee schedules based on the number 
children, just the fee for the first child is reported.  3 Reimbursement rates are based on services for preschool-age children in 
center-based settings for the state’s largest urban area.  4 This indicates whether the state has a differential reimbursement rate 
schedule for child care with higher standards of quality than those meeting the basic licensing requirements.      
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Alabama 59.5 18.7 6.9 4.0 4,500 2,336 
Alaska 11.7 16.3 3.5 4.0 No 5,114 
Arizona 93.8 0.0 10.0 4.0 No 3,984 
Arkansas 43.9 6.0 1.9 6.0 853 4,985 
California 517.0 563.6 85.6 5.5 250,000 6,495 
Colorado 55.7 30.0 8.9 6.0 567 3,822 
Connecticut 51.2 0.0 18.7 4.0 No 9,605 
Wash, DC 10.7 18.5 4.6 6.0 9,236 2,119 
Delaware 13.5 0.0 5.1 5.0 No 5,153 
Florida 225.9 131.6 33.4 4.0 40,000 4,478 
Georgia 151.2 28.2 22.2 4.0 13,166 3,167 
Hawaii 19.5 23.9 4.9 8.8 No WL 3,801 
Idaho 21.5 8.1 1.2 4.0 No 2,784 
Illinois 202.7 N.A. 56.9 4.0 No 2,385 
Indiana 155.4 4.1 15.4 4.0 14,043 3,754 
Iowa 42.3 28.4 5.1 16.0 No 3,302 
Kansas 44.1 20.4 6.7 16.0 No 3,628 
Kentucky 72.9 36.2 7.3 4.0 No 3,226 
Louisiana 96.7 49.9 5.2 4.0 No 3,441 
Maine 16.7 7.3 1.7 11.7 2,100 11,028 
Maryland 79.0 0.0 23.3 4.0 No 6,428 
Massachusetts 103.8 91.9 45.0 5.1 21,000 7,142 
Michigan 139.5 N.A. 24.4 8.9 No 4,291 
Minnesota 77.9 23.4 19.7 5.0 4,714 5,438 
Mississippi 59.4 N.A. 1.7 4.0 11,200 7,244 
Missouri 92.8 20.7 16.6 8.0 No 3,244 
Montana 13.9 2.0 1.3 4.0 No 2,157 
Nebraska 31.4 9.0 6.5 9.9 No 3,392 
Nevada 24.3 N.A. 2.6 6.2 No 4,372 
New Hampshire 16.1 0.0 4.6 4.0 No 4,516 
New Jersey 109.2 78.8 26.4 4.0 8,724 5,329 
New Mexico 37.7 33.8 2.9 4.0 No WL 2,719 
New York 316.0 N.A. 102.0 16.0 No WL 5,326 
North Carolina 172.1 79.6 37.9 4.0 22,616 3,440 
North Dakota 10.1 N.A. 1.0 4.0 No 2,005 
Ohio 198.4 0.0 45.4 4.6 No 2,735 
Oklahoma 74.1 29.5 10.6 18.0 No 2,078 
Oregon 58.7 0.0 11.3 4.0 No 2,195 
Pennsylvania 181.2 124.5 46.6 15.4 2,599 5,186 
Rhode Island 17.6 8.7 5.3 4.0 No 7,445 
South Carolina 67.9 1.5 4.1 4.0 No WL 3,607 
South Dakota 12.0 N.A. 0.8 18.0 No 3,604 
Tennessee 111.5 50.6 19.0 7.0 12,500 3,095 
Texas 392.1 0.0 27.7 4.0 37,000 3,608 
Utah 46.5 N.A. 4.5 15.8 No WL 2,621 
Vermont 10.3 9.2 2.7 9.0 No 5,232 
Virginia 86.8 9.4 21.3 4.0 2,962 7,898 
Washington 106.7 95.0 38.7 4.0 No 4,776 
West Virginia 31.2 0.0 2.9 4.0 No 3,367 
Wisconsin 83.2 63.2 16.4 4.0 No 5,355 
Wyoming 6.0 3.7 1.6 17.0 No 3,191 
FY2001 average monthly number of Source: ACF (2004) Child Care and Development Fund Report of State Plans FY 2004-
2005 and ACF (2003) Child Care and Development Fund Report to Congress. 
Notes: All dollars are in millions, except for spending per child.  1 Includes only the federal CCDF allocation.  2 Waiting list 
as of March/April 2002. “No WL” indicates that the state does not maintain a waiting list.  3 These figures are derived by 
dividing FY2003 federal and state (including MOE) direct service expenditures by children served by CCDF funds.  N.A. = 





TABLE 1.3: Characteristics of Children and Families Served by CCDF Funds 
State Monthly  
Children  


















Alabama 34,000 14 81 23 7 7.3 
Alaska 6,300 45 44 44 13 6.5 
Arizona 28,100 20 72 13 20 4.9 
Arkansas 9,300 23 76 0 39 7.2 
California 202,000 33 54 27 20 3.0 
Colorado 24,500 34 58 22 18 8.7 
Connecticut 13,700 6 47 47 21 5.1 
Wash, DC 7,500 2 98 52 2 3.6 
Delaware 13,500 38 56 21 15 8.7 
Florida 80,500 12 87 10 16 6.0 
Georgia 57,800 14 82 7 18 4.6 
Hawaii 8,900 45 50 85 56 N.A. 
Idaho 9,700 43 42 45 2 5.1 
Illinois 103,000 35 35 53 25 6.0 
Indiana 38,100 58 38 56 10 2.6 
Iowa 15,300 50 35 24 44 6.5 
Kansas 14,900 17 36 16 9 6.9 
Kentucky 37,700 27 69 23 10 7.2 
Louisiana 38,700 16 69 31 14 6.6 
Maine 2,100 47 46 22 N.A. N.A. 
Maryland 21,000 45 40 25 13 6.9 
Massachusetts 32,700 9 67 10 14 7.8 
Michigan 50,100 44 16 66 18 3.1 
Minnesota 26,400 52 36 37 N.A. 4.1 
Mississippi 8,400 11 78 20 15 2.3 
Missouri 35,900 48 48 41 26 3.6 
Montana 7,200 29 35 12 22 3.3 
Nebraska 12,800 49 40 28 25 9.9 
Nevada 7,000 13 86 24 23 12.0 
New Hampshire 6,600 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 0.1 
New Jersey 44,200 28 69 17 16 8.0 
New Mexico 22,800 52 42 51 25 6.5 
New York 180,800 46 33 49 41 5.5 
North Carolina 81,700 16 83 3 8 7.8 
North Dakota 4,700 43 28 6 10 12.7 
Ohio 84,000 39 61 0 23 4.9 
Oklahoma 38,700 18 82 0 19 6.8 
Oregon 25,600 76 21 55 19 8.0 
Pennsylvania 65,100 36 53 37 9 7.7 
Rhode Island 4,300 30 64 16 34 4.8 
South Carolina 20,300 16 77 15 20 3.1 
South Dakota 3,400 53 35 15 8 8.4 
Tennessee 59,600 18 76 12 26 1.7 
Texas 105,500 14 76 18 16 8.7 
Utah 9,900 57 35 48 20 5.3 
Vermont 3,500 50 43 23 20 4.9 
Virginia 15,900 38 61 13 29 9.5 
Washington 51,200 39 41 32 27 5.2 
West Virginia 7,800 49 48 8 9 3.3 
Wisconsin 26,300 38 61 0 8 7.1 
Wyoming 3,200 39 30 39 85 5.6 
Source: ACF (2003) Child Care and Development Fund Report to Congress and unpublished data. 
Notes: 1 These figures are for FY2001 and are expressed as percents.  2 This figure is for FY2000 and is expressed as a percent.  
















1975-1978 10.0 0-4,000 400 10.0 4,000-8,000 
1979-1984 10.0 0-5,000 500 12.5 6,000-10,000 
1985-1986 11.0 0-5,000 550 12.22 6,500-11,000 
1987 14.0 0-6,080 851 10.0 6,920-15,432 
1988 14.0 0-6,240 874 10.0 9,840-18,576 
1989 14.0 0-6,500 910 10.0 10,240-19,340 























































































































































































Source: 2004 Green Book, Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives.   
Notes: 1 Taxpayers with one qualifying child.  2 Taxpayers with two or more qualifying children.          
3 Single (childless) taxpayer.  4 Phase-out range for non-joint tax filers.  5 Phase-out range for joint tax 





TABLE 1.5: EITC Expenditures and Claimants, 1975-2003 
Year  Total Expenditures  
($ in millions) 
Refunded Portion of 
Credit  ($ in 
millions) 
Number of Families 
(millions) 
Average Credit per  
Family ($) 
1975 1,250 900 6,215 201 
1976 1,295 890 6,473 200 
1977 1,127 880 5,627 200 
1978 1,048 801 5,192 202 
1979 2,052 1,395 7,135 288 
1980 1,986 1,370 6,954 286 
1981 1,912 1,278 6,717 285 
1982 1,775 1,222 6,395 278 
1983 1,795 1,289 7,368 224 
1984 1,638 1,162 6,376 257 
1985 2,088 1,499 7,432 281 
1986 2,009 1,479 7,156 281 
1987 3,391 2,930 8,738 450 
1988 5,896 4,257 11,148 529 
1989 6,595 4,636 11,696 564 
1990 7,542 5,266 12,542 601 
1991 11,105 8,183 13,665 813 
1992 13,028 9,959 14,097 924 
1993 15,537 12,028 15,117 1,028 
1994 21,105 16,598 19,017 1,110 
1995 25,956 20,829 19,334 1,342 
1996 28,825 23,157 19,464 1,481 
1997 30,389 24,396 19,391 1,567 
1998 32,340 27,175 20,273 1,595 
1999 31,901 27,604 19,259 1,656 
2000 32,296 27,803 19,277 1,675 
2001 33,376 29,043 19,593 1,704 
2002 35,784 31,769 19,795 1,808 
2003 34,412 30,869 19,284 1,784 
Source: 2004 Green Book, Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives. 
 





TABLE 1.6: Distribution of EITC Filers and Payments, 2001 
 
All EITC Filers 
 
EITC Filers With One Child 
 
EITC Filers With Two or 
More Children 
 

























































































































Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service: http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/article/0,,id=96586,00.html.  These figures are based on the author’s calculations. 
Notes: N.A. = Not Applicable. 
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Notes: a full sample of single mothers below poverty; b black sample of single mothers below poverty; c white sample of single 
mothers below poverty; d poor women; e near-poor women; f non-poor women; g poor mothers one year after childbirth; h poor 
mothers two years after childbirth; I married women with children under 15; j married women with children under 6; k single 
women with less than a high school education and children under 13; l single women with more than a high school education and 
children under 13; m single women with less than a high school education and children under 6; n single women with more than a 
high school education and children under 6; o married mothers; p single mothers; q married/any employment; r married/employed 
full-time; s single/any employment; t single/employed full-time; u full-time employment; vpart-time employment; w overall 
employment.     
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TABLE 1.8: Summary of Empirical Work on the Labor  
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points from a 
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65.5%.  Wage 
elasticities 
vary between 
1.82 and 1.94.  
Notes: 1 These are the D-in-D estimators and are relative to the change in employment rates within the top quartile of predicted 
wages between 1986 and 1999.  2 Tax rate calculations are based on the change in net-of-tax wages if an individual moves 
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FIGURE 1.1: Summary of Major U.S. Welfare, Child Care, and Tax Policies 






TRA75 Tax Revenue Act 
of 1975 
Created the refundable Earned Income Tax Credit: 
provided a 10% wage subsidy up to a maximum credit of 
$400 to be phased out between AGI $6K and $8K 
CCTC76 Child Care Tax 
Credit of 1976 
Non-refundable credit of up to $4,800 (2+ children); 30% 
credit rate up to AGI $10K, then declines 1 percentage 
point every $2K until AGI hits $28K, where rate is 20% 
RA78 The Revenue Act 
of 1978 
Gave the EITC permanent status; increased the maximum 
credit (to $500) and the eligibility limit (to $10K); 
stipulated the credit would count toward determining 
eligibility and benefit amounts in mean-tested Federal 
and state programs 
OBRA81 Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act 
of 1981 
Changed the AFDC earnings disregard to the first $30 
plus 33.3% of each additional dollar of earnings; lowered 
deductions for child care expenses; decreased the asset 
ceiling to $1,000; lowered income eligibility 
TRA86 Tax Reform Act of 
1986 
Increased the personal exemption and standard 
deduction; expanded the EITC by indexing it for 
inflation, increasing the phase-in rate (to 14%), lowering 
the phase-out rate (to 10%), raising maximum credit to 
$850   
FSA88 Family Support 
Act of 1988 
Created JOBS program; required states to provide work 
supports and employment activities; increased earnings 
disregards for AFDC eligibility and child care benefits; 
required AFDC-UP parents to work 16 hours/week; 
expanded Medicaid coverage; tightened child support 
 
Created AFDC Child Care and Transitional Child Care; 
the former was an open-ended entitlement for AFDC 
recipients; the latter provided aid to former recipients for 
1 year after exiting welfare 
OBRA90 Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act 
of 1990 
Mandated that the EITC was not to be counted as income 
in determining eligibility for means-tested programs; 
increased the phase-in rate for families with 1 child to 
23% by 1994; created a separate rate schedule for 
families with 2+ children, increasing from 14% to 25% 
by 1994 
 
Created At-Risk Child Care and the Child Care and 
Development Block Grant; the former subsidized costs 
for families at risk of using AFDC; the latter provided 
matching funds for quality-improvement and consumer 
education 
OBRA93 Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act 
of 1993 
Created a separate EITC schedule for childless workers; 
increased the one-child credit rate to 34% by 1995; raised 
the two-child credit rate to $40%, for a maximum credit 






















































Federal government granted 43 states a  waiver to 
experiment with work requirements, time limits, and 
family caps 
 






Ended the legal entitlement to aid; pays fixed, close-
ended block grants to states; allows states to impose 
family caps; imposes work requirements after two years 
on welfare and a 60-month time limit on cash assistance; 
allows states to sanction families; provides incentives to 
reduce illegitimacy rate 
 
Created the Child Care and Development Fund; 
consolidated four child care programs; sets eligibility at 
85% of SMI; directs states to use 70% of funds to help 
welfare families (30% go to the working poor); permits 
states to transfer 30% of TANF grant to the CCDF; 
grants states authority over subsidy issues 
TRA97 Taxpayer Relief 
Act of 1997 
Created a child tax credit (non-refundable) of $500, 
which was not indexed for inflation 
 
Improved compliance on the EITC by developing a 
recertification program that allows taxpayers to prove 
their eligibility after an initial disallowance; denies 
benefits for two years among those who fraudulently 
claim the credit and imposing due diligence on tax 
preparers 
 
EGTRRA01 The Economic 




Created a 10% bracket; increased the child tax credit to 
$1,000, made it refundable for those earning over $10K, 
and phased it in at the same income level 
 
Created separate EITC flat and phase-out regions for 
married taxpayers who file jointly; the maximum credit 
applies to an additional $1,000 of earnings and therefore 


































JGTRRA03 The Jobs and 
Growth Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act 
of 2003 
Increased the child tax credit to $1,000 per child for 2003 
and 2004; expanded the 10% tax bracket over the same 
years; granted tax breaks for married couples 
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CHAPTER 2: WHY IS TAKE-UP FOR CHILD CARE SUBSIDIES SO LOW? 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The recent overhaul of the U.S. welfare system through the 1996 Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) included equally 
dramatic changes in the way the federal government provides child care assistance to 
low-income families.  Congress consolidated the patchwork child care subsidy system 
into a single block grant called the Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF).  The 
explicit goal of the new unified system is to help families transition from welfare to work 
and to keep employed families from becoming welfare dependent.  An important 
consequence of these changes has been the steady growth in federal allocations for child 
care subsidies: from $935 million in 1996 to $4.8 billion in 2004 (Administration for 
Children and Families [ACF], 2005). 
Although states are granted substantial flexibility in designing and implementing 
their subsidy regimes, the bulk of CCDF funds go toward direct services for child care 
assistance.19  Indeed, expenditures on direct services represent a large and growing share 
of states’ total expenditures in the period following welfare reform.20  The growth in 
spending, however, raises several questions about the extent to which eligible families 
receive child care assistance—hereafter called the take-up rate—and why those who are 
eligible do not.  Early estimates suggest that the take-up rate for subsidies is low relative 
to other targeted work supports, such as the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC).  For 
example, a 1999 ACF report found that 12 percent to 15 percent of eligible children 
                                                 
19 There are some federal requirements, however.  For example, PRWORA stipulates that states must spend no less than four percent 
of their CCDF allocation on quality improvement activities.   
20 In FY1999, spending on direct services constituted 82% of states’ total expenditures, compared to 85% by FY2004.   
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receive subsidies, while fully 80 percent to 86 percent of eligible taxpayers receive the 
EITC (ACF, 1999; Scholz, 1994). 
However, to my knowledge, no study has thus far described the characteristics of 
the eligible non-recipient subsidy population, nor has there been a systematic treatment of 
potential explanations for why many eligible households do not receive child care 
assistance.  The aim of this chapter, therefore, is to provide new estimates on eligibility 
and take-up rates for CCDF child care subsidies, and to explore factors related to take-up.  
In doing so, the analysis proceeds in three broad steps.  First, it simulates state-specific 
eligibility rules for a sample of households with children under age 13, and calculates 
eligibility and take-up rates for several policy-relevant sub-groups.  Second, the chapter 
provides a descriptive portrait of demographic, economic, and child care characteristics 
for eligible recipient and non-recipient households.  Finally, the chapter explores in a 
multivariate context the correlates of household eligibility and take-up, with a focus on 
state policies that influence both outcomes. 
To focus the chapter, much of the analysis and discussion concentrates on several 
propositions often advanced to explain why many eligible households do not receive 
child care subsidies.  The first explanation is that eligible non-recipient households are 
different from their recipient counterparts in ways that make subsidies unnecessary or 
undesirable.  Examples of such differences include the presence of relatives or another 
adult that provide free child care.  A second reason deals with the way states structure 
their eligibility and benefit policies.  Specifically, states face a trade-off between the 
breadth of eligibility and the depth of benefits, such that regimes with more generous 
benefit structures are likely to be matched with more stringent eligibility policies.  Third, 
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states are not aggressively promoting awareness of subsidy programs, and the current 
strategies are largely ineffective.  A final reason put forth is that many states do not have 
the financial resources to keep pace with the demand for subsidies—as evidenced by the 
presence of waiting lists—and therefore states must ration benefits in a way that makes 
some eligible households more likely to receive subsidies than other households. 
The analyses use data from the 2002 National Survey of America’s Families 
(NSAF) collected by the Urban Institute.  This dataset is ideal for the goals of this 
chapter, since it oversamples low-income households and collects detailed information on 
subsidy receipt and child care arrangements.  Eligibility for child care subsidies is 
simulated based on state policies in 2001, and focuses on rules defining “acceptable” 
work activities and income eligibility limits. 
I find that although 28 percent of households with children under age 13 are 
eligible for child care subsidies, take-up is just 14 percent, well within the range of 
previous estimates.  There is, however, substantial variation across household-types.  For 
example, fully 70 percent female-headed households receiving TANF are eligible for 
subsidies, with a take-up rate approaching 30 percent.  I also find important differences in 
the distribution of demographic, economic, and child care characteristics between eligible 
recipient and non-recipient households.  Eligible recipient households are more likely to 
be headed by young, single females with fewer relatives but greater numbers of young 
children in the household.  Interestingly, eligible recipients are simultaneously more 
likely to be engaged in a work activity and have an attachment to another means-tested 
program, such as TANF or food stamps.  Furthermore, a higher proportion of these 
households use paid sources of child care, are more likely to pay for child care, but when 
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they do, pay less than their eligible non-recipient counterparts.   Finally, there is evidence 
to support the claim that states substitute some generosity in eligibility for additional 
generosity in benefits, and that financially constrained states appear to be rationing 
subsidies in a way that targets specific household characteristics. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows.  Section 2.2 provides an 
overview of current child care subsidy policy and summarizes related research on take-up 
rates.  Section 2.3 introduces the data sources and discusses the process by which 
eligibility is simulated.  Section 2.4 presents the results, and Section 2.5 concludes. 
2.2 Overview of U.S. Child Care Subsidy Policy and Related Research 
 
The barrier to employment posed by child care costs gained increased prominence 
in the wake of historic welfare reform passed in 1996.  The PRWORA eliminated the 
legal entitlement to cash welfare and child care assistance for low-income families.  
Congress repealed Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), which was the 
primary public assistance program for nearly 60 years, and replaced it with Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families (TANF).  The legislation imposes strict work requirements 
on recipients, places a 60-month lifetime limit on welfare, sanctions families that fail to 
comply with work activities, and devolves to states substantial authority to develop their 
own reform approaches. 
Due to its strong work mandates, the 1996 PRWORA restructured the federal 
government’s role in providing child care assistance.  Congress repealed the AFDC-CC, 
TCC, and ARCC programs, and along with CCDBG money, consolidated these funding 
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streams into a single Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF).21  There are three 
primary elements to CCDF funding.  Each state receives a pre-determined share of 
federal mandatory funds, which remain constant over time.  States also qualify for 
matching grants, provided they meet certain Maintenance of Effort (MOE) requirements 
(i.e. maintain or exceed pre-CCDF spending levels).  Finally, the legislation authorizes 
nearly $1 billion in discretionary money that does not require a state match (Long & 
Clark, 1997).  Overall, PRWORA allocated $21 billion of child care over a seven year 
period, 70 percent of which must be targeted at direct services for families receiving 
TANF or transitioning from welfare into work (Greenberg, Lombardi, & Schumacher, 
2000). 
Eligibility for CCDF funds is set at 85% of the state median income (SMI), 
although states can and do establish lower ceilings.  In fact, just three states currently set 
income eligibility at or above 85% of SMI (Schulman & Blank, 2005).22  States are also 
given substantial flexibility in designing their subsidy systems, including being able to 
transfer up to 30 percent of their TANF block grant to the CCDF, setting reimbursement 
and co-payment rates, and defining acceptable work activities.  However, PRWORA 
stipulates that states must spend no less than four percent of their annual CCDF allocation 
on quality improvement activities.  Furthermore, a market rate survey must be conducted 
every two years so as to ensure that subsidy families have “equal access” to high-quality 
providers.  Results from the survey are used to set payment rates at or greater than the 
75th percentile of what the local market is charging.  The law also suggests that co-
                                                 
21 The acronyms are as follows: AFDC Child Care, Transitional Child Care, At-Risk child Care, and Child Care and Development 
Block Grant.   
22 The three states are Maine, Mississippi, and Texas.  However, in Texas, local jurisdictions set their own eligibility thresholds, 
leading to a range between 50% and 85% of SMI.   
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payments are considered affordable if families do not spend more than 10 percent of their 
income on child care. 
Data on subsidy take-up are starting to emerge from various sources.  Although it 
appears that states are serving a large number of children in any given month, recent 
evidence suggests that only 12 percent to 15 percent of eligible children currently receive 
assistance (ACF, 1999).  Findings from a recent U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) 
(1999) study confirm this, estimating that states are serving no more than 15 percent of 
the CCDF-eligible population.  More recent work based on a microsimulation model 
suggests that as of October 1999 9.7 million children and 5.8 million families were 
eligible for subsidies, although take-up rates were not calculated. (Oliver, Phillips, 
Giannarelli, & Chen, 2002). 
Rates of subsidy receipt have also been estimated for various sub-groups.  For 
example, Schumacher and Greenberg’s (1999) analysis of welfare leaver studies found 
that less than half of employed leavers receive subsidies in all states examined and less 
than 30 percent in a majority of states.  This is corroborated by Loprest (1999), who 
found that 20 percent of welfare leavers received a subsidy in the first three months after 
exiting.  Other research estimates that 21 percent of low-income families receive 
assistance from the government (or other organization), compared to eight percent among 
higher-income families (Giannarelli, Adelman, Schmidt, 2003).23  These authors also 
found that 28 percent of single-parent families and 34 percent of TANF families receive 
child care assistance from government or organizational entities.  Finally, using data from 
the 1999 NSAF, Tekin (2004a) estimates that approximately 13 percent of employed 
                                                 
23 The authors define “help from government assistance or other organization” as that which comes from paying for child care on a 
sliding scale, paying less because of family income, assistance from welfare or social services agencies, and help coming from sources 
other than individuals or an employer.  Note that government assistance through the tax code, specifically the Child Care Tax Credit, 
was omitted by the authors.  Low-income was defined as family income below 200% of the FPL.       
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single mothers receive a child care subsidy, which appears to be a comparatively low 
estimate. 




Data for this chapter come from several sources, principally the 2002 wave of the 
National Survey of America’s Families (NSAF) collected by the Urban Institute.24  The 
2002 NSAF was conducted during the early part of 2002, focusing on the economic, 
health, and social characteristics of children, adults under the age of 65, and households 
more generally.  Interviews were conducted with over 40,000 families, producing 
detailed information on over 100,000 individuals.  The survey is representative of the 
civilian, non-institutional population under age 65.  Among the distinctive sampling 
features of the NSAF are its foci on families in 13 states and families below 200 percent 
of the federal poverty line. 
This chapter draws extensively from the NSAF’s “focal child” file, which 
contains information on subsidy receipt and child care arrangements and expenditures.  
This file is structured such that up to two randomly selected focal children were targeted 
during the initial household screening.  Information was then gathered on one child under 
the age of 6 and another child between ages 6 and 17.25  Questions on all non-parental 
child care arrangements—including child care centers, family-based providers, relatives, 
and Head Start—were directed at respondents with children ages 0 to 12, regardless of 
the caretaker’s employment status.  This chapter focuses on the regular, primary child 
                                                 
24 Appendix 2.4 provides a detailed description of all data sources used in this chapter.  
25 Irrespective of the number of children in each age group, just one child per age category was sampled.  Data on the focal children 
were collected from the “most knowledgeable adult,” the individual in household who knows the most about each child’s health and 
education.  Often, but not always, the MKA is the householder, and there are cases in which each child has a different MKA.    
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care arrangement, defined as the one used at least once per week during the past month 
and in which the focal child spent the greatest number of hours while the respondent 
worked.  Questions on child care expenditures were also asked of each respondent, but 
the reported amounts reflect what was paid for all child care arrangements and all 
children in the household. 
As noted in Appendix 2.4, data on state-specific eligibility rules come from 
multiple sources.  The Children’s Defense Fund’s A Fragile Foundation (2001) report 
provided information on work requirements, while the State Developments report yielded 
information on income and earnings deductions.  Income eligibility limits and other state-
specific eligibility data were gathered from the Child Care Bureau’s biennial State Plans 
report, as well as unpublished data from the Bureau. 
The final analysis sample consists of 19,066 households with at least one child 
under age 13.26  Table 2.1 provides summary statistics for the sample of NSAF 
households.  Approximately 88 percent of household heads are employed, and 14 percent 
of households receive TANF, food stamps, or both.  Not surprisingly, female-headed 
households are much more likely to receive public assistance (36 percent).  In addition, 
these women are slightly younger and have fewer years of education than other 
household heads.  A similar proportion of households have younger children (ages 0 to 5) 
and older children (ages 6 to 17)—approximately 38 percent—but fewer households have 
children in both age groups (25 percent).  Slight differences exist across household-types, 
with female-headed households less likely to have younger children and more likely to 
have older children than other households.  Table 2.1 also presents descriptive statistics 
                                                 
26 Deletions from the sample were made for the following reasons: the householder was under age 18 or over age 64; total household 
earnings were less than zero; and the householder’s marital status was unknown.   
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for selected characteristics of states’ subsidy regimes.  Two-thirds of households are 
located in states with a waiting list, while nearly three-quarters reside in states that 
guarantee subsidies for TANF households.  Finally, the average state sets its weekly 
reimbursement rate for infant care at $164. 
Simulating Eligibility for Child Care Subsidies 
 
This section describes the process by which NSAF households were deemed 
eligible for CCDF child care subsidies.27  The methodology described here produces a 
measure of “technical eligibility,” meaning that states’ rules are applied strictly, 
consistently, and without regard to budget status or administrative idiosyncrasies.28  As 
previously stated, this chapter simulates state-specific work activity and income 
eligibility rules for 2001.  Evidence suggests that states began responding to deteriorating 
fiscal conditions around this time by making significant changes to their subsidy regimes 
(GAO, 2003).29  Therefore, some of the eligibility rules applied in this chapter likely 
changed at some point during 2001, and so the forthcoming simulations should be viewed 
as a snapshot of states’ subsidy regimes. 
Eligibility is determined along three dimensions: the age of the child in question, 
parental work status, and household income.  Generally speaking, a child must be under 
age 13, but special needs children are eligible until they reach age 19.  States also 
stipulate that parents must be involved in an acceptable work activity.  Significant 
variation exists in types of work activities that are deemed acceptable, the households to 
                                                 
27 Figure 2.1 provides additional information on the steps taken to determine eligibility for child care subsidies.  Appendix 2.5 
provides detailed information on how the indicator of child care subsidy receipt was created.   
28 Only published and clearly-defined eligibility rules are applied in this methodology.  It ignores requirements that are presented 
inconsistently or are indiscernible in published materials, and it obviously does not account for the informal and idiosyncratic 
procedures applied by states.      
29 For example, 23 states altered eligibility and benefits rules that lead to decreases in the availability of child care assistance.  Among 
these changes include lowering income eligibility limits, initiating waiting lists, and raising co-payment rates.   
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which these activities apply, and the number of hours per week that a parent must 
participate in a given activity.  Generally speaking, states accept formal employment and 
job search activities, as well as enrollment in post-secondary education and job training 
programs.  Furthermore, states treat TANF and non-TANF households quite differently 
when defining acceptable work activities and the amount of time one must spend 
performing it.  The final set of rules deals with household income.  States first determine 
countable income by applying income/earnings deductions and disregards, which is then 
compared to, and must be lower than, its income eligibility threshold.  As noted in the 
previous section, federal rules dictate that household income cannot exceed 85 percent of 
SMI, but states may set their eligibility threshold lower than the federal limit. 
It is important to note at this point that the unit of analysis is the household, and 
therefore eligibility is determined at the household level.  This nomenclature is slightly 
different from previous studies, which define subfamilies as separate family units 
(Giannarelli, Adelman, & Schmidt, 2003; Oliver, et al., 2002).  However, given the small 
number subfamilies in the NSAF and my assumption that primary and secondary families 
function as one “economic unit,” determining eligibility at the household level appears to 
be a reasonable approach.  Moreover, this approach is bolstered by the fact that a 
plurality of states consider income from “all household members” when determining 
eligibility, as opposed to income from just the parents or legal guardian (ACF, 2002).  
The primary implication of this nomenclature is that just one eligible child must be 
present for the entire household to be deemed eligible, even if that child is unrelated to 
the householder or resides in a separate subfamily. 
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Another critical point, stated in Oliver, et al. (2002), is that in practice eligibility 
for CCDF subsidies is determined on a monthly basis.  Although states authorize 
payments for six or 12 months, after which the household undergoes a recertification 
process, some states require households to report changes in employment and income on 
a monthly basis.  This stands in contrast to the present study, which considers the 
householder’s employment status at a single point in time and sums income over 12 
months.  The unavailability of monthly employment and income data means that I will 
classify as ineligible some high-income households with very small incomes in some 
months; conversely, I will classify as eligible some low-income households with very 
large incomes in some months.  Clearly, it would be imprudent to assume from the results 
in this chapter that a given household was eligible for the entire year. 
Figure 2.1 displays the process by which NSAF households were determined to 
be eligible for CCDF child care subsidies.  Since the sample includes only households 
with at least one child under age 13, every household meets the first major eligibility 
criterion.  Nearly every state allows special needs children ages 13 and over (but under 19 
years old) to receive subsidies, and at least one study attempted to include these children 
in its eligibility calculations (Oliver, et al., 2002).  However, the official language 
defining “special needs” is convoluted, making it difficult to operationalize in the NSAF 
dataset.  This study therefore focuses on eligibility among children under age 13, 
irrespective of the child’s disability status. 
The first major task was to split up the sample according to whether the household 
receives TANF and/or food stamps, and then simulate states’ rules for acceptable work 
activities.  Splitting up the sample in this manner is necessary because, as shown in 
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Figure 2.1, states’ work requirements are quite different for TANF and non-TANF 
households.  This study focuses on the work participation of the householder, and it 
simulates the following activities: formal employment, job searching, participation in 
post-secondary education, and enrollment in a job training program.30  Note that several 
work activities (post-secondary education and job training) require participants to be 
employed as well, and many states specify a minimum number of work hours per week in 
order to maintain eligibility.  However, this study simulates only participation in formal 
employment, and not hours of participation, among those in post-secondary education 
and job training.  If the householder fulfills the work requirements in his/her state of 
residence, income eligibility rules are then applied to the household’s income, a process 
described next.  Householder’s who do not meet the state’s work activity rules are 
deemed ineligible for subsidies. 
The second step involved the application of states’ income eligibility rules to 
households that met the work requirements described above.  As shown in Figure 2.1, 
two steps characterize this process: first, countable household income was calculated by 
applying income deductions and disregards, and second, countable income was compared 
to state-specific income eligibility limits.  Households with total countable income below 
a given state’s eligibility threshold were considered eligible for child care subsidies.  
Deductions and disregards are used by states to lower a household’s countable income.  
The former typically subtracts a flat percent of earned income or medical expenses, while 
the latter excludes sources of non-wage income, such as cash assistance and child 
support.  In 2001, five states used an income deduction, and nearly every state 
                                                 
30 In some cases, the householder is not the biological parent of the child in question.  However, this is of no consequence because 
CCDF rules provide a very broad definition of “parent” in its final ruling: “a parent by blood, marriage, or adoption…also a legal 
guardian, or other person standing in loco parentis” (http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ccb/policy1/current/finalrul/fr072498.pdf).     
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disregarded at least one source of income.  Once countable income was calculated for 
each household, states’ income eligibility thresholds—which vary by family-size—were 
compared to household income.31  Households meeting the work activity and income 




This section begins by presenting evidence on eligibility and take-up for child 
care subsidies among NSAF households with at least one child under age 13.  Eligibility 
and take-up rates are calculated for several household-types and across several policy-
relevant sub-groups.  The discussion then turns to the issue of explaining why take-up for 
child care subsidies is relatively low.  It does so by presenting a descriptive portrait of 
eligible recipient and non-recipient households, with comparisons provided for 
demographic, economic, and child care characteristics.  It ends with the estimation of 
eligibility and take-up probits, and a simulation of these outcomes based on several 
household and policy scenarios. 
Eligibility and Take-up Rates for Child Care Subsidies 
 
As shown in Table 2.2, nearly three in 10 households (28 percent) are eligible for 
child care subsidies, but take-up is just 14 percent.  Not surprisingly, female-headed 
households are more likely to be eligible and take-up (52 percent and 23 percent, 
respectively) than their male-headed and two-parent counterparts.  Eligibility and take-up 
rates are also higher among TANF households and those below the poverty line.  A 
                                                 
31 Unfortunately, the income eligibility data only cover households with up to five members.  Although it would be ideal to have these 
data for households of all sizes, I am still able to cover approximately 90% of all NSAF families with the available information.  
Households of six and over are assigned the same income eligibility limit as those with five members.  
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substantial proportion of households between 100 percent and 200 percent of the poverty 
line remain eligible (70 percent, with take-up around 13 percent), but these figures 
decline precipitously among households with incomes above 200 percent of poverty.  
Interestingly, a nontrivial proportion of TANF leavers as a whole are eligible for and 
take-up child care subsidies, but important differences exist by the stated reason for 
leaving welfare.  While nearly identical proportions of “decision” and “cut-off” leavers 
are eligible (around 70 percent)—indicating similar levels of need—decision leavers are 
much more likely to take-up: 30 percent compared to 21 percent.32  This suggests that 
households forced off TANF by the welfare office either feel stigmatized and will not 
attempt to secure additional government benefits, or they are under the impression that 
the receipt of child care subsidies is tied to the receipt of welfare.  The latter reason 
appears to coincide with evidence documenting a decline in food stamp enrollments 
among welfare leavers, because many individuals believe they are no longer eligible for 
such benefits (Zedlewski, 2004).33  Finally, the findings in Table 2.2 imply that subsidy 
take-up decreases as the child’s age increases: 16 percent of eligible households with 
children ages 0 to 5 (only) receive subsidies, compared to a take-up rate of nine percent 
among households with children ages 6 to 12 (only). 
A close examination of Table 2.2 reveals fairly low take-rates for child care 
subsidies, markedly lower than other targeted work supports, such as the EITC.  The low 
take-up rates persist across household-type, in many cases even among female-headed 
households.  In fact, the vast majority of estimates provided in Table 2.2 suggest that 
take-up is solidly in the range of 15 percent to 25 percent, whereas eligibility often 
                                                 
32 As stated in Table 2.2, “cut-off” leavers are those who were forced off TANF by the welfare office, while “decision” leavers are 
those who left on their own.   
33 The food stamp caseload declined 40 percent between 1994 and 2000, but has recently started growing again.    
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exceeds 60 percent.  The remainder of this section therefore explores factors related to 
subsidy take-up, focusing on several propositions that have been advanced to explain 
why many eligible households do not receive such assistance. 
Descriptive Analyses of Eligible Recipient and Non-recipient Households 
 
Tables 2.3-2.5 provide information on the distribution of demographic, economic, 
and child care characteristics of eligible households.  The first column in each table 
displays the eligibility and take-up rate for a given household attribute, while the 
remaining columns provide data on the distribution of that attribute across eligible 
households.  Comparisons between eligible recipient and non-recipient households are 
given in the fourth and fifth columns.  These comparisons will guide the forthcoming 
discussion. 
As shown in Tables 2.3-2.5, I find significant differences between eligible 
households that receive (recipient) and do not receive (non-recipient) child care subsidies.  
Looking first at Table 2.3, I find that although 40 percent of all eligible households are 
headed by a single female, fully 64 percent of recipient and just 35 percent of non-
recipient households are headed by single women.  This suggests that significantly fewer 
two-parent households are being offered child care subsidies, or conditional on an offer, 
are more likely to turn them down, opting instead to use one of the parents to provide 
child care.  Householders in eligible recipient households tend to be younger and more 
likely to be minority than their non-recipient counterparts.  Interestingly, recipient 
householders appear to be more skilled: 42 percent of these householders have at least 
some college education, while 34 percent of non-recipient householders have such 
training.  This indicates the practice of “creaming” by state administrators.  Moreover, 
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consistent with the belief that subsidies are targeted at households with young children, I 
find that 44 percent of recipient households have at least one child under age 5, but only 
21 percent of these households have a child ages 6 to 12.  The comparable numbers for 
eligible non-recipient households are 37 percent and 36 percent, respectively.  Finally, 
there is evidence to suggest that non-recipient households are more likely to have access 
to informal child care providers, thereby obviating the need for subsidies.  Non-recipient 
households tend to be larger and have a greater number of relatives on average than their 
recipient counterparts.  Perhaps most importantly, a significantly higher proportion of 
non-recipient households contain an older adult (other than the parent). 
Turning now to Table 2.4, I find equally dramatic differences with respect 
households’ economic characteristics.  Consistent with the “strings attached” nature of 
child care subsidies, as well as much empirical evidence, a significantly greater 
proportion of eligible recipient households are involved in at least one work activity.  The 
story changes, however, when we consider the extent of work effort.  Part-time work is 
more prevalent among recipient households (33 percent versus 26 percent), and full-time 
work is more prevalent among non-recipient households (74 percent versus 67 percent).  
This finding coincides with economic theory on the incentives created by child care 
subsidies: as earnings grow, co-payment rates—acting as implicit taxes—also increase, 
thereby creating a disincentive to increase work effort (or hours of work).34  However, the 
inverse interpretation may also be true, in the sense that as co-payments rise (because 
earnings increase) households are more likely to leave the subsidy system and switch to 
informal, unpaid sources of child care.  Finally, eligible recipient households appear to be 
                                                 
34 Given that these findings are based on simple percentages (and not conditioned on other factors), the above interpretation should be 
viewed as preliminary.      
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more attached to other sources of government assistance.  For example, fully 36 percent 
of such households are insured by a public program, compared 20 percent among non-
recipient households.  Rates of TANF and food stamp receipt are also significantly higher 
among households receiving child care subsidies, and interestingly, a higher proportion 
of recipient households receive income from child support.  These findings again imply 
several interpretations.  One is that households already involved with the cash assistance 
system do not feel as stigmatized about participating in another program.  Another 
interpretation is that once households are enrollment in one public program, it is easier 
for agencies to identify other programs for which it might be eligible or need.  A final 
interpretation is it simply reflects states’ preferences to target child care subsidies at 
households receiving cash assistance, so they eventually work their way off welfare.35 
The final table, Table 2.5, focuses on the child care arrangements and 
expenditures of eligible recipient and non-recipient households.  Given the evidence that 
child care arrangements vary dramatically by the age of the child, three sets of findings 
are presented: those for children ages 0 to 4, children age 5, and children ages 6 to 12 
(Sonenstein, Gates, Schmidt, & Bolshun, 2002).  Across all three age groups, we find that 
recipient households are more likely to use paid sources of child care, such as center- and 
family-based services.  For example, fully 40 percent of eligible recipient children ages 0 
to 4 are in a center-based environment, while just 18 percent of eligible non-recipient 
children use these services.  The predominant child care mode among non-recipient 
households is parent care.  These findings, although descriptive, are consistent with 
economic models of child care subsidies, as well as much empirical evidence, which 
                                                 
35 Indeed, Blau and Tekin (2001) find that child care subsidies simultaneously increase the likelihood that single mothers are employed 
and receiving welfare.  Some of the effect is due to a true behavioral relationship, but undoubtedly some part of the effect is also due 
to the fact that state agencies are targeting benefits at those who are either employed or receiving public assistance.   
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suggest subsidies create an incentive to switch to paid sources of child care (Blau, 2001; 
Tekin, 2004b).36  This interpretation should be evaluated against the possibility that 
recipient households were already using paid sources of care prior to receiving a subsidy, 
and therefore subsidies became an attractive method for defraying child care costs.  Not 
surprisingly, given the above findings, a much higher share of recipient households pay 
some amount for child care services.  As shown in Table 2.5, three-fourths of such 
households with children ages 0 to 4 pay for child care, while just one-quarter of their 
non-recipient counterparts do.  But among households in both groups that do pay 
something for child care, recipient households pay less per month on average: $261 
versus $314.37 
In sum, I find substantial differences between eligible recipient and non-recipient 
households.  Many of these differences persist across demographic, economic, and child 
care characteristics.  Specifically, recipient households are more likely to be headed by 
young, single women with slightly more education, and more likely to have young 
children.  Moreover, a greater share of eligible recipient householders are engaged in at 
least one work activity, including formal employment, but are less likely to work full-
time.  Participation in other means-tested programs is higher among recipient households, 
suggesting that states view them as “priorities.”  Finally, I find support for several 
arguments advanced by others to explain the low take-up rate.  Eligible non-recipient 
households tend to be larger, have a greater number of relatives, and are more likely to 
                                                 
36 This appears to be corroborated by the multivariate results, which will be discussed in the next section.  Appendices 2.1 – 2.3 
estimate the eligibility and take-up equations that include controls for the type of child care arrangement used by the household.  
Specifically, Appendix 2.3 shows that take-up is significantly higher among households using center- and family-based services 
(parent care is the omitted category).  
37 It is important to note that the NSAF does not collect child care expenditure data on a per-child or per-child care arrangement basis.  
Rather, expenditures are reported for all children and across all arrangements.  Therefore, the expenditures in Table 2.5 should not be 
interpreted as the amount paid for just the child in a given age group; it is the total amount paid by a household with a child in a given 
age group.      
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have an older adult present—all of which suggest that non-recipient households have 
greater access to unpaid sources of child care.  This argument is bolstered by the fact that 
non-recipient households are more likely to use parent and relative care, while recipient 
households appear to be using center- and family-based services. 
Correlates of Household Eligibility and Take-up 
 
This section explores in a multivariate context factors related to household 
eligibility and take-up for child care subsidies.  Table 2.6 provides estimates from the 
eligibility model, and Tables 2.7 and 2.8 provide results from the take-up model.  All 
equations are estimated with probit regression, and robust standard errors are calculated 
to correct for heteroskedasticity.  Marginal effects are displayed in the tables for ease of 
interpretation.  This section concludes with a series of policy simulations, the results of 
which are presented in Table 2.9.  As in the previous section, much of the discussion will 
focus on testing several explanations for why many eligible households not receive child 
care assistance.  Specifically, I attempt to discern whether states trade-off generosity in 
eligibility with the generosity of benefits; whether states’ policies—especially those 
aimed at increasing awareness of subsidy programs—are related to eligibility and take-
up; and whether states ration benefits according to specific household characteristics. 
It should be noted that the results presented in this section are purely descriptive 
in nature.  The equations are not derived from a formal theoretical model, and therefore 
the parameter estimates should not be viewed as having some underlying behavioral 
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meaning.38  Many of the included predictors, however, match those originating in formal 
models of subsidy receipt, including the one developed by Tekin (2004a). 
Results from the subsidy eligibility equation are presented in Table 2.6.  The 
model is estimated on the full sample of NSAF households.  The first column presents 
marginal effects for a model that includes only household characteristics, while the 
second column adds work activities for the householder.  The last two columns include 
estimates of state policies.  Formally, the probit equation is specified as follows: 
[2.1]     Pr[eligiblei = 1 | x] = Φ{α + β1Hi + β2Ei + β3Pi + µr + εi}, 
where eligiblei is a binary indicator for whether the i
th household is eligible for child care 
subsidies, and Hi, Ei, and Pi  represent matrices of household characteristics, the 
householder’s employment status, and state policies, respectively.  The β’s are estimated 
parameters, µr, is a matrix of region fixed effects, and εi is a disturbance term. 
Since the CCDF delivers its benefits through means-testing (i.e., household income is a 
major determinant of eligibility), parameter estimates derived from [2.1] can usefully be 
thought of as indicators of economic need for child care subsidies.  However, as will be 
shown, state policy choices also affect the likelihood a household will be eligible, even 
after accounting for its level of need. 
Nearly all of the coefficients in Table 2.6 take on the expected sign and are 
statistically significant at conventional levels.  Single, female-headed households and 
                                                 
38 Even predictors derived from a theoretical framework are problematic.  Recent research, including Tekin (2004a), treat subsidy 
receipt as a “choice” variable, that is, the decision to receive a child care subsidy is modeled as a function of household characteristics 
and state policies.  As such, the parameter estimates from this model imply some underlying behavioral meaning.  However, for 
several reasons, I do not believe subsidy receipt should be treated as a choice variable.  Receipt of a child care subsidy is conditional 
on an offer made to a household by a state agency.  Although it is difficult, if not impossible, to know the offer rate for subsidies (itself 
a problem), intuition and indirect evidence suggest that offer rates are very low.  First, if offer rates were higher, take-up rates would 
also likely be higher.  Second, nearly half of all states currently have waiting lists, thus limiting states’ ability to make offers to 
eligible households.  Finally, the nature of CCDF funding (close-ended block grants) suggests that states cannot substantially increase 
(or decrease) offer rates in response to changing demand or economic conditions.  For these reasons, it is difficult to believe that 
subsidy take-up is a matter of choice for households, and therefore the parameter estimates derived from a subsidy equation cannot 
reflect an underlying set of household preferences for child care subsidies.               
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those headed minorities are more likely to be eligible for child care subsidies.  Not 
surprisingly, the likelihood of eligibility decreases as the householder’s educational level 
increases, and as non-wage income increases.  Receipt of public assistance (TANF/food 
stamps) is associated with a 27 – 37 percentage point increase in the probability of being 
eligible for subsidies, depending on the model, suggesting that most of these household 
fulfill the income and work activity requirements.  As shown in the second column, 
householder participation in all three work activities is related to eligibility, especially 
those involved in non-employment activities (job training and education, for example).  
This most likely reflects the fact that household income is extremely low, and that a 
majority of states count job training and education as acceptable work activities. 
Looking at columns three and four, I find that several state polices are 
significantly related to eligibility, although sometimes in unexpected ways.  Households 
in states that exempt any income when determining eligibility and which guarantee 
subsidies for TANF families are significantly more likely to be eligible.  However, this 
latter effect appears to be offset by the lower eligibility propensity among households in 
states that give TANF families “priority,” a somewhat surprising result.  In addition, 
states’ awareness and access strategies appear to have mixed results.  Although a 
nontrivial proportion of NSAF households are “exposed” to one or more of these 
strategies, the use of mass media to distribute subsidy information is the only one with a 
positive and significant association with eligibility.39 
Finally, the last three variables in column four—states’ use of tiered 
reimbursement rates for odd-hour and quality care and the waiver of co-payments for 
                                                 
39 Fully 40 percent of the NSAF sample resides in states that use mass media; 32 percent are in states that post subsidy information on 
its website; and 27 percent allow households to complete/submit an application over the over web or through the mail.    
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poor families—represent an indirect test of whether states trade-off generosity in 
eligibility for additional generosity in benefits.  Each policy is an indicator of states’ 
benefit generosity, and so its inclusion in an eligibility equation tests the existence and 
direction of such a trade-off.  Indeed, the results suggest there is evidence for the 
proposition that households residing in states with more generous benefit regimes are less 
likely to be eligible, ceteris paribus.  In fact, the coefficient on each variable suggests that 
households in states with all three policies are 14 percentage points less likely to be 
eligible for child care subsidies. 
Results from the subsidy receipt and take-up equations are presented in Tables 2.7 
and 2.8.40  Table 2.7 presents marginal effects for the basic receipt and take-up equations, 
while Table 2.8 estimates the take-up probit separately for states with (WL) and without 
(NWL) a waiting list.  Using the presence of a waiting list as a proxy for states’ financial 
constraints, this model explores whether WL states ration benefits according certain 
household characteristics.  The subsidy receipt equation is estimated on the full sample of 
NSAF households, and the take-up equation includes only the sub-sample of eligible 
households.  Several other papers describe results from subsidy receipt equations, and so 
this discussion will focus on take-up (Tekin, 2004a; Tekin, 2004b). 
Looking at the last two columns in Table 2.7, it is immediately clear that fewer 
variables are statistically significant than in the eligibility equation, a clear indication that 
many eligible households do not receive child care subsidies.  In fact, states appear to be 
targeting very specific types of households: single, female-headed households and those 
headed by blacks; households with younger children (ages 0 to 5) as opposed to older 
children (ages 6 to 12); households receiving public assistance; those participating in at 
                                                 
40 Since the form of the receipt/take-up probit is identical to the eligibility probit, the will model will not be re-stated here.   
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least one major work activity; and to a lesser extent households transitioning off welfare.  
Interestingly, conditional on eligibility, increases in non-wage income are not related to 
take-up.  Neither household size nor the presence of another older adult are related to 
take-up propensity, suggesting that states do not favor households without access to 
informal child care.41  For those eligible households offered a subsidy, this finding could 
also mean that child care subsidies are equally desirable to those with and without 
sources of informal care. 
States’ policy choices, moreover, appear to have mixed effects on take-up.  The 
presence of a waiting list decreases take-up propensity by 6.5 percentage points, 
ostensibly because offer rates are lower in states with budget constraints.  There is some 
evidence that states with more generous benefits also have higher take-up rates: eligible 
households in states that waive co-payments for poor families and that have tiered 
reimbursement rates are more likely to receive a child care subsidy.  Conditional on being 
eligible, however, states’ awareness strategies do not appear to be associated with subsidy 
receipt.  This finding, coupled with the results from the eligibility equation, suggest that 
states’ awareness and access strategies are largely ineffective. 
Table 2.8 displays the results of take-up probit estimated separately for NWL and 
WL states.  The purpose of this analysis is to explore whether the correlates of subsidy 
take-up differ across households according to their waiting list environment.  As 
previously stated, the presence of a waiting list is assumed to indicate a state’s limited 
financial ability to meet its demand for child care subsidies.  If the parameter estimates 
are indeed different between the models, there are likely “structural” dissimilarities 
                                                 
41 The number of relatives in the household was also tested in the model (in place of household size) and was found to be non-
significant as well.   
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across these states’ policy environments.  One manifestation of such a structural 
difference is that states with a waiting list may ration benefits according to specific 
household characteristics. 
The story emerging from Table 2.8 suggests that WL states are structurally 
different from NWL states, and therefore are likely rationing child care subsidies to 
certain households.  Eligible minority households are significantly more likely to receive 
a subsidy in WL states, but they are no more likely to receive a subsidy in NWL states.  
Furthermore, there is an increased likelihood of take-up among higher-skilled households 
in WL states, implying that states are “creaming” as a method for distributing child care 
assistance.  The presence of younger children (ages 0 to 5) is associated with greater take-
up propensity in WL states, whereas in NWL states the age of the child does not matter.  
Larger households are less likely to receive a subsidy in WL states, suggesting that 
financially constrained states favor households without access to informal providers.42  
Employed householders are equally likely to take-up a subsidy in WL and NWL states, 
but those involved in at least one non-employment activity (job training or education, for 
example) are significantly more likely to take-up in WL states.  There is, finally, some 
evidence that WL states are targeting benefits at recent TANF leavers, which again is 
indicative of “creaming.” 
Subsidy Eligibility and Take-up Simulations 
 
To summarize the findings in the previous sections, I use the estimates from the 
eligibility and take-up probits to simulate the effect of changes in household 
characteristics and state policies.  All simulations are conducted using the full model for 
                                                 
42 Similar results were obtained when the number of relatives was included in the model (in place of household size).   
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both outcomes.43  As shown in Table 2.9, the top panel presents the eligibility 
simulations, while the bottom displays the take-up simulations.  I also conduct separate 
take-up simulations for states with and without a waiting list.  For simplicity and ease of 
comparison, I use as baseline households those that are female-headed with at least one 
child under age 5.44  Predicted probabilities are derived by holding all other variables at 
their mean value. 
Consistent with the eligibility calculations and probit results, cash assistance 
households are highly likely to be eligible for child care subsidies (0.651).  The typical 
employed householder is significantly less likely to be eligible (0.521), but those 
involved in non-employment work activities are virtually guaranteed to be eligible.  
Moreover, eligibility appears to be quite responsive to changes in states’ policies, 
especially income exemptions and TANF guarantees.  For example, the average single, 
female householder (who is employed and receiving cash assistance) in states with both 
policies has a 0.862 probability of being eligible, compared to 0.753 in states with neither 
policy.  The generosity of states’ subsidy benefits also has implications for the likelihood 
of eligibility, with more generous regimes associated with lower eligibility propensities.  
For example, working female-headed households in states with tiered reimbursement 
rates have an eligibility-probability of 0.404, compared to 0.547 in states without such 
benefits. 
Turning to the take-up simulations, I find that female-headed households engaged 
in at least one work activity are favored by states over households receiving cash 
assistance.  Take-up is predicted to be highest among those who are simultaneously 
                                                 
43 Eligibility simulations are drawn from the fourth column in Table 2.6, and the take-up simulations use the coefficients from the 
fourth column in Table 2.7. 
44 In addition, this baseline household was chosen because reflects the group most likely affected by changes in child care subsidy 
policies, and is of primary interest to scholars and policymakers.   
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employed and involved in another work activity: 0.544 compared to 0.307 among 
TANF/food stamp recipients.  Interestingly, despite the fact that an overwhelming 
majority of recent welfare leavers are eligible for subsidies, the likelihood of take-up for 
this group is just 0.269, well below that of welfare recipients.  Eligible households with 
and without access to sources of informal child care are equally likely to receive a 
subsidy, suggesting that both household-types find it similarly desirable or necessary to 
use subsidies.  Given the probit results, it is not surprising that the presence of a waiting 
list leads to significant reductions in the probability of take-up.  Take-up is also quite 
responsive to other state policies.  For example, a $100 increase in the weekly 
reimbursement rate (for infant care) increases take-up propensity among female-headed 
households to 0.354, from a baseline of 0.314.  Moreover, the introduction of tiered 
reimbursement rates raises the probability of take-up to 0.398. 
The final sections of Table 2.9 present simulation results based on the take-up 
probit estimated separately on WL and NWL states.  As with previous simulations, it 
begins with a baseline household—in this case employed, low-skilled female-headed 
households with young children—and then simulates the effect of small changes.45  Two 
things are immediately clear from comparing take-up propensities across WL and NWL 
states.  First, fairly large take-up differences exist, and second, in nearly every case 
predicted take-up is actually higher in WL states.  This may at first appear 
counterintuitive given that previous simulations revealed a lower take-up propensity in 
WL states.  However, recall that the separate take-up probits also revealed substantial 
“structural” differences in the way WL and NWL states are targeting subsidies.  
                                                 
45 This baseline household was chosen because it contains a set of characteristics that is easily observed by state administrative offices 
charged with making decisions about subsidy eligibility and offers.  It is also a bundle of attributes that states likely target when 
“priority” households are identified.       
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Specifically, WL states appear to ration subsidies according to specific household 
characteristics, thereby making households with those characteristics more likely to 
receive a subsidy.  Stated another way, overall take-up propensities are lower in states 
with a WL, but for those households with characteristics that are targeted by WL states, 
the take-up probability is actually higher. 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
The 1996 PRWORA increased substantially funding for child care assistance and 
consolidated four existing programs into a single CCDF.  The primary purpose of the 
consolidation was to eliminate the fragmentation associated with the previous subsidy 
system, as well as to ease the transition of low-income households from welfare to work.  
The additional funding was also intended to meet the growing demand for child care 
services stemming from PRWORA’s strict work requirements.  Previous research on 
subsidy take-up, however, coupled with the fact that 20 states currently have waiting lists, 
suggest there is a large unmet need for child care assistance. 
The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to provide new estimates of eligibility 
and take-up rates for CCDF child care subsidies, and to explore factors related to why 
many eligible households do not receive such assistance.  As noted throughout the 
chapter, much of the analysis and discussion is guided by several commonly cited 
propositions to explain the low take-up rate for subsidies: eligible non-recipient 
households differ in ways from their recipient counterparts that make subsidies 
unnecessary or undesirable; states trade-off breadth (increasing eligibility) for additional 
depth (increasing benefits) or vice versa; states’ awareness and access strategies are 
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inadequate and ineffective; and states ration benefits to households with specific 
characteristics. 
I find that although nearly 30 percent of households with children under age 13 
are eligible for child care subsidies, just 14 percent receive assistance, well within the 
range of previous estimates.  This estimate clearly masks substantial variation across 
various household-types and employment statuses, but a careful review of the evidence 
suggests that take-up is solidly in the range of 15 percent to 25 percent, whereas 
eligibility often exceeds 60 percent.  Turning to potential explanations, I find substantial 
differences between eligible recipient and non-recipient households.  Recipient 
households tend to be higher-skilled, have younger children, and simultaneously more 
likely to be engaged in a work activity and enrolled in another mean-tested program.  
Eligible non-recipient households, on the other hand, tend to be larger, have a greater 
number of number relatives, and are more likely to have an older adult present—all of 
which suggest that non-recipient households have greater access to unpaid sources of 
child care.  States’ policy choices are also related to eligibility and take-up.  Specifically, 
states appear to be trading-off eligibility for additional generosity in benefits.  The 
presence of waiting lists, furthermore, is associated with large reductions in take-up.  
Although most states use several awareness and access strategies, they are of limited 
value at increasing eligibility and take-up.  In general, states appear to target specific 
household characteristics when distributing subsidies: minority, female-headed 
households with young children and those that are receiving cash assistance, transitioning 
from TANF, or engaged in at least one work activity.  However, states with a waiting list 
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are rationing benefits more aggressively, usually in ways that simultaneously favor the 
least-skilled and most-skilled households. 
The findings in this chapter come amid a fierce Congressional debate over the 
reauthorization of the 1996 welfare law.  Changes to TANF and child care assistance 
(CCDF) are included in a budget reconciliation bill, which is currently working its way 
through conference committee.  The legislation includes some of the largest and most 
aggressive changes to U.S. welfare and child care policy since the 1996 law.  Most of 
these provisions impose new work requirements, while giving states very little additional 
money to support the new initiatives.  For example, the bill seeks to penalize states that 
serve poor two-parent families, and it stipulates that 90 percent of two-parent families 
must participate in work activities for at least 35 hours per week (Parrott, Park, & 
Greenstein, 2005).  Funding for child care subsidies, meanwhile, includes a $1 billion 
increase, apparently significantly less than what the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 
projects is necessary to fund the new work requirements. 
The commingling of these policy changes is expected to increase demand for 
child care services and subsidies, while lowering states’ ability to meet the new demand 
and increasing child care costs for low-income households.  Based on the results in this 
chapter, take-up rates for subsidies are predicted to fall dramatically if the proposed 
changes are adopted.  In addition, states will have to ration benefits more aggressively, 
with low-income working households declining as a “priority” for assistance.  Subsidy 
dollars will likely shift away from serving single, female-headed households and toward 
two-parent households, so that they can meet the new work requirements. 
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(N = 14,199)   
Female-Headed 
Households 
(N = 4,179) 
Male-Headed 
Households 
(N = 688) 
Employed (%) 0.876 (0.329) 0.888 (0.315) 0.829 (0.375) 0.892 (0.309) 
Receives TANF/food stamps (%) 0.140 (0.347) 0.077 (0.266) 0.361 (0.480) 0.173 (0.378) 
Household Headship (%)     
     Two-parent 0.749 (0.433) 1.00 1.00 1.00 
     Single, Female-headed 0.208 (0.406) 1.00 1.00 1.00 
     Single, Male-headed 0.041 (0.200) 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Householder’s Age 36.70 (8.43) 37.01 (7.89) 35.35 (9.85) 37.85 (9.23) 
Householder’s Race/Ethnicity (%)     
     White 0.632 (0.482) 0.684 (0.464) 0.452 (0.497) 0.607 (0.488) 
     Black 0.145 (0.352) 0.086 (0.281) 0.344 (0.475) 0.211 (0.408) 
     Hispanic 0.175 (0.380) 0.173 (0.378) 0.183 (0.387) 0.160 (0.366) 
     Other 0.046 (0.210) 0.055 (0.228) 0.019 (0.138) 0.021 (0.143) 
Householder’s Education (%)     
     Less than High School 0.127 (0.333) 0.113 (0.316) 0.179 (0.383) 0.126 (0.332) 
     High School/GED 0.306 (0.460) 0.291 (0.454) 0.360 (0.480) 0.295 (0.456) 
     Some College 0.294 (0.456) 0.274 (0.446) 0.345 (0.475) 0.409 (0.492) 
     College+ 0.271 (0.444) 0.320 (0.466) 0.114 (0.318) 0.168 (0.374) 
Household’s Non-Wage Income 
(/1,000) ($) 
3.54 (7.61) 3.14 (7.67) 4.96 (7.44) 3.48 (6.56) 
Total Household Income  
(/1,000) ($) 
59.03 (44.77) 67.85 (45.67) 29.99 (27.04) 45.60 (33.29) 
Household Size (No.) 4.10 (1.30) 4.30 (1.21) 3.54 (1.39) 3.34 (1.34) 
No. Relatives in Household 2.95 (1.32) 3.20 (1.23) 2.27 (1.30) 1.86 (1.28) 
No. Children Ages 0-5  0.860 (0.815) 0.904 (0.812) 0.768 (0.829) 0.539 (0.688) 
No. Children Ages 6-17  1.17 (1.08) 1.16 (1.09) 1.22 (1.07) 1.13 (1.00) 
Presence of Child Ages 0-5 (%) 0.381 (0.485) 0.392 (0.488) 0.352 (0.477) 0.319 (0.466) 
Presence of Child Ages 6-12 (%) 0.373 (0.483) 0.344 (0.475) 0.438 (0.496) 0.561 (0.496) 
Presence of Children Ages 0-5 
and 6-12 (%) 
0.245 (0.430) 0.262 (0.440) 0.209 (0.407) 0.119 (0.324) 
Presence of Other Adult Ages 
55+ (%) 
0.034 (0.182) 0.036 (0.186) 0.027 (0.162) 0.034 (0.183) 
Householder is U.S. Born (%) 0.826 (0.378) 0.810 (0.392) 0.877 (0.328) 0.877 (0.328) 
Region of Residence (%)     
     Northeast 0.189 (0.391) 0.187 (0.390) 0.204 (0.403) 0.146 (0.354) 
     South 0.359 (0.479) 0.347 (0.476) 0.396 (0.489) 0.383 (0.486) 
     Midwest 0.224 (0.417) 0.228 (0.419) 0.205 (0.404) 0.246 (0.431) 
     West 0.227 (0.418) 0.236 (0.425) 0.193 (0.394) 0.223 (0.416) 
State Subsidy Policies (%)     
     Waiting List  0.663 (0.472) 0.659 (0.473) 0.671 (0.469) 0.680 (0.466) 
     Guarantee for TANF HH’s  0.725 (0.446) 0.729 (0.443) 0.709 (0.453) 0.729 (0.444) 
     Any Income Exemption  0.850 (0.356) 0.842 (0.363) 0.875 (0.330) 0.858 (0.349) 
     Weekly RR for Infants ($) 164.34 (60.29) 164.86 (60.43) 162.33 (60.22) 165.03 (58.14) 
Source: Author’s calculations from the 2002 NSAF. 
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TABLE 2.2: Simulated Eligibility and Take-Up Rates for Child Care Subsidies 
 All Households 
(N = 19,066 ) 
Two Parent 
Households 
(N = 14,199) 
Female-Headed 
Households 
(N = 4,179) 
Male-Headed 
Households 
(N = 688) 
All Households     
Subsidy Receipt (%)  0.066  0.038 0.163 0.081 
Eligible (%) 0.276 0.207 0.524 0.287 
Take-Up (%)  0.139 0.079 0.225 0.138 
TANF Households     
Subsidy Receipt 0.184 0.111 0.246 0.133 
Eligible  0.639 0.547 0.711 0.617 
Take-Up  0.218 0.109 0.286 0.175 
Non-TANF Households     
Subsidy Receipt 0.047 0.032 0.116 0.070 
Eligible  0.217 0.179 0.418 0.218 
Take-Up  0.101 0.071 0.167 0.116 
TANF Leavers1     
Subsidy Receipt 0.239 0.161 0.289 0.180 
Eligible  0.707 0.573 0.788 0.678 
Take-Up  0.266 0.151 0.316 0.252 
“Cut-off” Leavers     
Subsidy Receipt 0.177 0.069 0.219 -- 
Eligible  0.690 0.495 0.778 -- 
Take-Up  0.207 0.070 0.234 -- 
“Decision” Leavers     
Subsidy Receipt 0.280 0.209 0.340 -- 
Eligible  0.719 0.614 0.794 -- 
Take-Up  0.303 0.185 0.373 -- 
Household Income  
< 100% of FPL 
    
Subsidy Receipt 0.138 0.072 0.196 0.138 
Eligible  0.753 0.775 0.745 0.610 
Take-Up  0.165 0.082 0.239 0.182 
Household Income 100%-
200% of FPL 
    
Subsidy Receipt 0.111 0.064 0.211 0.127 
Eligible  0.703 0.664 0.784 0.732 
Take-Up  0.128 0.077 0.223 0.117 
Employed     
Subsidy Receipt 0.070 0.041 0.180 0.079 
Eligible  0.299 0.226 0.582 0.300 
Take-Up  0.142 0.079 0.236 0.148 
Presence of Child  
Ages  0-5, Only 
    
Subsidy Receipt 0.078 0.044 0.206 0.120 
Eligible  0.277 0.212 0.526 0.359 
Take-Up  0.159 0.091 0.277 0.114 
Presence of Child  
Ages  6-12, Only 
    
Subsidy Receipt 0.040 0.017 0.097 0.062 
Eligible  0.242 0.166 0.469 0.192 
Take-Up  0.089 0.034 0.135 0.180 
Presence of Children Ages  
0-5 and 6-12 
    
Subsidy Receipt 0.089 0.059 0.230 0.063 
Eligible  0.328 0.254 0.635 0.545 
Take-Up  0.168 0.102 0.293 0.111 
Source: Author’s calculations from the 2002 NSAF. 
Notes: 1 A TANF leaver is defined as any individual in a given household (but in most cases is the householder or his/her spouse, 
if present) who reported receiving TANF at some point after 2000, but was not receiving TANF at the time of the survey (early 
2002).  All leavers are included here, irrespective of whether they left on their own or whether the “welfare office cut them off.”  
Blank cells indicate that there are an insufficient number of observations on which to base the estimate. 
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TABLE 2.3: Demographic Characteristics of Households Simulated  
to be Eligible for Child Care Subsidies 











Household Headship (%)     
     Two-parent 0.207 / 0.079 0.561 0.319 0.601*** 
     Single, Female-headed 0.524 / 0.225 0.394 0.637 0.354*** 
     Single, Male-headed 0.287 / 0.138 0.043 0.043 0.043 
Householder’s Age (%)     
     18-27 0.467 / 0.209 0.234 0.351 0.215*** 
     28-37 0.286 / 0.138 0.431 0.430 0.432 
     38-47 0.215 / 0.091 0.266 0.175 0.281*** 
     48-57 0.183 / 0.072 0.055 0.028 0.059*** 
     58+ 0.186 / 0.160 0.011 0.013 0.011 
Householder’s Race/Ethnicity (%)     
     White 0.183 / 0.108 0.418 0.324 0.434*** 
     Black 0.432 / 0 .235 0.227 0.384 0.202*** 
     Hispanic 0.510 / 0.113 0.322 0.262 0.332*** 
     Other 0.185 / 0.126 0.031 0.028 0.031 
Householder’s Education (%)     
     Less than High School 0.558 / 0 .095 0.260 0.175 0.274*** 
     High School/GED 0.344 / 0.148 0.384 0.402 0.381 
     Some College 0.256 / 0.187 0.276 0.366 0.261*** 
     College+ 0.080 / 0.098 0.079 0.055 0.083*** 
Household Size (No.) -- 4.12 3.91 4.16*** 
No. Relatives in Household (No.) -- 2.93 2.77 2.96*** 
No. Children Ages 0-5 (No.)  -- 0.97 1.13 0.94*** 
No. Children Ages 6-17 (No.) -- 1.27 1.16 1.29*** 
Presence of Child Ages 0-5 (%) 0.277 / 0.159 0.382 0.438 0.373*** 
Presence of Child Ages 6-12 (%) 0.242 / 0.089 0.326 0.209 0.345*** 
Presence of Children Ages 0-5 and  
6-12 (%) 
 







Presence of Other Adult Ages 55+ (%) 0.209 / 0.104 0.025 0.019 0.027** 
Householder’s Place of Birth (%)     
     U.S. Born 0.241 / 0.153 0.721 0.795 0.709*** 
     Foreign Born 0.445 / 0.102 0.278 0.204 0.290*** 
Region of Residence (%)     
     Northeast 0.269 / 0.156 0.184 0.206 0.180 
     South 0.305 / 0.129  0.396 0.366 0.401 
     Midwest 0.197 / 0.175 0.160 0.202 0.153 
     West 0.315 / 0.121 0.258 0.224 0.264 
Source: Author’s calculations from the 2002 NSAF. 
Notes: All percents are weighted.  *, **, *** indicate a statistically significant difference between eligible recipient and eligible 
non-recipient households at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  Tests of statistical significance are based on 
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TABLE 2.4: Economic Characteristics of Households Simulated 
 to be Eligible for Child Care Subsidies 











Work Activities (%)     
     Employed 0.299 / 0.142 0.948 0.969 0.944 
     Received Help Looking  0.473 / 0.198 0.075 0.107 0.070*** 
     Job Training Courses 0.356 / 0.169 0.085 0.103 0.082 
     HS/GED Courses 0.672 / 0.167 0.025 0.031 0.025** 
     College Courses 0.280 / 0.201 0.074 0.107 0.069*** 
Weeks Worked (%)     
     1-13 Weeks 0.618 / 0.155 0.061 0.066 0.060 
     14-26 Weeks 0.576 / 0.161 0.101 0.115 0.099* 
     27-39 Weeks 0.426 / 0.135 0.095 0.090 0.096 
     40-52 Weeks 0.261 / 0.139 0.741 0.727 0.743 
Mean Weeks Worked -- 43.82 43.35 43.90 
Weekly Hours Worked (%)      
     1-35 Hours 0.436 / 0.175 0.269 0.332 0.259*** 
     36+ Hours 0.268 / 0.130 0.730 0.667 0.740*** 
Mean Hours Worked -- 39.72 37.78 40.04*** 
Health Insurance (%)     
     Uninsured 0.557 / 0.113 0.350 0.285 0.360*** 
     Insured by Public Program1 0.635 / 0.224 0.222 0.358 0.200*** 
HH Public Assistance          
     TANF (%) 0.636 / 0.250 0.124 0.223 0.108*** 
            Amount Received   -- 3,365 3,159 3,435 
     Food Stamps (%) 0.645 / 0.219 0.310 0.487 0.281*** 
            Amount Received  -- 2,096 2,024 2,119 
     SSI (%) 0.367 / 0.161 0.063 0.073 0.061 
            Amount Received  -- 5,929 5,184 6,072 
     Unemployment Insurance 0.316 / 0.147 0.093 0.098 0.092 
            Amount Received  -- 2,488 2,192 2,539* 
      Child Support (%) 0.374 / 0.212 0.196 0.298 0.179*** 
            Amount Received  -- 3,033 2,408 3,211*** 
Total HH Earnings  -- 20,311 18,096 20,685*** 
Total HH Non-wage Income  -- 4,428 4,415 4,436 
Total HH Income  -- 22,131 20,543 22,399*** 
 Source: Author’s calculations from the 2002 NSAF. 
 Notes: All percents are weighted.  *, **, *** indicate a statistically significant difference between eligible recipient 
and eligible non- recipient households at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  Tests of statistical significance 
are based on unweighted percentages.  Blank cells indicate that the quantity is not possible to calculate. 
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TABLE 2.5: Child Care Arrangements and Expenses of Households Simulated  
to be Eligible for Child Care Subsidies 









Children Ages 0 - 4     
Child Care Arrangements (%)     
     Center-based 0.240 / 0 .309 0.217 0.399 0.179*** 
     Family-based 0.214 / 0.271 0.079 0.128 0.069** 
     Nanny/Babysitter 0.242 / 0.170 0.030 0.031 0.030 
     Relative  0.332 / 0.196 0.276 0.325 0.267 
     Parent 0.359 / 0.048 0.396 0.114 0.453*** 
Paying for Care (%) -- 0.352 0.744 0.273*** 
Monthly Expenses ($) -- 296 261 314*** 
Share of HH Income (%) -- 0.253 0.287 0.235 
Children Age 5     
Child Care Arrangement (%)     
     Center-based 0.316 / 0.233 0.450 0.557 0.425*** 
     Family-based 0.257 / 0.253 0.047 0.063 0.043** 
     Nanny/Babysitter 0.268 / -- 0.036 0.035 0.037 
     Relative  0.308 / 0.212 0.186 0.210 0.180 
     Parent 0.265 / 0.072 0.264 0.101 0.301*** 
     Before-/After-school Program  0.061 / -- 0.014 0.031 0.010** 
Paying for Care (%) -- 0.348 0.637 0.280*** 
Monthly Expenses ($) -- 301 257 324 
Share of HH Income (%) -- 0.170 0.135 0.188 
Children Ages 6 - 12     
Child Care Arrangement (%)     
     Before-/After-school Program 0.219 / 0.372 0.129 0.356 0.093*** 
     Family-based 0.287 / 0.232 0.064 0.110 0.056*** 
     Nanny/Babysitter 0.245 / 0.252 0.035 0.065 0.030*** 
     Relative  0.290 / 0.162 0.210 0.253 0.203 
     Parent 0.288 / 0.043 0.488 0.158 0.540*** 
     Self-care 0.220 / 0.104 0.072 0.055 0.074** 
Paying for Care (%) -- 0.301 0.713 0.238*** 
Monthly Expenses ($) -- 279 287 276 
Share of HH Income (%) -- 0.176 0.188 0.171 
Source: Author’s calculations from the 2002 NSAF. 
Notes: All percents are weighted.  *, **, *** indicate a statistically significant difference between eligible recipient and eligible 
non-recipient households at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  Tests of statistical significance are based on unweighted 
percentages. Blank cells indicate that the quantity is not possible to calculate, or that there are insufficient observations on which 
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TABLE 2.6: Estimated Marginal Effects from the Subsidy Eligibility Equation 
Variable ∂Pr(Eligible)/∂x  

























































Less than High School 0.353 
(0.025)*** 
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 (0.013)***  
Employed Plus At Least One  
Other Work Activity1 





 (0.032)***  
At Least One Other Work  
Activity Only1 













 (0.012)***  







 (0.012)***  







 (0.015)***  
Subsidy Priority for Special  
Needs Children 
-- -- -0.011  
(0.018)  
0.0001 
 (0.017)  
Use of Media to Distribute 
Information About Subsidies 
-- -- 0.039  
(0.013)*** 
0.043 
 (0.014)***  
Subsidy Information Posted  
on State’s Website 
-- -- -0.068  
(0.012)***  
-0.058 
 (0.013)***  





 (0.019)  
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Waiver of Co-payment for  
Families < the FPL 
-- -- -- -0.056 
(0.018)*** 
Log-Likelihood -8,279.028 -7,483.346*** -7,400.628*** -7,378.027*** 
Number of Observations 18,821 18,821 18,821 18,821 
McFadden’s R2 0.251 0.323 0.330 0.332 
Percent Correctly Predicted 0.782 0.811 0.816 0.816 
Source: Author’s calculations from the 2002 NSAF. 
Notes: 1 Other work activity includes formal help in obtaining employment and/or enrollment in high school/GED courses, 
college courses, or a job training program.  All models are estimated with region dummies.  *, **, *** indicate that the 
coefficient is statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.  The asterisk(s) adjacent to the log-likelihood 
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TABLE 2.7: Estimated Marginal Effects from the Subsidy Receipt and Take-up Equations 
Variable Receipt Equation Take-up Equation 
 ∂Pr(Receive or Take-up)/∂x 





































































































































































Employed Plus At Least One 

































Waiver of Co-payment for  



















Use of Media to Distribute 






 89  


















Log-Likelihood -3,877.840 -3,849.099*** -2,018.954 -2,001.139 
Number of Observations 18,807 18,807 5,567 5,567 
McFadden’s R2 0.161 0.167 0.109 0.117 
Percent Correctly Predicted 0.933 0.933 0.854 0.855 
Source: Author’s calculations from the 2002 NSAF. 
Notes: 1 Other work activity includes formal help in obtaining employment and/or enrollment in high school/GED courses, 
college courses, or a job training program.  All models are estimated with region dummies.  *, **, *** indicate that the 
coefficient is statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.  The asterisk(s) adjacent to the log-likelihood 
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TABLE 2.8: Estimated Marginal Effects from the “Rationing” Equation 
 Take-up: No Waiting List Take-up: Waiting 
List 
                                                                            ∂Pr(Take-up)/∂x 



































































































Waiver of Co-payment for Families  




















 91  
























Log-Likelihood -574.390 -1,375.558 
Number of Observations 1,491 4,076 
McFadden’s R2 0.169 0.117 
Percent Correctly Predicted 0.844 0.861 
Source: Author’s calculations from the 2002 NSAF. 
Notes: 1 Other work activity includes formal help in obtaining employment and/or enrollment in high school/GED 
courses, college courses, or a job training program.  All models are estimated with region dummies.  *, **, *** 
indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.  The asterisk(s) adjacent 
to the log-likelihood indicate(s) that the additional variables provide statistically significant explanatory  
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TABLE 2.9: Subsidy Eligibility and Take-up Simulations 
Scenario  
Full Sample (Observed Mean: 0.276) Pr(Eligible) 
Predicted Mean From Full Model 0.189 
Female-headed HH With At Least One Child Ages 0-5  
        TANF/Food Stamp Recipient 0.651 
        Employed Only 0.521 
        Employed Plus At Least One Other Work Activity1 0.902 
        Other Work Activity Only 0.947 
Employed Female-headed HH With At Least One Child Ages 0-5  
        With No Other Adult Ages 55+ in HH  0.517 
        With Other Adult Ages 55+ in HH 0.616 
Female-headed HH With At Least One Child Ages 0-5 
         Employed and State Does Not Have an Income Exemption  0.472 
         Employed and State Has an Income Exemption 0.532 
         TANF/FS Recipient and State Does Not Have a TANF Guarantee  0.585 
         TANF/FS Recipient and State Has a TANF Guarantee  0.681 
         Employed/TANF/FS Recipient and State Has Neither Policy  0.753 
         Employed/TANF/FS Recipient and State Has Both Policies 0.862 
Employed Female-headed HH With At Least One Child Ages 0-5 
          State Does Not Have a Tiered RR for Odd-hour or Quality Care 0.547 
          State Has Tiered RR for Odd-hour and Quality Care 0.404 
Full Sample (Observed Mean: 0.139) Pr(Take-up) 
Predicted Mean From Full Model 0.114 
Female-headed HH With At Least One Child Ages 0-5  
        TANF/Food Stamp Recipient 0.307 
        Employed Only 0.314 
        Employed Plus At Least One Other Work Activity 0.544 
        Other Work Activity Only 0.426 
        TANF Leaver 0.269 
Employed Female-headed HH With At Least One Child Ages 0-5  
        With No Other Adult Ages 55+ in HH  0.313 
        With Other Adult Ages 55+ in HH 0.360 
Female-headed HH With At Least One Child Ages 0-5  
         Employed and State Does Not Have a Waiting List 0.399 
         Employed and State Has a Waiting List 0.285 
         TANF/FS Recipient and State Does Not Have a Waiting List 0.391 
         TANF/FS Recipient and State Has a Waiting List 0.278 
Employed Female-headed HH With At Least One Child Ages 0-5 
         $100 Increase in the Weekly RR for Infants 0.354 
         State Does Not Have a Tied RR for Odd-hour or Quality Care 0.309 
         State Has Tiered RR for Odd-hour and Quality Care 0.398 
Sub-sample of HH’s in States Without a Waiting List  
Employed, Low-skilled Female-headed HH With At Least One Child Ages 0-5  
         Employed Only 0.299 
         Employed Plus At Least One Other Work Activity 0.518 
         TAN/FS Recipient 0.323 
         TANF Leaver 0.244 
Sub-sample of HH’s in States With a Waiting List  
Employed, Low-skilled Female-headed HH With At Least One Child Ages 0-5  
         Employed Only 0.351 
         Employed Plus At Least One Other Work Activity 0.627 
         TAN/FS Recipient 0.314 
         TANF Leaver 0.317 
Source: Author’s calculations from the 2002 NSAF 
Notes: Simulations were conducted using the full model from the eligibility and take-up equations.  
Specifically, the eligibility simulations use coefficients from the fourth column in Table 2.6 (N=18,821), and 
the take-up simulations use coefficients from the fourth column in Table 2.7 (N=5,567).  Simulations for states 
with and without a waiting list are derived from the models in Table 2.9 (N=4,076 and N=1,491, respectively).  
Predictions are derived by holding all other variables at their mean values.  1 Other work activity includes 
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FIGURE 2.1: Simulation of Technical Eligibility for CCDF Child Care Subsidies 
 
All NSAF households 
with children under age 13 
 
 
          Household receives                                                                                          Household does not  
          TANF/food stamps                                                                                      receive TANF/food stamps 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
             























  Phase I: Simulate State-specific Eligibility Rules for Acceptable Work Activities 
• Employment is acceptable (51 states) 
• Employment is required (17 states) 
• Job search is acceptable (51 states) 
• Education is acceptable (45 states) 
     • Work requirement (9 states) 
• Job training is acceptable (51 states)    
• Employment is acceptable (51 states) 
• Employment is required (18 states) 
• Job search is acceptable (16 states) 
• Education is acceptable (46 states) 
     • Work requirement (13 states) 
• Job training is acceptable (48 states) 
     • Work requirement (7 states)    
Is the householder 
participating in an 
acceptable work 
activity? 
If NO, household 
is ineligible 
If YES, apply states’ income 
eligibility rules 
Phase II: Simulate State-specific Income Eligibility Rules 
• Apply income/earnings deductions (5 states) 
• Apply income/earnings disregards: 
     • Cash assistance programs (32 states) 
     • Scholarships/grants/loans (28 states) 
     • Adoption subsidies/foster care (22 states) 
     • Earned Income Tax Credit (17 states) 
     • Child support (13 states) 
     • Unemployment Insurance (2 states) 
Is countable household income less than the 
state’s income eligibility threshold? 
If NO, household 
is ineligible 
If YES, household is eligible for CCDF 
child care subsidies 
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CHAPTER 3: THE EFFECTS OF CHILD CARE COSTS AND TAXES ON      
THE EMPLOYMENT OF SINGLE MOTHERS: EVIDENCE                                     
FROM A SIPP-CPS MATCHING PROCEDURE 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The 1990s marked a watershed period in the evolution of U.S. social policy.  
Indeed, significant changes were introduced across a number of policy domains, each 
with the goal of increasing the incentive for single mothers to reduce welfare dependency 
and enter the labor force.  Additional funding for child care subsidies and the Earned 
Income Tax Credit (EITC) are among the most prominent vehicles through which the 
federal and state governments have eased the transition from welfare to work.  
Expenditures on child care subsidies increased from $168 million in 1990 to $9.4 billion 
in 2004, owing in large part to the 1996 passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) and the creation of the Child Care and 
Development Fund (CCDF) (Besharov & Higney, 2006).  Similarly, dramatic expansions 
of the EITC in 1990 and 1993 increased funding from $10.5 billion to $33.8 billion over 
the same period (Green Book, 2004).  With annual expenditures exceeding those of the 
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) program, the EITC is now the single 
largest antipoverty program in the U.S. and the fastest growing item in the federal budget.   
 Concurrent with these policy changes has been the explosion in employment 
among single mothers and a rapid decline in the welfare rolls.  Specifically, between 
1990 and 2004, the employment rate for single women with children (ages 0-12) 
increased from 68.9 percent to 76.6 percent, peaking at 81.7 percent in 2000.  
Conversely, after reaching 5.0 million families in 1994, welfare caseloads declined to 
approximately 2.2 million, its lowest level in 30 years.  Welfare participation rates among 
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single mothers fell over 40 percentage points throughout the decade, from 58 percent to 
15 percent. 
Given the recent changes to child care and tax policy, a growing empirical 
literature has attempted to estimate their causal effects on the employment of single 
mothers.  Isolating these policies is a difficult task for several reasons.  First, at the same 
time that reforms to child care and tax policies were implemented, other changes 
occurred that created similar incentives for single mothers to work.  States began 
experimenting with welfare reforms in the early 1990s that ultimately became the basis 
for the 1996 PRWORA.  Distilling the effects of welfare reform has been challenging in 
and of itself because states often made many changes simultaneously.  In addition, the 
strong economy throughout the 1990s increased real earnings for low-skilled workers for 
the first time in nearly two decades, providing an unambiguous incentive to leave welfare 
for work.  Second, although a substantial literature examines the labor supply effects of 
child care prices and taxes separately, to date no study has done so within a modeling 
framework that accounts for both factors simultaneously.  Given that previous research 
demonstrates the importance of prices and taxes for single mothers, excluding one of 
these factors might lead to an omitted variables problem.        
However, estimating child care prices and taxes is complicated because these 
variables are endogenous to the work decision and are observed only among employed 
single mothers.  Therefore, a large number of supporting equations must be specified in 
order to handle these issues.  A further complication arises from the fact that nationally 
representative surveys either do not collect data on child care expenditures (Current 
Population Survey, CPS) or do not contain large samples of single mothers (Survey of 
 
 96  
Income and Program Participation, SIPP).  The limited availability of child care data for 
low-income populations creates challenges for exploiting cross-state and year-to-year 
changes in child care and other policies, leaving most studies in the literature with a 
single cross-section of data and a small number of policy and economic controls.   
 Accordingly, this chapter makes a number of important contributions.  First, I join 
together empirical techniques from previous child care and EITC studies to 
simultaneously estimate the effects of prices and taxes on the labor supply of single 
mothers.  A unique dataset is created by merging child care expenditure data from 
multiple panels of the SIPP with demographic and economic data from the 1990 to 2004 
March CPS.  This is accomplished by first constructing SIPP and CPS samples in an 
identical manner and then creating an imputation procedure that assigns a potential child 
care expenditure to single mothers in the CPS.  These data are supplemented by detailed 
state-level information on welfare policies as well as child care regulations, wages, and 
labor supply.  The construction of a rich dataset over a significant time period allows for 
a more rigorous test of the effect of child care prices and taxes than previous work.   
The creation of explicit measures for child care expenditures and net-wages over a 
15-year period allows me to examine a previously unexplored issue: whether, and to what 
extent, the responsiveness of single mothers to child care prices and taxes changed 
throughout the 1990s.  Specifically, I compare the labor supply response to prices and 
taxes across one- and multiple-child families before and after major federal expansions of 
child care subsidies and the EITC.  The intuition for such a model stems from the fact 
that child care subsidies and the EITC became increasingly generous toward multiple-
child families over the study period, especially after the passage of PRWORA in 1996 
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and OBRA in 1993.  Therefore, one might expect these single mothers to become 
comparatively less sensitive to child care expenditures and more sensitive to net-of-taxes 
wages.  Such findings would strengthen the conclusion that child care subsidies and the 
EITC have the hypothesized effects.  My approach, moreover, represents a significant 
improvement over previous research, in which policy effects are simply inferred by the 
differential employment growth of multiple-child families.    
A third contribution of this chapter is to compare the simulated effect of 
expansions to subsidies and the EITC.  Policy simulations in previous child care studies 
are severely flawed because they focus on the employment-effects of linear, universal 
subsidy programs when in fact states’ CCDF regimes are non-linear, means-tested 
programs.  None of the EITC studies conduct explicit employment simulations on single 
mothers.   My policy simulations therefore expand previous work by examining plausible 
benefit schedules and focusing on populations for whom child care subsidies and the 
EITC likely have the greatest influence.   
Finally, this study employs a new methodology to account for the endogeneity of 
child care expenditures by using a tri-variate sample selection framework estimated via 
simulated maximum likelihood.  A three-equation sample selection procedure more 
accurately reflects not only the decision-making process that leads researchers to observe 
child care costs for some mothers, but also the censoring in the SIPP survey design.  
Furthermore, given that previous child care studies neglect careful specification checks, I 
assess the robustness of price-effects by comparing estimates from tri-variate and bi-
variate sample selection models with those that do not assume selection bias, and by 
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drawing upon characteristics of states’ child care regulations and labor markets for 
alternative exclusion restrictions.  
Estimates from the main employment model suggest that the labor supply of 
single mothers is indeed sensitive to child care costs and taxes.  I find that a one percent 
increase in costs and net-wages are associated with a 5.4 percentage point decrease and a 
seven-percentage point increase in employment, respectively.  These translate to an 
elasticity of employment (last year) with respect to child care expenditures of -0.174 and 
an elasticity of employment with respect to net-of-taxes wages of 0.711.  One of the 
central implications of this finding is that child care price-effects are considerably smaller 
than what is commonly found in the literature, whereas the tax-effects are solidly within 
the range of previous estimates.  Most child care studies find price elasticities in the range 
–0.45 to –0.75, while previous EITC work estimates elasticities in the range 0.59 to 1.16.  
In addition, I find low-skilled single mothers and those with young children are 
moderately more responsive to child care prices and the returns to work.  These main 
results are corroborated by my alternative modeling strategy: single mothers with 
multiple children became comparatively less sensitive to child care prices and more 
sensitive to net-wages over the study period, especially after expansions to child care 
subsidies and the EITC were enacted.  Robustness tests indicate that child care price-
effects are not sensitive to tri-variate versus bi-variate sample selection procedures, nor 
are the estimates particularly sensitive to the identifying instruments in the expenditure 
equation.  However, estimated price-effects appear to be very sensitive to the use of 
repeated cross-sectional data and the inclusion of additional policy controls.  Finally, 
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policy simulations imply that a system of generous, targeted work supports generate more 
employment than one that provides limited, universal assistance. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows.  Section 3.2 provides an 
overview of the policy changes between 1990 and 2004 that have implications for single 
mothers’ work incentives.  It also reviews the relevant empirical literature across each 
policy domain.  Section 3.3 introduces the data and empirical strategy, discusses the 
construction of key policy variables, and provides a brief description of the theoretical 
effects of each policy variable.  Section 3.4 presents results from several employment 
models and conducts a number of policy simulations.  Finally, conclusions and policy 
implications are discussed in Section 3.5. 
3.2 Review of Policy Changes and Relevant Literature  
In this section, I describe the primary child care, tax, and welfare policies with 
implications for the employment of single mothers.  Across each policy domain, I first 
highlight important federal and state legislation enacted between 1990 and 2005 (shown 
in Figure 3.1), followed by a discussion of how each policy altered labor supply 
incentives for single mothers (shown in Table 3.1).  Finally, I summarize previous 
empirical work on child prices, taxes, and welfare policy.       
Child Care Subsidy Policy   
 Throughout the early-1990s, the federal government operated four major child 
care assistance programs aimed at low-income families.  The 1988 Family Support Act 
created the first federal child care entitlements through Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children Child Care (AFDC-CC) and Transitional Child Care (TCC).  The AFDC-CC 
program guaranteed child care benefits so that welfare recipients could participate in the 
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Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training program, which enrolled able-bodied 
individuals into employment and job training activities.  The TCC subsidized child care 
costs for families that lost AFDC eligibility because of employment or earnings growth.  
This program partially offset child care costs for up to 12 months after leaving welfare.  
Child care subsidy policy was expanded once again in 1990 with the passage of the 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA90).  It created the landmark Child Care and 
Development Block Grant and the At-Risk Child Care program, which aimed to increase 
quality and serve low-income families disassociated with the welfare system. 
Recognition of the employment barriers posed by child care costs took center 
stage with the passage of PRWORA in 1996.  This legislation eliminated the legal 
entitlement to cash welfare and child care assistance and consolidated existing funding 
streams into a single Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF).  One of the key 
features of the CCDF is that subsidy recipients must be engaged in a state-defined 
“acceptable” work activity.  In addition, states can serve a broad population of non-
TANF families, and are given significant latitude in the design of their subsidy regimes.  
Overall, PRWORA allocated $21 billion for child care assistance over a seven year 
period, 70 percent of which must be used to subsidized costs for families receiving TANF 
or transitioning from welfare to work (Greenberg, Lombardi, & Schumacher, 2000).46                                                                         
Table 3.1 outlines the effects of changes to child care subsidy policy throughout 
the 1990s.  Expenditures on the programs that eventually became the CCDF grew 
steadily in the period 1990 to 1996, but exploded after the passage of welfare reform.  By 
2004, approximately $9.4 billion was spent on child care subsidies through the CCDF, 
                                                 
46 Eligibility for CCDF subsidies is set at 85 percent of a state’s median income (SMI), although states are able to establish a lower 
ceiling.  States are given substantial flexibility in designing their subsidy systems, including being able to transfer up to 30 percent of 
their TANF block grant to the CCDF, setting reimbursement and co-payment rates, and defining acceptable work activities.   
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compared to $168 million in 1990.  This led to a steep rise in the number of subsidy 
dollars available per child under age 5, the age group targeted by child care assistance 
programs.  Consistent enrollment data prior to 1995 cannot be computed, but the 
available evidence shows a moderate increase in the (monthly) number of children served 
by CCDF subsidies: from 1.4 million in 1995 to 1.7 million in 2004.  The 1990s, 
moreover, witnessed equally important changes in the broader child care market.  
Demand for nonparental child care services rose during this period largely in response to 
increasing employment among women with children.  However, private child care wages, 
which are a good proxy for prices, remained basically unchanged.47  That wage growth 
was flat in the face of increased demand suggests that the demand for child care labor is 
highly elastic (Blau, 1993; 2001).  This appears to be corroborated by the data in Table 
3.1: whereas private child care earnings (in an average state) increased 25 percent 
between 1990 and 2004, the private child care workforce grew 83 percent. 
A large body of research examines the relationship between child care costs and 
women’s work decisions.  Non-experimental evidence comes from two primary sources: 
studies on price effects and studies of actual subsidy programs.  The review herein 
focuses on the former type, given its relevance to this study.48  The most common 
methodological approach to examining price effects includes a discrete choice 
participation probit with predicted child care costs and wages as the key right-hand-side 
variables.  Both measures are derived from OLS models that control for sample selection 
bias on employment and the decision to pay for child care (expenditures only).  This 
                                                 
47 The production of child care is a very labor intensive process, accounting for nearly 70 percent of the price of child care (Helburn, 
1995).   
48 Labor supply studies of subsidy programs include Berger and Black (1992), Gelbach (2002), Meyers Heintz, and Wolf (2002), Blau 
and Tekin (forthcoming), and Tekin (2004a; 2004b).  Every study finds that receipt of a child care subsidy increases substantially the 
probability of employment.  Two studies investigate the labor supply effects of the Dependent Care Tax Credit (DCTC) (Averett, 
Peters, & Waldman, 1997; Michalopoulos, Robins, & Garfinkel, 1992).  The former study finds an elasticity of hours worked of -0.78, 
while the latter estimates elasticities of essentially zero. 
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basic approach is quite common in the literature, and the results are surprisingly uniform 
(Baum, 2002; Blau & Robbins, 1991; Ribar, 1992, Connelly & Kimmel, 2001; 2002; 
2003; Kimmel, 1995, U.S. GAO, 1994; Connelly, 1992; Han & Waldfogel, 2001; 
Anderson & Levine, 2000).  Although nearly every study finds a negative relationship 
between child care costs and mothers’ labor supply, the range of elasticities is large (from 
0.06 to -1.36).  However, there appears to be a recent convergence of estimates centering 
on -0.40. 
Federal and State Tax Policy 
 
Arguably the most important change to work incentives faced by single mothers 
comes from the EITC.49  Enacted in 1975 as part of the Tax Reduction Act (TRA), 
expenditures on the EITC increased dramatically throughout the 1990s.  By 2003, 
foregone revenue due to the credit totaled $33.8 billion, up from $10.5 billion in 1990.  
Claimant families also grew steadily during this period, from 12.5 million to 19.3 million.  
Single-parent families comprise 48 percent of all claimants, and 76 percent of EITC 
dollars go to these families (Liebman, 1999; Green Book, 2004). 
The EITC received three major expansions, but this discussion focuses on those 
occurring during the 1990s.50  With the passage of the 1990 Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act, a second benefit schedule was created for families with two or more 
children.  The phase-in rate was set initially at 17.3 percent of earnings up to $7,140, for 
a maximum credit of $1,235.  Families with one child received a wage subsidy of 16.7 
                                                 
49 The EITC introduces a complicated set of labor supply incentives for low-income workers.  Because the program comprises three 
credit regions, it is useful to think of it as three separate programs.  The first region is called the phase-in range, which, due to its 
negative marginal tax rate, operates like a wage subsidy by increasing workers’ net-of-taxes wages.  The plateau range, where the 
credit rate is zero for each additional dollar earned, acts like a lump sum transfer.  Finally, the phase-out range is essentially a negative 
income tax because of the way it gradually phases out benefits as earnings rise.       
50 The first expansion came with the passage of the 1986 Tax Reform Act (TRA86).  This legislation indexed the EITC for inflation, 
increased the phase-in rate, and decreased the phase-out rate.   
 
 103  
percent over the identical earnings range, thereby yielding a maximum credit of $1,192.  
A third expansion to the EITC occurred through the 1993 Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act (OBRA93).  This legislation increased the differential phase-in rate 
and maximum credit for one- versus two- (or more) child families.  By 1996, when the 
changes were fully phased in, families with one child received a wage subsidy of 34 
percent, while families with two or more children received a subsidy of 40 percent.  The 
maximum credit available to both families was, respectively, $2,152 and $3,556.                         
  President Bush’s Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 
and the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 introduced several 
potentially important changes for single mothers.  It lowered the bottom tax bracket to 10 
percent (from 15 percent) and expanded the Child Tax Credit (CTC).  Enacted in 1997, 
the CTC originally provided a $500 credit to families with children under age 17.  The 
program was of limited value to low-income families because it was non-refundable.  
However, the 2001 and 2003 tax leglislation increased the credit to $1,000 per eligible 
child and made it partially refundable.51  The cumulative effects of these expansions 
made the CTC the single largest cash assistance program aimed at children (Burman & 
Wheaton, 2005).   
 State-level tax policy was also altered in substantial ways throughout the 1990s.  
Specifically, the introduction and proliferation of state EITC’s further eased the tax 
burden for single mothers.  By 2004 18 states developed an EITC—compared to seven in 
1994—13 of which make it refundable like the federal credit.  These credits simply 
“piggyback” onto the federal EITC by using its eligibility rules and computing credits as 
                                                 
51 For a single mother with three children, for example, the credit phases in at a rate of 15 percent between $11,000 and $31,000, after 
which the full credit is available until earnings reach $75,000.   
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a percentage of its benefits.52 Annual foregone revenue from state EITC’s ranges from 
$17 million in Vermont to $591 million in New York (Nagle & Johnson, 2006).         
 The cumulative effects of changes to federal and state tax policy over the 1990s 
are summarized in Table 3.1.  Two of the most important developments are the decrease 
in the bottom income MTR and the increase in the federal EITC’s phase-in rate and 
maximum credit.  The income tax liability for the average single mother with one child 
fell $928 between 1990 and 2004.  A single mother with two or more children 
experienced a decline of $2,034.  Overall the amount of income taxes paid by the average 
single mother in 2004 was 160 percent less than the amount paid in 1990.  Most of the 
decline can be attributed to the decreased federal MTR, the 1993 federal EITC expansion, 
and the proliferation of state EITCs.                
 A growing body of research evaluates the labor supply effects of the EITC.  A 
majority of this work focuses on analyzing major changes to the EITC embedded in tax 
laws (Ellwood, 2000; Hotz, Mullin & Scholz, 2005; Eissa & Liebman, 1996; Meyer & 
Rosenbaum, 1999; 2000; 2001) or geographic disparities in the generosity of state 
EITC’s (Cancian & Levinson, 2005).  The basis for this approach is to observe 
participation rates for a sample of individuals most likely affected by an EITC expansion 
before and after passage of the law, relative to changes in a comparison group.  Results 
from these studies as a whole find strong, positive effects of EITC expansions on the 
labor supply of single mothers.  Another set of studies use a structural approach, drawing 
on economic theory to suggest parameterizations of policy and budget constraint 
variables that enter the work decision.   Most of this research focuses on estimating 
                                                 
52 Wisconsin’s EITC provides a striking example.  Introduced in 1995, the Wisconsin EITC supplements the federal credit by 4 
percent for families with one child, 14 percent for families with two children, and 43 percent for families with three or more children.  
This translates to a maximum credit that is $1,107 larger for Wisconsin’s two-child families and $1,641 larger for three-child families 
(Cancian & Levinson, 2006). 
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employment models at the extensive margin (Looney, 2005; Meyer & Rosenbaum, 1999; 
2001; Grogger, 2003; 2004, Neumark & Wascher, 2000), while others concentrate on the 
intensive margin (Dickert, Houser, & Scholz, 1995; Hoffman & Seidman, 1990; Keane, 
1995; Keane & Moffitt, 1998).  Results from these studies find elasticities of employment 
with respect to the return to work in the range 0.59 to 1.16.  Policy simulations suggest 
that the EITC accounts for one-third of the employment increase among single mothers 
throughout the 1990s (Meyer & Rosenbaum, 2001; Grogger, 2004). 
Welfare Policy 
 
 The final set of policy changes deals with those made to the primary cash 
assistance program in the U.S., Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).  
Enacted as part of the Social Security Act of 1935, AFDC was originally intended to 
provide financial assistance to widowed mothers and their children.  Over time, however, 
growing caseloads and expenditures coupled with low employment rates among women 
receiving AFDC led to concerns that the program created strong work disincentives.  
These concerns prompted calls from across the political spectrum that AFDC required a 
significant overhaul.  Precursors to this overhaul came from the flurry of state welfare 
wavier programs enacted throughout the early-1990s.53  
 Several important reforms grew out of this period.  This discussion focuses on 
two that are of particular importance for this analysis.  First, many states experimented 
with changes to their earnings disregards when computing benefits for employed 
recipients.  Under AFDC states exempted the first $30 of earnings and 33 percent of the 
                                                 
53 Section 1115 of the Social Security Act stated that the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) could under certain 
conditions waive the rules for AFDC.  This would allow states to experiment with alternative approaches to running their welfare 
regimes.  Prior to the 1990’s such waivers were not sought out.  By 1992, however, 30 waivers from 26 states were approved; another 
83 waivers from 43 states were approved during the first term of the Clinton administration.  On the eve of welfare reform, all but five 
states were given approval for at least one welfare waiver. 
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remainder when calculating monthly benefits.  Benefits would therefore be reduced at a 
rate of 67 percent for each additional dollar earned, leading many to argue that such high 
implicit tax rates would increase the incentive to remain out of work.  Therefore, by 
1996, 18 states implemented changes that increased the initial exemption and lowered the 
benefit phase-out rate.54  The second set of waivers came from placing time limits on the 
receipt of welfare.  Beginning in 1993, 15 states implemented policies that limited the 
amount of time a mother could receive cash assistance.  These time limits ranged from 21 
months in Connecticut to 60 months in Hawaii, after which either the adult portion or the 
entire family grant was terminated (other states enacted work requirements).             
 With most states already experimenting with AFDC reforms, the stage was set for 
the passage of PRWORA in 1996.  This law repealed the AFDC program, replacing it 
with the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), and eliminated the legal 
entitlement to cash assistance.  A central change embodied by the TANF program is its 
“work first” philosophy.  States are required to move welfare recipients into work (or 
other work-related activities) within two years of benefit receipt, but 20 states have 
chosen to enforce the work requirement immediately.  Families that fail to comply with 
work requirements face either a partial or full-family benefit sanction.  By 1996 nine 
states imposed full-family sanctions, rising to 30 states in 1998 (and beyond).  Finally, 
the legislation places a 60-month lifetime time limit on welfare receipt, although states 
are allowed to establish stricter limits.   
 Table 3.1 provides a summary of the effects of changes to federal and state 
welfare policy throughout the 1990s.  The maximum welfare benefit available to 
                                                 
54 In some cases, these changes were dramatic.  Connecticut, for example, disregarded 100 percent of earnings up to the poverty line.  
Others, like Illinois, disregarded a flat percentage of all earnings (67 percent).    
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unemployed families fell 25 percent (in real dollars) between 1990 and 2004, with states 
experiencing declines as large as 32 percent in the period after welfare reform.  Single 
mothers were also increasingly exposed to states’ waiver programs.  By 1996, fully 61 
percent of single mothers lived in states that implemented at least one statewide welfare 
reform, while 25 percent lived in a state that implemented a time limit.  Along with these 
policy “sticks” states also provided a number of “carrots.”  Raising the generosity of 
earnings disregards became the main vehicle for doing so, as seen in Table 3.1.  
Employed single mothers in 1990 could expect the first $6,254 (or 34 percent) of 
earnings to be exempt when calculating benefits.  By 2004, the average amount of 
disregarded earnings increased to $13,129 (or 67 percent of earnings). 
 There is surprisingly little research on the labor supply effects of welfare reform 
policy.  Of the eight studies completed, two focus exclusively on evaluating waiver-based 
reforms (Meyer & Rosenbaum, 2001; Moffitt, 1999), while the remainder includes a 
combination of pre- and post-PRWORA data (Fang & Keane, 2005; Looney, 2005; 
Grogger, 2003; Kaushal & Kaestner, 2001; O’Neill & Hill, 2001; Schoeni & Blank, 
2000).  There is, in addition, substantial variation in the types of reforms studied.  Five 
estimate the effects of “any waiver” or “any statewide reform,” finding employment-
effects in the range of essentially zero to 11 percentage points.  Other studies evaluate the 
effects of specific reforms.  Two studies investigate states’ earnings disregards, with one 
finding that a $1,000 increase in welfare benefits for employed recipients is associated 
with a 5.7 percentage point increase in employment.  Another four studies look at time 
limits, reporting employment-effects in the range of 2.3 to 15.8 percentage points.   
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3.3 Empirical Implementation  
 
The forthcoming discussion introduces the primary data sources used in the 
analysis, and then describes the process by which child care expenditure data from the 
SIPP are merged with demographic and labor market information from the CPS.  Next, I 
discuss the two main modeling strategies.  The first approach estimates the effects of 
child care expenditures, net-of-taxes wages, welfare policies, and macro-economic 
conditions on the employment of single mothers over the period 1990 to 2004.  The 
second approach exploits policy variation in the treatment of one- and multiple-child 
families to explore whether single mothers became more or less responsive to child care 
prices and taxes throughout the 1990s.  I then describe the construction of key policy 
variables.  I focus on adjustments to child care expenditures and net-of-taxes wages 
because, as previously mentioned, both variables are endogenous to the work decision 
and therefore require a number of supporting equations.  Finally, I end with a brief 
discussion of the theoretical effect of each policy variable on the employment of single 
mothers.   
Data Sources and SIPP-CPS Matching Procedure 
 
Data for this research are drawn from multiple sources, principally the March 
Current Population Survey (CPS) and the Survey of Income and Program Participation.  
The CPS is a nationally representative survey of approximately 60,000 households, 
providing detailed data on labor market behavior, income, and demographic 
characteristics for individuals ages 15 and over.  March CPS surveys for years 1991 to 
2005 are used, yielding information on employment and income for the years 1990 to 
2004.  I include in the sample single women (widowed, separated, divorced, and never 
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married) ages 21 to 64, who have at least one child ages 12 or under.  The sample is 
limited to children in this age range because it is the one most relevant to simultaneous 
eligibility for child care subsidies, the EITC, and welfare.  Single mothers from census-
defined families comprise the unit of analysis.  I include not only independent female-
headed families (primary families), but also female heads of related sub-families and 
(unrelated) secondary families.  Defining families in this manner provides the closest 
match to a tax-filing unit, which is crucial for determining eligibility for the EITC and 
other means-tested programs.  After applying a number of standard exclusions on the 
sample composition, the final analysis sample consists of 74,043 single mothers with at 
least one child ages 0 to 12.55 
Table 3.2 presents summary statistics for selected years of the CPS sample.  The 
human capital and demographic variables include age, educational attainment, race, 
marital status, non-wage income, and the presence and number of children in various age 
groups.  A few observations about the data are worth making.  First, the average skill 
level of single mothers increased during the observation period, as evidenced by the 
upward shift in educational attainment.  Specifically, the fraction of single mothers with 
some college experience increased nearly 10 percentage points throughout the 1990s.  
Second, marital behavior within the population of single mothers changed dramatically.  
Never married mothers comprised about 41 percent of all single mothers in the early-
1990s, but their representation grew to 51 percent by 2004.  This increase was offset by 
reductions in the number of separated and divorced mothers.56 
                                                 
55 Exclusions to the sample include women in the armed services; women with negative earnings, negative non-labor income, positive 
earnings but zero hours of work, or positive hours of work but zero earnings; and women with hourly wages over $150.  Also, 
approximately one-fourth of single mothers appear in the sample for two consecutive years, given the CPS structure.      
56 The changes in composition might be indicative of a larger issue.  Grogger (2003) notes that constraining a sample to only single 
mothers in the context of studying the effects of welfare and tax policies could lead to a type of sample selection bias.  Such policies 
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 A major drawback of the CPS is that it does not collect data on child care costs.  
Therefore, I must draw from various panels of the SIPP to impute child care expenditures 
for the CPS sample.  The SIPP comprises a series of national panels, with sample sizes 
ranging from approximately 14,000 to 37,000 households.57  Although the majority of 
SIPP survey content focuses on a “core” of labor force, program participation, and 
income questions, the survey is supplemented by several “topical” modules, one of which 
covers child care.  A typical child care module collects data on all child care 
arrangements for children under age 15.  Detailed information is ascertained on the type 
of child care used, the number of hours per week a child spends in care, and the cost 
associated with purchasing it.   
 Since the SIPP collects much of the same information as the CPS, it is possible to 
define both samples in exactly the same manner.58  A critical step in this process is to 
achieve a close temporal match between the collection of SIPP child care data and CPS 
labor market and earnings data.59  Fortunately, the SIPP introduces a child care module at 
several points throughout the sampling period.  Specifically, I draw from the 1990, 1991, 




                                                                                                                                                 
have altered marriage and fertility incentives, leaving the population of female heads after the policy changes to appear significantly 
less employable.  Of course, this assumes that success in the marriage and labor markets are positively correlated, but if they are, it 
could lead to conservative estimates of the effects of EITC and welfare policies on labor supply.       
57 The duration of each panel ranges from 2.5 to four years.  Households included in a given panel are divided into four rotation 
groups, each of which is interviewed in successive months.  The four-month period required to interview each rotation group is called 
a wave.   
58 Appendix 3.1 presents summary statistics for the employment, demographic, and child care characteristics of the SIPP sample of 
single mothers. 
59 Obtaining a close temporal match between the datasets is justified because the structure of child care prices likely changed in 
important ways over the sampling period.  First, employment growth among single mothers lead to an increase in the demand for and 
supply of child care.  A by-product of increased demand for child care services is the growing demand for child care labor, which 
accounts for 70 percent of child care prices (Helburn, 1995).  Finally, public policies aimed at lowering costs and increasing quality 
have also contributed to a changing price structure.   
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SIPP Panel/Wave for the Child 
Care Module 
Calendar Months to Which 
the SIPP Child Care 
Data Apply 
CPS “Data” Year(s) Matched to 
the SIPP Child Care 
Expenditure Data 
1990 Panel, Wave 3 9/90 – 12/90 1990 
1991 Panel, Wave 3 9/91 – 12/91 1991, 1992 
Overlapping 1992 Panel, Wave 
6 and 1993 Panel, Wave 3 
9/93 – 12/93 1993, 1994 
1993 Panel, Wave 9 9/95 – 12/95 1995, 1996 
1996 Panel, Wave 4 3/97 – 6/97 1997, 1998 
1996 Panel, Wave 10 3/99 – 6/99 1999, 2000, 2001 
2001 Panel, Wave 4 1/02 – 4/02 2002, 2003, 2004 
   
For example, characteristics of single mothers from SIPP’s 1990 panel (wave 3) are used 
to assign child care expenditures to a similarly constructed sample of single mothers in 
the 1990 CPS.  Since the child care module is not implemented every year, there are 
several years during the study period that a single wave of child care data is applied to 
multiple years of CPS data.  This is particularly the case during the latter part of the study 
period, when SIPP child care modules were not carried out as frequently.  After both 
samples are created, I estimate a separate OLS child care expenditure equation for each 
SIPP child care module, yielding a total of seven equations. I do so to allow for shifts in 
the price structure over the study period.  Variables included in this model are age, 
educational attainment, race, non-wage income, the number of children in various age 
groups, urban residence, and southern residence.  I also include measures of states’ child 
care regulatory environment, private child care wages, and the number of private child 
care establishments.  Parameter estimates associated with each variable are then applied 
to the corresponding attribute in the appropriate CPS sample.  It is important to note that 
SIPP child care data are observed only if a single mother is employed and paying for 
child care.  To predict child care expenditures for all single mothers, as is my goal for the 
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CPS, several supporting equations must be estimated prior to the expenditure model.  I 
describe this process in a forthcoming section.   
Estimating the Model 
 
The Main Employment Equation.  I now describe the primary modeling 
strategy.  Using CPS data over the period 1990-2004, I examine the effects of child care 
prices and taxes, along with changes to welfare policy and the economy, on the 
employment decisions of single mothers.  Therefore, I estimate a discrete choice 
participation equation that uses parameterizations of budget constraint, policy, and 
economic variables thought to influence the relative utility from employment.  The 
primary right-hand-side variables in this model are hourly child care expenditures and 
net-of-taxes hourly wages, both of which are endogenous to the work decision.  Stated 
formally, the estimated employment probit is: 
[3.1] Pr[empist = 1 | x] = Φ{α + β1E[lnEist*] + β2E[lnwist*(1-τ)] + Pist′γ + Xist′θ + εist} 
for i = 1, …, Nsi; s = 1, …, S; t = 1, …, N, where emp is the employment status for the i
th 
mother in state s at time t.  The variables lnE* and lnw*(1-τ) are, respectively, the natural 
logarithms of predicted hourly child care expenditures and net-of-taxes wages.  Recall 
that child care expenditures are imputed from the SIPP using the procedure described 
above.  The P′ is a vector of policy and economic controls.  Included here are states’ 
maximum AFDC/TANF benefits available to a family of three; a dummy variable that 
equals one for all state-years after the initial implementation of any statewide waiver or 
welfare reform; a dummy variable that equals one for all state-years after the 
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implementation of a time limit60; the predicted amount of disregarded earnings when 
calculating welfare benefits for employed single mothers; the AFDC/TANF participation 
rate for female-headed families; and the unemployment rate.61  Child care expenditures, 
net-wages, and disregarded earnings are allowed to vary across women, state of 
residence, and year, while the remaining policies vary across state-year cells.   The X′ is a 
vector of human capital and demographic controls, including age (and age-squared), 
education, marital status, race, non-wage income, and the presence and number of 
children in various age groups.  I also include a number of controls for sources of 
unobserved heterogeneity.62  State fixed-effects capture state-specific, time-invariant 
determinants of child care, tax, and welfare policy that are also related to the work 
decision.  A set of year dummy variables is also included to net out time-varying factors 
affecting all states.  Finally, I control for national and state-specific time-varying 
unobservables by experimenting with both general and state-specific linear time trends.   
 Identification of policy-effects is achieved through a number of channels.  Single 
mothers face different child care price structures and tax rates depending on the state of 
residence and sample year.  These individual sources of variation are further exploited by 
the timing and intensity of federal and state changes to child care and tax policy.  Recall 
that the sampling period covers the creation of two large child care subsidy programs in 
the early-1990s and major shift in child care policy in 1996.  These policy changes, 
                                                 
60 As expected, the welfare reform dummy variables are highly correlated because states often made many changes simultaneously.  
But a multicolinearity problem should be mitigated by the fact that I interact the time limit variable with the age of the mother.        
61 Appendix 3.2 provides a detailed description of how the key policy variables are constructed and the theoretical effect of each on 
the employment of single mothers. 
62 Policy endogeneity (a manifestation of unobserved heterogeneity) is a concern for all evaluations of public policies.  Grogger’s 
(2003) explicit discussion is quite helpful in highlighting the problem.  Simply stated, policy endogeneity occurs when unobserved 
attributes of states’ single mothers are correlated with both the timing (and intensity) of policy changes and the propensity for 
employment.  Another manifestation occurs when the effects of policies cannot be distinguished from other factors, such as the 
unemployment rate, because the onset of policy changes co-occurs with trends in economic conditions.  Nearly every study in the 
literature deals with this issue through use of state fixed-effects, year dummies, and state-specific time trends.  I do the same in this 
chapter.    
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coupled with the evolution of the child care market (shown in Table 3.1), have produced 
significant interstate and temporal variation in child care markets with which to identify 
child care-price effects.  The federal and state tax structures have undergone similar 
dramatic changes over the sampling period.  The creation and expansion of a separate 
EITC schedule for families with two (or more) children allows me to compare families of 
different sizes over time.  Furthermore, a reduction of the bottom MTR and the growing 
generosity of the CTC provide additional identifying variation.  Proliferation of state 
EITCs allows me to compare the tax treatment of single mothers across states and over 
time.  Finally, for the welfare variables, I rely on the gradual phasing-in and increased 
intensity of states’ welfare reform efforts throughout the early-1990s, culminating in a 
major shift in federal welfare policy through the 1996 PRWORA.   
Alternative Specifications.  In alternative specifications, I make more explicit 
use of the differential policy treatment of families with different numbers of children.  
Specifically, I estimate a number of models that include three-way interactions between 
the child care expenditure (and wage) variables, a dummy variable that equals one if the 
family has two or more children ages 0 to 18, and the set of year dummies.  Stated 
formally, the employment probit is given by: 
[3.2] Pr[empist = 1 | x] = Φ{α + β1E[lnEist] + β2[kidsist] + yeart′βt + ϕt[E(lnEist) 
            ∗ kidsist ∗ yeart] + Pist′γ + Xist′θ + εist}, 
where lnE is the mother’s predicted child care expenditure, kids is the dummy variable 
for two or more children, year is a dummy variable for year t, and [lnE ∗ kids ∗ year] is 
the three-way interaction.  The identical model is estimated for wages, substituting lnw(1-
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τ) for child care expenditures on the right-hand-side.63  I omit the year dummy for 
1997—the first year of PRWORA’s implementation—in the model with child care 
expenditures, thereby treating it as the comparison year.  Therefore, the coefficient on the 
three-way interaction, ϕ, should be interpreted as the differential employment-effect of 
child care expenditures for families with two (or more) children in year t, relative to 
1997.  Omitted from the model for wages is the 1993 dummy—representing the tax year 
before the differential acceleration of EITC benefits for families with two (or more) 
children.  In this case, the coefficient on the interaction term is interpreted as the 
differential sensitivity to net-wages among multiple-child families in year t, relative to 
1993.  The intuition for these models stems from the fact that child care subsidies and the 
EITC became increasingly generous toward multiple-child families over the study period 
(particularly after the passage of PRWORA96 and OBRA93).64  Therefore, one should 
expect such families to become less sensitive to child care expenditures and more 
sensitive to the returns to work.  
Construction of Key Policy Variables 
Procedure for Adjusting Child Care Expenditures.  Recall that one of the 
drawbacks of the CPS is that child care data are not collected.  I therefore use the SIPP to 
impute child care expenditures for similar samples in the CPS.  As previously mentioned, 
a number of adjustments are made to child care expenditures (lnE*) before estimating the 
employment models.  These adjustments are required for several reasons.  First, 
idiosyncrasies in the SIPP survey design coupled with the underlying decision-making 
                                                 
63 In addition to estimating this model separately for child care expenditures and net-taxes, I experimented with including both sets of 
interactions at the same time.  The results were very similar.   
64 The differential generosity of the EITC toward multiple-child families is well-known.   However, a number of states now treat such 
families differently with respect to child care subsidies.  Maryland provides an example.  Subsidy co-payments are highest for the 
youngest child in a given family, slightly lower for the second and third children, and do not exist for four or more children.         
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process of single mothers leads researchers to observe child care expenditures if the 
following conditions are met: the mother is employed, using a SIPP-defined source of 
paid child care, and paying for that care.  It is therefore necessary to assign a potential 
child care expenditure to mothers with missing data, because the cost structure faced by 
working mothers may not reflect that of non-working mothers had they been employed.  
In other words, the single mothers for whom these data are non-missing are likely a self-
selected group.  Second, child care expenditures are endogenous in the presence of 
unobserved factors related to the work decision.  Unobserved child care quality is a 
common example: quality is related to the decision to use paid care, which in turn affects 
how much is spent and ultimately the employment decision. 
To deal with these issues, I estimate four supporting equations: first-stage 
employment, use-of-paid child care, and pay-for-care equations, followed by a predicted 
hourly child care expenditure equation.  The three first-stage equations are used to 
construct sample selection terms for the expenditure model; that is, child care 
expenditures are corrected for selectivity on employment and the joint decision to use a 
paid source of child care and pay for that care.  It is important to note that I estimate these 
models separately for each SIPP child care module implemented during the observation 
period, yielding a total of seven sets of supporting equations [i.e., one for each of the 
following SIPP panels and (waves): 1990 (3), 1991 (3), overlapping 1992 (6) and 1993 
(3), 1993 (9), 1996 (4), 1996 (10), and 2001 (4)].  
As previously stated, the introduction of a tri-variate sample selection framework 
represents an important innovation in the child care literature.  Previous research uses a 
bi-variate selection correction, controlling only for selection into employment and paying 
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for child care.  However, this framework ignores a common skip pattern in SIPP’s 
questionnaire as a potential third source of selection bias.  Specifically, the SIPP child 
care module is designed such that child care payment questions cover only a subset of 
arrangements, making the child’s participation in one of these arrangements a 
requirement before expenditure data are ascertained.65  Accounting for all three factors 
leads to a modeling strategy that reflects both the mechanical and behavioral processes 
that lead researchers to observe child care expenditures for only some women.  Stated 
formally, joint estimation of the tri-variate sample selection framework is given by the 
following multivariate probit model:         
[3.3] Pr[empist] = Pr[z1 = 1 | x) =  Xist′π1 + µist1  
 Pr[paidcareist] = Pr[z2 = 1 | z1 = 1, x) =  Xist′π2 + µist2            
 Pr[payist] = Pr[z3 = 1 | z1 = 1, z2 = 1, x) =  Xist′π3 + µist3, 
where emp in [3.3] represents the dichotomous employment decision; paidcare is the 
decision to use a SIPP-defined source of paid child care; pay represents whether the 
mother pays for care; and µist1, µist2, and µist3 are disturbance terms distributed multivariate 
normal with a mean of zero and a  standard deviation of unity.  The X′ in [3.3] is a vector 
of demographic and human capital characteristics of the mother and one-year lags of the 
state unemployment rate and maximum welfare benefit.  Variables included in these 
models reflect single mothers’ underlying preferences for work and non-maternal child 
care, including martial status, the availability of informal arrangements, ages of children, 
and disposable income.  Since algorithms to evaluate multivariate normal integrals are 
not readily available, I rely on simulated maximum likelihood methods to jointly estimate 
                                                 
65 The SIPP-defined modes of paid child care include relatives, non-relatives, center-based care (including pre-school), and other 
school-based programs. 
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[3.3].  Specifically, I use the Geweke-Hajivassilioiu-Keane (GHK) smooth recursive 
simulator.66  The GHK simulator exploits the computational tractability and accuracy of 
the univariate normal by approximating the multivariate normal as the product of 
sequential univariate normal distribution functions (Cappellari & Jenkins, 2003).67     
I then estimate the following OLS model on the sub-sample of single mothers 
with positive child care expenditures, the coefficients from which will be applied to 
single mothers in the CPS: 
[3.4] lnEist* =  Xist′θ + λ1-3 + νist,  
where lnE is the natural logarithm of child expenditures per hour of employment.  To 
construct this variable, I sum expenditures across all child care arrangements for the three 
youngest children in a family, and then divide this amount by total hours worked during 
the reference week.  This definition deviates from others in the literature, which includes 
expenditures covering only the primary arrangement of the youngest child.  However, the 
approach taken in this chapter is preferable because it exploits all available information 
on mothers’ child care use, and it assumes that employment decisions depend on total 
expenditures (and not just those of a single child).  The X′ is a vector of exogenous 
determinants of child care costs, including age, education, race, non-wage income, the 
number of children in various age groups, metropolitan residence, and region.  Variables 
such as age, education, and race control for individual preferences in the choice of child 
care services, while children’s age groupings account for the fact that market prices vary 
                                                 
66 For reviews of the GHK simulator, see Greene (2003), Keane (1994), and Stern (1997).  The GHK simulator is widely 
acknowledged as one of the fastest and most accurate simulators available.  It also has a number of desirable properties: the simulated 
probabilities are unbiased, they are bounded within 0, 1, and the simulator is a continuous function of the model’s parameters.  As 
with all simulation methods, the GHK estimator is consistent and unbiased as the number of replications and observations increases.  
However, it has been shown that for the GHK, simulation bias is reduced substantially even for a moderate number of replications 
(Cappellari & Jenkins, 2003).       
67 It derives values for each error term by randomly drawing values from truncated normal distributions and then recursively 
computing simulated multivariate probability values.  The process is repeated R times (as set by the analyst), with each iteration 
producing a value for the contribution to the simulated log-likelihood function. 
 
 119  
according to the age of the child.  Finally, selection bias is accounted for through the 
inclusion of three inverse Mill’s ratio terms (λ1-3) derived from the set of first-stage 
equations.   
A key estimation issue is the identification of child care expenditures in the main 
employment model ([3.1]).  To do so, at least one statistically significant variable 
appearing in [3.4] must be omitted from the main equation.  I draw upon the most recent 
work by Anderson and Levine (2000) and Connelly and Kimmel (2003) for guidance on 
an appropriate set of exclusion restrictions.  Some specifications rely on the number of 
children in various age groups, assuming that the number of children affects labor supply 
only through its effect on the accumulation of child care expenses.  In addition, I 
experiment with several alternative sources of identifying variation that are often 
neglected in the literature.  Specifically, detailed data on state-level child care 
regulations, private child care establishments, and private child care workers’ wages 
provide a rich set of instruments to identify [3.4].  One must assume that these variables 
reflect structural attributes of states’ child care markets, and are therefore associated with 
market prices but have no direct effect on employment.68  To assess the sensitivity of 
price-effects in [3.1], I estimate several permutations of the expenditure equation, each 
one varying the exclusion restrictions and the assumptions regarding selection bias.   
  To illustrate the results from estimating [3.3] and [3.4], Table 3.3 presents 
estimates using the 1990 SIPP.  While space limitations preclude a full discussion of the 
results, they are consistent with those found in the literature.  In addition to this baseline 
                                                 
68 Several studies find that more stringent regulations lead to higher prices for child care (Blau, 2002; Heeb & Kilburn, 2004; Hotz & 
Kilburn, 1995), with either a small or statistically insignificant effect on employment (Blau, 2003; Ribar, 1992; Heeb & Kilburn, 
2004; Hotz & Kilburn, 1995).  To date, only a handful of studies use child care regulations as instruments in the expenditure equation, 
and in each case, regulations are strongly related to prices.  These results suggest that child care regulations influence labor supply 
indirectly and only through their influence on child care prices. 
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expenditure equation, I estimate a number of models that alter the exclusion restrictions 
and sample selection framework, the results of which are shown in Table 3.4.  The effects 
of minimum standards are consistent with theoretical predictions and recent empirical 
work.  Higher child-staff ratios and educational requirements are associated with lower 
child care expenditures.  Both results accord with the findings in Hotz and Xiao (2005), 
whose estimates indicate that private child care firms gain when state regulations 
mandate lower child-staff ratios but lose from increased educational requirements.  
Results in Table 3.4 also suggest that raising salaries for and the supply of private child 
care workers are associated with greater expenditures among single mothers, confirming 
theoretical predictions. 
Procedure for Adjusting Wages.  Non-linearities arising from federal and state 
income taxes and transfer programs plague empirical work on labor supply, because the 
average low-income worker faces a large number of plausible tax rates, all of which are 
endogenous to the amount of labor supplied.  As Moffitt (1986; 1990) points out, it is 
difficult to discern how changes to the budget set affect the movement of individuals 
from one segment to another or cause individuals to bunch at kink points.69  Moreover, it 
appears that workers facing an identical set of tax rates choose very different locations on 
the budget constraint.  This suggests a large role for unobserved work preferences in 
explaining the labor supply decision.   
A number of methods have been used to attempt to surmount this issue (Meyer & 
Rosenbaum, 1999; 2001; Eissa & Hoynes, 2004; Dicket-Conlin, Houser, & Scholz, 
1995).  In this chapter, I develop a simple approach that closely resembles those proposed 
                                                 
69 Recent work by Saez (2002) suggests that there is little evidence of bunching at kink points.  Even the large, discontinuous jumps in 
MTR’s caused by the ETIC do not appear to be associated with bunching.   
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by Hausman, Kinnucan, and McFadden (1981) and Heckman and MaCurdy (1981).  
Specifically, I rely on a set of instrumental variables to net out selection bias arising from 
the decision to choose a given location on the budget constraint, and I rely on a set of 
exogenous characteristics to predict a net-of-taxes hourly wage for CPS single mothers.  
This approach exploits the general sample selection framework developed by      
Heckman (1979).                                                                           
 I begin by adjusting observed annual earnings in the CPS for federal (and state) 
income and payroll taxes using the NBER’s TAXSIM calculator.  TAXSIM is a micro-
simulation model capable of generating income tax rates and liabilities to a fairly high 
degree of accuracy.  I then create a net-of-taxes hourly wage variable by dividing net-
earnings by annual hours worked.  Next, the goal is to predict an exogenous net-wage for 
workers and the sub-sample of single mothers for whom wage data are not observed.  
This is accomplished through a two-step Heckman wage procedure, with the first step 
modeling the participation decision and the second step estimating an OLS net-of-taxes 
wage equation of the form:   
[3.5] lnwist(1-τ) =  Xist′ψ + λ + ζist, 
where  X′ is a vector of exogenous characteristics of the mother (age, race, and 
education), controls for state-level economic conditions, and state fixed-effects.  The λ is 
a sample selection term constructed from a first-stage participation probit.  Variables 
used to identify the participation equation include dummies for the youngest child in the 
family, the number of children ages 0 to 18, and non-wage income.  The sample selection 
term controls for differential employment tastes across mothers, and by extension, the 
propensity to choose a segment on the budget constraint.  A separate wage equation was 
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estimated for every year in the sampling period to allow for shifts in the wage structure.  
Table 3.5 presents an example of the results from this procedure using the 1991 CPS.  
These results accord well with those from previous studies.  
3.4 Estimation Results from the Employment Model 
Main Results 
Results from the main labor supply equation are presented in Table 3.6, while 
those from the alternative modeling strategy are depicted in Figures 3a and 3b.  As for the 
main results, I begin by reproducing the employment model estimated by others in the 
child care literature.  I then present a number of estimates based on the full specification, 
followed by sub-samples of low-skilled mothers and those with children ages 0 to 5.  For 
each model, two sets of results are shown based on the exclusion restrictions in the child 
care expenditure equation ([3.4]).  The first column shows price-effects derived from the 
baseline expenditure model (results shown in Table 3.3), while the second column shows 
price-effects derived from the richer set of child care instruments (results shown in Table 
3.4).70 
Results presented in columns (1a) and (1b) are derived from the 1995 March CPS, 
and are meant to recreate a typical model in the child care literature.  Such models are 
estimated on a single cross-section of data from the pre-PRWORA period, and include 
only the policy variables listed in each column as well as several demographic 
                                                 
70 In addition to the variables shown in Table 3.6, all models control for age, race, marital status, education, age ranges for the 
youngest child in the family, presence of a child ages 13-17, and number of children ages 0 to 5.  All variables are correctly signed and 
statistically significant.  In addition, recall that the richer set of child care instruments includes measures of minimum quality 
standards, the supply of private child care establishments, private child care earnings.    
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variables.71  These models are also estimated without controls for unobserved 
heterogeneity.  A comparison of columns (1a) and (1b) shows that the coefficients on 
hourly child care expenditures are very similar, indicating that price-effects are not 
sensitive to the choice of exclusion restrictions in the expenditure equation.72  The 
estimates in column (1b) imply that a one percent increase in hourly child care 
expenditures is associated with an 18.5 percentage point decrease in the probability of 
employment (last year), while a similar increase in net-of-taxes wages increases the 
probability of employment by 40 percentage points.  Although these estimates appear to 
be rather large, they are quite close (and even slightly below) those commonly found in 
the child care literature.  
Columns (1c) and (1d) provide estimates from the full specification and sampling 
period.  Added to these models are the complete set of policy variables and a number of 
controls for unobserved heterogeneity. Comparing the model in (1d) with the one in (1b) 
it is immediately clear that the estimates of child care expenditures and net-of-taxes 
wages experience a significant reduction.  Marginal effects imply that a one percent 
increase in hourly child care costs decreases employment by 5.4 percentage points, and a 
similar increase in net-wages increases employment by seven percentage points.  These 
coefficients indicate elasticities of employment with respect to hourly child care 
expenditures of –0.174 and net-of-taxes wages of 0.711.   
One of the primary implications of these findings is that child care price-effects 
are considerably smaller than what is commonly found in the literature, whereas as the 
tax-effects are within the range of previous estimates.  Most child care studies find price 
                                                 
71 There are exceptions to this, however.  Anderson and Levine (2000) use three years of SIPP data, Connelly and Kimmel (2003) use 
two years of SIPP data, Han and Waldfogel (2001) use fours years of CPS data, and Tekin (2002) uses a single cross-section of NSAF 
data.        
72 The interpretations presented hereafter will focus on the second set of marginal effects [columns (1d), (2b), (3b)].   
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elasticities in the range –0.45 to –0.75, while previous EITC work estimates elasticities in 
the range 0.59 to 1.16.  Several factors likely account for the discrepancy in price-effects, 
the most important of these being the use of repeated cross-sectional data over a 
significant time period, a rich set of policy variables, and controls for unobserved 
heterogeneity.  It is interesting to note that a comparison of columns (1c) and (1d) shows 
once again that price-effects are not sensitive to additional instruments in the expenditure 
equation.  The consistency of these results suggests that the use of additional instruments 
is not responsible for the difference between my results and those of earlier studies.                 
The next several variables summarize the effects of various components of state 
and federal welfare reform efforts.  Specifically, I include parameterizations of the 
maximum welfare benefit available to non-workers, the expected amount of disregarded 
earnings when computing benefits for employed recipients, implementation of any 
statewide welfare reform and time limits, and states’ AFDC/TANF participation rate.  As 
expected, the monthly maximum welfare benefit shows a negative association with 
employment, but the amount of disregarded earnings shows a positive association.  
Interestingly, the size of states’ maximum welfare grant appears to be a greater negative 
work incentive than the positive incentive introduced by the generosity of welfare 
benefits to working recipients.  However, it does appear that increasing the initial 
earnings disregard and lowering the benefit reduction rate generates a sizable work 
incentive: a one percent in disregarded earnings is associated with a 1.4 percentage point 
increase in the probability of employment.  Only one other observational study has 
attempted to capture the generosity of states’ earnings disregards for employed welfare 
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recipients, and it also found significant positive effects (Meyer & Rosenbaum, 1999; 
2001). 
Turning to the welfare reform dummy variables, I find that the implementation of 
any statewide welfare reform is associated with a 1.7 percentage point increase in the 
probability of employment.  Some caution must be used when interpreting this 
coefficient, because states often began several reforms simultaneously.  This makes it 
impossible to disentangle the effects of individual reforms, but the positive coefficient 
accords with the theoretical prediction for most of the individual changes and reflects the 
overarching goal of welfare reform to increase employment.  Building on research by 
Grogger (2003) and Grogger and Michalopoulos (2003), I capture the effects of time 
limits through a dummy variable and its interaction with the age of the mother.  Allowing 
the effect of time limits to vary by age accounts for the possibility that mothers save their 
welfare benefits until an employment shock occurs.  Indeed, the theoretical model 
developed by Grogger and Karoly (2005) suggests that forward-looking mothers will not 
draw upon their benefits today, opting instead to save them for future use.73  The results 
in Table 3.6 corroborate this previous work: the coefficient on the time limit-age 
interaction suggests that this policy leads to smaller increases in employment as the 
mother ages.  For example, time limits are associated with a 2.1 percentage point increase 
in employment among single mothers who are 25 years old [0.046 + (25 x -0.001)], but 
only a 1.1 percentage point increase among 35-year-olds.   
  Finally, I estimate the effect of stigma costs and changes to the culture of states’ 
welfare offices through the AFDC/TANF participation rate.  This variable is the fraction 
                                                 
73 The precise relationship between time limits and employment depends on the age of the mother’s youngest child.  Beginning with 
the observation that AFDC/TANF eligibility ends when her youngest child reaches age 18, a five-year time limit does not influence 
work decisions when the youngest is between ages 13 and 17.  However, the younger the younger the youngest child is below age 13, 
the stronger the incentive to “bank” welfare benefits for future use.  
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of single mothers in a given state-year who receive welfare benefits.  Recall (from Table 
3.1) that this measure reached a peak of around 58 percent in 1992 and 1993, but declined 
dramatically thereafter.  Therefore, one would expect much stigma higher costs 
associated with welfare participation in recent years.  This decline, however, also 
captures important changes to the culture of states’ welfare offices.  Indeed, it is argued 
that welfare offices transformed from “check writing” to “people changing” entities 
throughout the 1990s.  This changing philosophy is borne out by the fact that several 
states now operate formal diversion programs that provide welfare applicants with small 
cash grants (and even loans) if they agree to stay off welfare.  My findings suggest that 
higher psychic or transaction costs to welfare participation are associated with increased 
employment propensities.  In fact, the coefficient on the AFDC/TANF participation rate 
suggests that a one-percentage point decrease in the participation rate is expected to 
increase employment among single mothers by 14 percentage points.   
  Table 3.6 also presents separate estimates for two policy-relevant sub-groups: 
low-skilled single mothers, defined as those with a high school degree or less, and single 
mothers with young children.  Generally speaking, one would expect the effect of the 
policy variables to be greater among these sub-samples.  The evidence supports these 
predictions, especially for mothers with low educational attainment.  Low-skilled single 
mothers and those with young children are moderately more responsive to child care 
expenditures and the returns to work, as evidenced by the larger elasticities.  In addition, 
both groups appear to be more sensitive to states’ maximum welfare benefits and 
earnings disregards.  Interestingly, the marginal effect associated with “any statewide 
welfare reform” is negative, but statistically insignificant, for low-skilled mothers.  In 
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other analyses not shown, I find that welfare reform is associated with a significant four-
percentage point increase in employment among mothers with some college or above.  
This suggests that states’ welfare offices are “creaming” or that policy reforms are most 
successful among women already likely to be employed.  However, this finding 
contradicts the work of others, which typically finds a larger role for welfare reform 
among less-skilled women (Moffitt, 1999; Meyer & Rosenbaum, 1999; 2001).  
Additional work is needed to resolve this issue.                        
 Given the interest in the relative contributions of recent policy changes and the 
economy, it is worthwhile to discuss briefly the effect of the unemployment rate.  The 
marginal effect in column (1d) implies that a one-percentage point increase in the 
unemployment rate decreases employment among single mothers by 0.7 percentage 
points.  This coincides with what others have found.  In other analyses not shown, I also 
include an interaction of unemployment with a dummy variable that equals one if the 
mother has two or more children.  The coefficient on the interaction is the differential 
effect of the economy on multiple-child families, and the results suggest that these 
families are indeed more responsive to changes in the macro-economy.  This is somewhat 
of a concern, because this chapter and others use one-child families as a comparison 
group.   
Alternative Specifications 
 
As previously stated, I estimate alternative specifications of the main employment 
model that include three-way interactions of child care expenditures (and wages) with a 
dummy variable that equals one if the mother has two or more children and the set of 
year dummy variables.  The goal of this exercise is to test whether these families became 
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more or less responsive to prices and taxes in the period after an expansion of child care 
subsidies and the EITC.   
The results of this analysis are presented in Figure 3.2a (expenditures) and 3.2b 
(net-wages).  As shown in the figures, the employment differential between multiple- and 
one-child families was dramatic during the early-1990s, with employment rates among 
the former dipping as much as 19 percentage points below the latter by 1993.  By 2004, 
however, the employment rate for multiple-child families was just five-percentage points 
below that of one-child families.  Previous research attributes this development to the 
differential tax and transfer treatment of families with different numbers of children, 
whereby policies accelerated benefits for multiple-child families.  If this is the case, one 
might also expect these families to become less sensitive to child care costs but more 
sensitive to taxes over time, relative to their one-child counterparts.   
The results in Figure 3.2a and 3.2b lend support to this idea.  Throughout the 
early-1990s, multiple-child families were more responsive to child care costs and equally 
responsive to taxes.  However, over the course of the decade and especially after the 
passage of PRWORA96 (which increased child care assistance) and OBRA93 (which 
increased the EITC), multiple-child families became equally responsive to prices and 
more responsive to taxes.  This is shown by plotting the coefficient on the three-way 
interaction term, which is the differential effect of child care expenditures (and net-
wages) among multiple-child families.  The interaction coefficient for child care 
expenditures is statistically significant in the years prior to PRWORA96, as shown in 
Figure 3.2a, but then becomes non-significant following passage of the law.  Conversely, 
the coefficients in Figure 3.2b are non-significant in the period before OBRA93, but then 
 
 129  
become significant after its passage.  Figures 3.2a and 3.2b also show that changes in the 
differential responsiveness to prices and taxes track closely observed changes in the 
differential employment rate, thus providing additional evidence that these policies are at 
least partially responsible for closing the employment gap between one- and multiple-
child families.  Effects such as these are expected when child care subsidy policy and the 
EITC have evolved in a way that provides additional benefits to families with greater 
numbers of children. 
Sensitivity Tests 
 
Estimates from the main employment probit are subjected to extensive sensitivity 
tests to determine whether price- and wage-effects are robust to changes in the 
specification.  Results from this exercise are shown in Table 3.7.  Generally speaking, the 
estimates do not appear to be sensitive to a wide range of specification issues.  Given 
space limitations, I consider only a few below.74 
 Columns (1) and (2) alter the assumptions regarding the selectivity of mothers for 
whom child care expenditures are observed.  In the first case, I estimate a bi-variate 
sample selection framework (employment and paying for care) and in the second I 
assume the absence of selection bias.  Both estimates remain negative and statistically 
significant at conventional levels, although the latter estimate is substantially lower than 
the others.  These results coupled with the fact that price-effects are also robust to 
changes in the exclusion restrictions are contrary to Kimmel’s (1998) work.  My results 
suggest that price-effects are instead sensitive to additional policy controls, the inclusion 
                                                 
74 For a complete listing of all sensitivity tests, refer to the notes under Table 3.7.    
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of fixed-effects, and the use of repeated cross-sectional data.  Additional work is needed, 
however, to fully resolve this issue. 
 The next several models restrict the analysis period to the years before 
PRWORA96, the years after its implementation, and the deletion of years during which 
the economy was growing slowly or in a recession (1990-1993 and 2001-2004).  
Although the results are fairly robust to changes in the sampling period, two issues 
warrant some attention.  First, price-effects become statistically insignificant when the 
analysis is conducted on the post-PRWORA period; second, wage-effects become 
insignificant when the analysis omits the years during the most recent economic 
slowdown.  This suggests there might be unobserved factors related to the enormous shift 
in welfare policy or the economy that are commingled with the price- and wage-effects.  
On the other hand, it could be an indication that the policy variables differentially affect 
employment depending on macro-economic conditions.  Resolving this issue requires 
substantial future work. 
 Given the drawbacks of SIPP child care data and their attending criticisms, it is 
instructive to examine the sensitivity of price-effects to changes in child care 
expenditures.  One of the primary drawbacks of the SIPP is that analysts cannot uniquely 
identify nine states in the early panels.  More recent data reduce this number to five 
states.  This is a potentially serious omission that preclude even multiple cross-sections of 
data from taking full advantage of state-by-state variation in policies and child care 
prices.  Therefore, the estimates in column (7) are derived from a model that deletes from 
the CPS the nine states that cannot be uniquely identified in the SIPP.  Fortunately, the 
results remain unchanged.  In addition, recent work by Besharov, Morrow, and Shi 
 
 131  
(2006) point out a number of problems with SIPP child care data “that make it largely 
unusable for most analyses.”  I deal with this issue by substituting a proxy for hourly 
expenditures: states’ weekly wage for private child care workers.  Although this reduces 
substantially the available variation to identify price-effects, the results are once again 
unchanged, as shown in column (8).   
 One final set of sensitivity tests is described.  The analysis sample for this 
research comprises all single mothers, regardless of marital status.  In addition to never-
married mothers, I include those who are divorced, separated, and widowed at the time of 
the survey.  However, this group is heterogeneous with respect to a number of labor 
market, human capital, and demographic characteristics.  Never-married mothers, in 
particular, tend to be younger (and have younger children), are lower skilled, have less 
education and work experience, and are more welfare prone than their previously married 
counterparts.  From a policy perspective, never-married mothers appear to be a more 
relevant group for the analysis, and so I estimate the employment model with only these 
mothers included.  As expected, never-married mothers are more responsive to child care 
expenditures and net-of-taxes wages.  The coefficients imply a price elasticity of –0.245 
and a wage elasticity of 1.504.   
Policy Simulations 
 
To summarize the findings in the previous sections, I use the estimates from the 
full employment model [column (1d) in Table 3.6] to conduct a number of policy 
simulations.  As shown in Table 3.8, the top panel presents a number of child care 
subsidy simulations, and the bottom panel simulates the effects of changes to tax and 
EITC parameters.  Most of the simulation results are compared to the baseline predicted 
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probability of employment for the full sample of single mothers (0.780).  The remaining 
comparisons are relative to a baseline probability for a specified sub-sample. 
 The first three subsidy simulations provide estimates of the anticipated 
employment-effect from subsidy programs that do not take income into account.  That is, 
they simulate the effects of universal child care subsidy programs that reduce 
expenditures by 25 percent, 50 percent, and 75 percent, respectively, for all single 
mothers.  With one-quarter of child care costs subsidized, the employment probability 
rises marginally to 0.795, an increase of 1.5 percentage points.  However, a government 
subsidy that covers three-quarters of child care costs is expected to increase employment 
by 6.6 percentage points, to 0.846.   
 The next three policy experiments conceive child care subsidy benefits in relation 
to earnings.  An abundance of evidence shows that low-income families pay a much 
larger share of their earnings on child care services than their high-income counterparts 
(Giannarelli, Adelman, & Schmidt, 2003).  Moreover, CCDF language states that low-
income families have “equal access” to high-quality providers if they do not spend more 
than 10 percent of their income on child care.  It is therefore instructive to examine the 
employment-effects of subsidy regimes that limit payments to specified percentages of 
total income.  As shown in Table 3.8, a child care subsidy that decreases costs to 10 
percent of net-of-taxes wages is expected to raise the employment probability by 5.6 
percentage points.  Interestingly, a subsidy program that reduces expenses to 15 percent 
of net-earnings results in a 3.8 percentage point increase in employment.  This indicates 
that the average single mother spends more than 15 percent of hourly wages on          
child care. 
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 There are a number of flaws, however, with the above simulations.  First, 
employment-effects are derived from a universal subsidy program, whereas CCDF 
subsidies are means-tested, restricting eligibility to 85 percent of SMI.  Second, these 
simulations are based on linear benefit schedules, whereas CCDF subsidies are non-linear 
and provide the greatest benefits to families with the lowest incomes.  Therefore, the final 
policy experiment attempts to mimic a targeted, non-linear subsidy system comprised of 
six benefit segments.75  It provides free child care to families with incomes no greater 
than $5,000, and then reduces the subsidy in increments of 15 percentage points until 
income exceeds $30,000.  At this point, the family is no longer eligible for subsidies.76  
Results from this policy experiment imply a dramatic increase in employment among 
single mothers.  Approximately 90 percent of mothers are predicted to be employed 
under this non-linear subsidy system, an increase of 11.7 percentage points.  If one 
assumes that all single mothers are about equally sensitive to child care expenditures, it 
appears that a generous, targeted subsidy system generates more employment than one 
that provides limited, universal assistance. 
 The simulations presented in Panel B begin by showing the effects of similar 
percent increases in the net returns to work.  Specifically, it focuses on a 25 percent, 50 
percent, and 75 percent increase in net-of-taxes hourly wages for the full sample of single 
mothers.  The predicted employment response is generally smaller than for child care 
subsidies, which is surprising in light of the fact that wage elasticities are much larger 
than price elasticities.  A partial explanation for these results—borne out by several 
                                                 
75 It is common for states’ subsidy systems to have several piecewise linear segments.  Maryland’s subsidy system, for example, has 
10 segments that increase in approximately $2,000 to $3,000 increments.  The system is furthered complicated by separate benefit and 
co-payment schedules for families of different sizes.    
76 This reflects quite well the chosen the break-even point among states.  In 2004, the average state set its eligibility limit (for a family 
of three) at $29,184.     
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studies—is that low-income women are more sensitive to taxes than high-income women.  
I assess this explanation in the last two tax experiments by disaggregating the 
employment response to a 50 percent increase in net-earnings by wage decile and EITC 
benefit segment.  These results show substantial heterogeneity across the wage 
distribution.  Employment is predicted to increase 10.7 percentage points over the bottom 
three wage deciles, compared to 5.6 percentage points over the top three deciles.  Similar 
results are found when the simulations are conducted across the 2003 EITC benefit 
schedule.  
3.5 Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
Throughout the 1990s, significant changes were enacted across a number of social 
policy domains that increased the incentive for single mothers to work.  Two of the most 
significant policy shifts were expansions to child care subsidy programs and the EITC.  
Each of these changes was implemented against a backdrop of federal and state welfare 
reform initiatives and unprecedented economic growth.  As these events unfolded, single 
mothers experienced a dramatic increase in employment and a decline in welfare use.  
The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to examine the effects of child care prices and 
taxes, controlling for welfare reform polices and macro-economic conditions, on the 
employment of single mothers between 1990 and 2004.   
 Results in this study suggest that the employment decisions of single mothers are 
sensitive to child care expenditures and taxes.  Estimates in my preferred specification 
imply elasticities of employment with respect to child care expenditures and net-of-taxes 
wages of -0.174 and 0.711, respectively.  These main results are corroborated by my 
alternative modeling strategy: single mothers with multiple children became 
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comparatively less sensitive to child care prices and more sensitive to net-wages over the 
study period, especially after expansions to child care subsidies and the EITC were 
enacted.  In addition, federal and state welfare reform initiatives—especially time limits 
and increased earnings disregards—appear to have made important contributions to 
moving single mothers from welfare to work.  Finally, demand-side factors such as 
improved macro-economic conditions played a substantial role in raising employment 
among single mothers.   
 One of the primary implications of my findings is that child care price-effects are 
considerably smaller than what is commonly found in the literature, whereas as the tax-
effects are within the range of previous estimates.  For example, most child care studies 
find price elasticities in the range –0.45 to –0.75, while previous EITC work estimates 
elasticities in the range 0.59 to 1.16.  This study makes several data and methodological 
improvements over previous research that likely account for the differences in estimated 
price-effects.  First, I merge empirical techniques from previous child care, EITC, and 
welfare studies to jointly estimate multiple policies alongside controls for macro-
economic conditions and a rich set of demographic characteristics.  Given that previous 
employment research demonstrates the importance of child care prices, taxes, and welfare 
reform for single mothers, excluding one of these factors might lead to significant 
omitted variables bias.  Second, whereas as previous child care studies use a single 
section cross-section of data and a small number of observations, this is the first study to 
estimate employment models that take full advantage of cross-state and temporal 
variation in child care policies and markets.  Specifically, I combine detailed data on 
child care regulations and labor markets with a large micro dataset over a 15-year period.  
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As a result, I rely on significantly more sources of exogenous variation to estimate price-
effects.  Third, I develop a methodological approach that characterizes more accurately 
the self-selection of single mothers into employment and the use of paid child care.  Each 
of these improvements is made possible by the construction of a rich dataset that for the 
first time merges child care expenditure data from one survey (SIPP) with demographic 
and labor market data from another survey (CPS) over a substantial time period. 
 Policy implications of this research are borne out by the simulation results.  I 
compare the employment response of universal increases in child care subsidies and 
decreases in taxes to a system that provides generous, targeted assistance.  Specifically, I 
examine the amount of employment generated by a non-linear child care subsidy system 
(that includes means-testing) and increases in the EITC over the program segments.  
Results in each exercise suggest that a system of generous, targeted work supports 
generates more employment than one that provides limited, universal assistance.  These 
findings are important in light of the reauthorization of TANF and the CCDF through the 
2005 Deficit Reduction Act.  This legislation introduces several punitive measures for 
welfare recipients and states, including greatly accelerated work participation rates, a 
narrowing of acceptable work activities, and the imposition of financial penalties on 
states that fail to comply with federal guidelines.  The new work requirements are, 
furthermore, matched with small increases in funding for child care subsidies, a TANF 
block grant that is not adjusted for inflation, and an economic climate less favorable than 
the one throughout the late-1990s.  The cumulative effects of these policy changes imply 
that the federal government endorses the “work first” over the “make work pay” 
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philosophy.  However, results of my policy simulations suggest that the latter might 















































TABLE 3.1:  Summary of Characteristics and Policy Changes Affecting Single Mothers, 1990-2004 
Policy / Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Panel A: Employment and Earnings (March CPS) 
Employment (%) 
All Mothers 
With High School/Less  
With Children Ages 0-5 
With 1 Child 



























































































Panel B: States’ Child Care Characteristics 
CCDF Spending  
($ in millions) 














































Private Child Care 
Earnings ($)  
12195 12522 12828 12856 12976 13038 13158 13468 13824 14157 14350 14639 14976 15174 15249 
Private Child Care Worker 7670 8146 8685 9404 10065 10611 10976 11481 12119 12638 13167 13695 13954 14004 14061 
Panel C: Federal and Sate Tax Policies 
Bottom Income MTR  0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.10 0.10 0.10 
















































































































Income Tax Liability 
All Mothers 
With 1 Child 





























































Panel D: States’ AFDC/TANF Programs 
Maximum Benefit ($) 557 545 532 515 505 494 481 467 456 451 441 434 438 430 419 
Welfare Reform 
Any Reform (%) 
Time Limits (%) 





























































Participation Rate (%) 0.511 0.546 0.578 0.575 0.549 0.500 0.439 0.371 0.273 0.209 0.185 0.168 0.160 0.157 0.152 
Panel E: Economic Environment 
Unemployment 5.6 6.8 7.5 6.9 6.1 5.6 5.4 4.9 4.5 4.2 4.0 4.7 5.8 6.0 5.5 
Notes: Dollars are adjusted for inflation to reflect 2004 prices.  All means, except for the employment, welfare reform, and income tax liability variables, represent state-level averages.  Welfare reform parameters 
indicate the proportion of single mothers in the CPS who are affected by a given reform.  Time limits never reach full coverage because Michigan and Vermont do not have them.  The labor supply, earnings, 
income tax liability, and earnings disregard variables are calculated only among those who are employed.  These are calculated from the CPS sample for each year.   The CCDF spending figures are from Besharov 
& Higney (2006).   
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TABLE 3.2:Variable Means for the CPS Sample of Single Mothers: 1992, 1995, 1998, 2001, 2004 
CPS “Data” Year  
Number of Observations 
1992 
N = 4,397  
1995 
N = 3,849   
1998 
N = 3,773  
2001 
N = 6,764  
2004 
N = 6,572  
Age 32.56  (8.18) 33.09 (8.69) 33.44 (8.70) 33.76 (9.04) 33.86 (9.41) 
Less than High School (%) 0.236 (0.424) 0.220  (0.414) 0.201  (0.400) 0.187 (0.390) 0.198 (0.399)  
High School/GED (%) 0.399 (0.489) 0.360 (0.480) 0.354 (0.478) 0.361 (0.480) 0.336 (0.472) 
Some College (%) 0.343 (0.474) 0.394 (0.488) 0.422 (0.493) 0.418 (0.493)  0.431 (0.495) 
BA+ (%) 0.020  (0.140) 0.023 (0.151) 0.022 (0.147) 0.032 (0.177) 0.032 (0.177) 
Widowed (%) 0.044 (0.205) 0.042 (0.202) 0.046 (0.210) 0.046 (0.210) 0.038 (0.191) 
Separated (%) 0.186 (0.389) 0.189  (0.391) 0.154 (0.361) 0.138 (0.345) 0.136 (0.343) 
Divorced (%) 0.359 (0.479) 0.343 (0.475) 0.330 (0.470) 0.322  (0.467) 0.317 (0.465) 
Never Married (%) 0.409 (0.491) 0.423 (0.494) 0.468 (0.499) 0.492  (0.499) 0.507  (0.499) 
Non-white (%) 0.368 (0.482) 0.370 (0.483) 0.359 (0.479) 0.354 (0.478) 0.356  (0.479) 
Non-wage Income ($) 466.99 (761.58) 508.65 (936.66) 408.60 (718.44) 428.91 (815.10) 437.06 (833.53) 
Child Ages 0-2 (%) 0.283 (0.450)  0.266 (0.442) 0.239 (0.426) 0.248 (0.432) 0.258 (0.437) 
Child Ages 3-5 (%) 0.351 (0.477) 0.355 (0.478) 0.343 (0.474) 0.317  (0.465) 0.335 (0.472) 
Child Ages 6-12 (%) 0.674  (0.468) 0.678 (0.466) 0.694 (0.460) 0.691 (0.461) 0.682 (0.465) 
Child Ages 13-17 (%) 0.211 (0.408) 0.224 (0.417) 0.230  (0.421) 0.233 (0.423) 0.232  (0.422) 
Youngest Child: 0-2 (%) 0.283 (0.450) 0.266 (0.442) 0.239 (0.426) 0.248 (0.432) 0.258 (0.437) 
Youngest Child: 3-5 (%) 0.256  (0.436) 0.265 (0.441) 0.269 (0.443) 0.247 (0.431) 0.253  (0.434) 
Youngest Child: 6-8 (%) 0.204  (0.403) 0.222 (0.415) 0.239 (0.426) 0.218 (0.413) 0.214 (0.410) 
Youngest Child: 9-12 (%) 0.255  (0.436) 0.245 (0.430) 0.251 (0.434) 0.285 (0.451) 0.274 (0.446) 
No. of Children Ages 0-2 0.328 (0.562) 0.299  (0.531) 0.265 (0.498) 0.275 (0.503) 0.289 (0.523) 
No. of Children Ages 3-5 0.410 (0.606) 0.411 (0.598) 0.385  (0.569) 0.353  (0.552) 0.375 (0.564) 
No. of Children Ages 6-12 0.916 (0.819) 0.936  (0.842) 0.963 (0.837) 0.946 (0.820) 0.924  (0.813) 
No. of Children Ages 0-17 1.916 (1.088) 1.930 (1.083) 1.900 (1.035) 1.865 (0.991) 1.885 (1.007) 
Urban Residence (%) 0.812 (0.390) 0.818 (0.385) 0.834 (0.371) 0.829 (0.376) 0.841 (0.364) 
South (%) 0.368 (0.482) 0.378  (0.484) 0.364  (0.481) 0.371 (0.483) 0.391 (0.488) 
Source: Author’s calculations from the 1993, 1996, 1999, 2002, and 2005 March Current Population Survey (CPS). 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses.  Data are weighed using the March Supplemental Person Weight.  Dollars are adjusted for inflation to reflect 2004 prices. 
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TABLE 3.3: Simulated Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the 




Multivariate Probit Sample Selection Equations 
Variable Participation 
 
Use of Paid Care 
 





hour of work) 
Age 0.072 (0.036)** 0.133 (0.031)*** 0.106 (0.033)*** 0.005 (0.010) 
Age2 -0.001 (0.000)** -0.002 (0.000)*** -0.001 (0.000)*** -- 
High School/GED 0.448 (0.086)*** 0.460 (0.084)*** 0.446 (0.089)*** -0.235 (0.160) 
Some College 0.578 (0.101)*** 0.572 (0.103)*** 0.469  (0.108)*** -0.095  (0.190) 
BA+ 1.287 (0.161)*** 1.067 (0.126)*** 1.027  (0.130)*** -0.521  (0.262)** 
Widowed 0.458 (0.190)** 0.362 (0.193)* 0.279  (0.227) -- 
Divorced 0.536 (0.094)*** 0.326 (0.086)*** 0.382 (0.092)*** -- 
Separated 0.328 (0.102)*** 0.290 (0.094)*** 0.390  (0.096)*** -- 
Non-white -0.062 (0.079) -0.092 (0.071) -0.095 (0.076) 0.060 (0.095) 
ln(non-wage income) -0.109 (0.009)*** -0.073 (0.007)*** -0.051 (0.007)*** 0.035 (0.017)** 
Child Ages 0-2 -0.264  (0.106)** 0.119 (0.113) 0.185  (0.181) -- 
Child Ages 3-5 0.031 (0.102) 0.208 (0.100)** 0.225 (0.146) -- 
Child Ages 6-12 0.002 (0.121) -0.220  (0.120)* -0.196 (0.134) -- 
Child Ages 13-17 0.313 (0.110)*** -0.101  (0.106) 0.216 (0.230) -- 
No. of Children Ages 0-2 -- -- 0.332 (0.207)* 0.296 (0.115)** 
No. of Children Ages 3-5 -- -- 0.383 (0.205)* 0.201 (0.097)** 
No. of Children Ages 6-12 -- -- 0.272 (0.188) 0.114 (0.068)* 
No. of Children Ages 0-17 -0.187 (0.051)*** -0.116 (0.051)** -0.401 (0.185)** -- 
Unemployed Adult -- -0.351 (0.298) -3.197 (0.252)*** -- 
Urban Residence -0.018 (0.087) 0.120 (0.082) 0.070 (0.084) 0.321 (0.101)*** 
South 0.115 (0.095) 0.072 (0.067) 0.063 (0.068) -0.020 (0.085) 
Unemployment Ratet-1 -0.051 (0.025)** -- -- -- 
Maximum AFDC Benefit t-1 -0.000 (0.000) -- -- -- 






0.967 (0.011) -- 
λparticipation -- -- -- 0.955 (1.189) 
λuse of paid care -- -- -- -0.444 (2.398) 
λpaying for care -- -- -- -2.536 (2.166) 
R
2
 -- -- -- 0.138 
Log Pseudolikelihood -- 
Number of Observations 
-1,886.420 
1,664 414 
Source: Author’s calculations from SIPP’s 1990 Panel, Wave 3. 
Notes: Marginal effects are presented.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  *, **, *** indicate that the coefficient is 
statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  ρ1,2, ρ1,3, and ρ2,3 is the correlation between the errors in models 
1 and 2, 1 and 3, and 2 and 3, respectively.The lambdas are the sample selection parameters derived from the joint participation, use 
of paid care, and pay for care equations.  Estimates from the other SIPP panels (waves) are available from the author upon request. 














TABLE 3.4: Alternative Specifications of the OLS Child Care Expenditure Equation: All SIPP Panels (Waves) 
Variable 1990 (3) 1991 (3) 1992 (6)/ 
1993 (3) 
1993 (9) 1996 (4) 1996 (10) 2001 (4) 
Panel A: Tri-variate Sample Selection Model and the Inclusion of State-level Child Care Instruments 

























-- -- -- 
Educational Requirement: Director  
(centers) 













































































Panel B: Bi-variate Sample Selection Model and the Inclusion of State-level Child Care Instruments  

























-- -- -- 
Educational Requirement: Director 
(centers) 
-- -- -- -- -0.025 
 (0.011)**  
-0.097 
 (0.055)*  
-- 
ln (annual wages for private child care staff) 0.070 
 (0.033)** 
0.013 











No. of Private Child Care Establishments  
(/ 1,000) 
0.079 
 (0.042)*  
-0.009 











λparticipation 0.565  




 (1.065)  
  1.711 




  (1.832) 
5.768 
 (2.306)**  
λpaying for care -2.640 












 (1.483)*  
Panel C: No Correction for Selection Bias and the Inclusion of State-level Child Care Instruments 



























-- -- -- 
Educational Requirement: Director  
(centers) 



































Source: Author’s calculations from SIPP’s Core File and Child Care Topical Module in the 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1996, and 2001 Panels. 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  *, **, *** indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  The 
lambdas are the sample selection   parameters derived from the joint participation, use of paid care, and pay for care equations.   All models include controls for age, 
education, race, non-wage income, the number of children in various age groups, metropolitan residence, and region 
 
 143  
TABLE 3.5: Estimates from the Heckman Selection-Corrected Wage Equation, 1991 CPS 
Variable Probit Participation 
Equation 
OLS Net-of-Taxes  
Wage Equation 
Youngest Child Ages 3-5  0.228 
(0.058)*** 
-- 
Youngest Child Ages 6-8  0.331 
(0.065)*** 
-- 
Youngest Child Ages 9-12  0.476 
(0.067)*** 
-- 
No. of Children Ages 0-18 -0.080 
(0.021)*** 
-- 























































λparticipation -- -0.006  
(0.054) 
R2 -- 0.122 
Number of Observations 4,352 2,959 
Source: Author’s calculations from the 1991 CPS. 
Notes: Marginal effects are presented.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  *, **, *** indicate that the coefficient is statistically 
significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  Estimates from the other CPS years are available upon request from the 




TABLE 3.6: Parameter Estimates from the Main Employment Probit 
Variable All Single Mothers Single Mothers With A High 
School Degree or Less  
Single Mothers With  
Children Under Age 6 
 (1a) (1b) (1c) (1d) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) 








































































































































State Fixed-effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Linear Time Trend No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month-in-sample Dummies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
εprices (Elasticity) -1.090 -1.288 -0.173 -0.174 -0.258 -0.265 -0.288 -0.286 
εwages (Elasticity) 3.956 4.038 0.828 0.711 1.089 0.957 0.846 0.689 
McFadden’s R2 0.154 0.155 0.160 0.160 0.154 0.154 0.151 0.151 
Log-pseudolikelihood -2,253.04 -2,250.46 -35,089.18 -35,092.46 -23,087.87 -23,089.52 -19,617.50 -19,621.68 
Number of Observations 4,306 4,306 74,043 74,043 43,156 43,156 37,723 37,723 
Source: Author’s calculations from the 1991-2005 March Current Population Survey (CPS). 
Notes: Marginal effects are shown, along with robust standard errors (in parentheses).  *, **, *** indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  All models 
include controls for age; age-squared; marital status; non-white; educational attainment; whether the  youngest child in the family is ages 3-5, ages 6-8, and ages 9-12; the presence of a child ages 13-17; and the 
number of children ages 0-5.  Estimates for these variables are available from the author upon request.  The estimates in models (1a) and (1b) come from the 1995 March CPS, while those in  (1c) and (1d) are 
derived from the full observation period.  Both sets of models include all single mothers with at least one child ages 0-12.  Models (2a) and (2b) include only single mothers with no more than a high school 
education, while models (3a) and (3b) reduce the sample to families with at least one child ages 0-5.  The models in columns (a) and (b) differ only in the way the hourly child care expenditure variable is 
identified in the OLS prediction equation.  The variable in column (a) uses the standard demographic instruments, while the variable in column (b) uses a richer set of state-level child care characteristics.  See 
text for details.     
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TABLE 3.7: Tests of Robustness 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 




























εprices (Elasticity) -0.115 -0.019 -0.539 -0.015 -0.065 -0.280 -0.203 
εwages (Elasticity) 0.709 0.254 2.606 2.793 1.034 0.422 0.892 
McFadden’s R2 0.159 0.158 0.196 0.116 0.137 0.182 0.160 
Log-pseudolikelihood -35,131.01 -35,156.22 -14,788.89 -20,162.90 -26,130.79 -22,772.63 -32,298.19 
Number of Observations 74,043 74,043 29,484 44,559 56,557 47,441 67,172 
Variable (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 




























εprices (Elasticity) -0.203 -0.245 -0.147 -0.144 -0.089 -0.266 -0.187 
εwages (Elasticity) 0.074 1.504 0.504 0.866 0.974 0.889 0.532 
McFadden’s R2 0.158 0.146 0.173 0.162 0.130 0.171 0.178 (R2) 
Log-pseudolikelihood -35,151.42 -16,909.72 -23,504.47 -35,003.9 -13,566.33 -21,405.86 -- 
Number of Observations 74,043 33,081 51,239 74,043 30,892 43,151 74,043 
Source: Author’s calculations from the 1991-2005 March Current Population Survey (CPS). 
Notes: Marginal effects are shown, along with robust standard errors (in parentheses).  *, **, *** indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
All models include controls for age; age-squared; marital status; non-white; educational attainment; whether the   youngest child in the family is ages 3-5, ages 6-8, and ages 9-12; the presence of a 
child ages 13-17; the number of children ages 0-5; and all policy variables listed in Table 3.7.  Estimates for these variables are available from the author upon request.  Each column represents a 
model in which the following change(s) are made: (1) child care expenditures are corrected for selectivity using a bi-variate sample selection procedure; (2) child care expenditures are not 
corrected for selectivity; (3) restricted to the period 1990-1996 (pre-PRWORA era);  (4) restricted to the period 1997-2004 (post-PRWORA era); (5) deletion of the period 1990-1993; (6) deletion 
of the period 2001-2004; (7) deletion of the nine states that are not uniquely identified in the SIPP (Maine, Vermont, Iowa, North Dakota, South Dakota, Alaska, Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming);  
(8) substitutes states’ weekly, private child care worker wages (/100) for predicted child care expenditures;  (9) includes only never-married mothers (deleting divorced, separated, and widowed 
mothers);  (10) includes families with at least one child ages 6-12;  (11) includes a set of interactions between year dummy variables and the number of children ages 0-18; (12) includes only 
families with one child ages 0-18; (13) includes only families with two or more children ages 0-18;  and (14) estimates the model using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression.      
  
 
 146  
TABLE 3.8: Policy Simulations 
Policy Scenario Pr(employment) Percentage Point Change 
Baseline Predicted Probability  0.780  
Panel A: Child Care Subsidy Simulations 
25% Subsidy 0.795 1.5 
50% Subsidy 0.815 3.5 
75% Subsidy 0.846 6.6 
Subsidy Reducing Child Care Costs to 15% of Net-





Subsidy Reducing Child Care Costs to 10% of Net-





Subsidy Reducing Child Care Costs to 5% of Net-





Targeted Nonlinear Subsidy: All Mothers 
a) $0 - $5,000: 100% subsidy 
b) $5,001 - $10,000: 85% subsidy 
c) $10,001 - $15,000: 70% subsidy 
e) $15,001 - $20,000: 55% subsidy 
f) $20,001 - $25,000: 40% subsidy 
g) $25,001 - $30,000: 25% subsidy 









Panel B: Tax and EITC Simulations 
25% Increase in Net-of-Taxes Hourly Wages 0.796 1.6 
50% Increase in Net-of-Taxes Hourly Wages 0.808 2.8 
75% Increase in Net-of-Taxes Hourly Wages 0.818 3.8 
Employment Change from a 50% Increase in Net-
of-Taxes Hourly Wages by Predicted Wage Decile 
        1st Decile 
        2nd Decile 
        3rd Decile 
        4th Decile 
        5th Decile 
        6th Decile 
        7th Decile 
        8th Decile 
        9th Decile 
        10th Decile 
 
 
0.535 to 0.573 
0.629 to 0.665  
0.694 to 0.727  
0.738 to 0.769  
0.782 to 0.810   
0.817 to 0.842  
0.837 to 0.859  
0.859 to 0.879 
0.871 to 0.890 













Employment Change from a 50% Increase in Net-
of-Taxes Hourly Wages by the 2003 EITC Schedule 
        Phase-in Region 
        Plateau Region 
        Phase-out Region 
        Above Phase-out Region 
 
 
0.747 to 0.777  
0.808 to 0.834  
0.842 to 0.864 







Notes: All simulations use estimates from the model in column (1d) in Table 3.7.   The baseline predicted probability is the 
probability of employment based on the  estimates from that model.  With the exception of the predictions from the wage 
decile and EITC schedule exercises, percentage point change is in relation  to the baseline probability of employment.  
Wage deciles and EITC regions are expressed in 2004 dollars. 
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FIGURE 3.1: Summary of Major Social Policy Legislation  









Act of 1988 
Created JOBS program; required states to provide work supports 
and employment activities; increased earnings disregards for 
AFDC eligibility and child care benefits; required AFDC-UP 
parents to work 16 hours/week; expanded Medicaid coverage; 
tightened child support 
 
Created AFDC Child Care and Transitional Child Care; the 
former was an open-ended entitlement for AFDC recipients; the 







Act of 1990 
Mandated that the EITC was not to be counted as income in 
determining eligibility for means-tested programs; increased the 
phase-in rate for families with 1 child to 23% by 1994; created a 
separate rate schedule for families with 2+ children, increasing 
from 14% to 25% by 1994 
 
Created At-Risk Child Care and the Child Care and Development 
Block Grant; the former subsidized costs for families at risk of 
using AFDC; the latter provided matching funds for quality-






Act of 1993 
Created a separate EITC schedule for childless workers; 
increased the one-child credit rate to 34% by 1995; raised the 





Waivers of  
1992 -1996 
Federal government granted 43 states a waiver to experiment 









Act of 1996 
Ended the legal entitlement to aid; pays fixed, close-ended block 
grants to states; allows states to impose family caps; imposes 
work requirements after two years on welfare and a 60-month 
time limit on cash assistance; allows states to sanction families; 
provides incentives to reduce illegitimacy rate 
 
Created the Child Care and Development Fund; consolidated four 
child care programs; sets eligibility at 85% of SMI; directs states 
to use 70% of funds to help welfare families (30% go to the 
working poor); permits states to transfer 30% of TANF grant to 




Act of 1997 
Created a child tax credit (non-refundable) of $500, which was 
not indexed for inflation 
 
Improved compliance on EITC by denying benefits for 10 years 
those who fraudulently claim the credit and imposing due 




Growth and Tax 
Relief 
Reconciliation 
Act of 2001 
Created a 10% bracket; increased the child tax credit to $1,000, 
made it refundable for those earning over $10K, and phased it in 
at the same income level 
 
Created separate EITC flat and phase-out regions for married 
taxpayers who file jointly; the maximum credit applies to an 
additional $1,000 of earnings and therefore extends the phase-out 
































































Act of 2003 
Increased the child tax credit to $1,000 per child for 2003 and 
2004; expanded the 10% tax bracket over the same years; granted 
tax breaks for married couples 
 




DRA05 The Deficit 
Reduction Act 
of 2005 
Reauthorized the TANF program created in 1996; increased 
states’ work participation rates to 50% of all TANF recipients 
and 90% of two-parent recipients; changed the baseline year for 
the “caseload reduction credit” to 2005 (from 1995); narrowed 
the definition of acceptable work activities; imposed penalties on 
states of up 5% of the TANF grant for failure to comply with 
federal guidelines; increased funding for child care subsidies by 
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FIGURE 3.2a: Differential Effect of Child Care Expenditures Across Families 
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Differential Price-effect, Relative to 1997 Employment Differential (2+ children - 1 child)
FIGURE 3.2b: Differential Effect of Taxes Across Families 
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CHAPTER 4: CODEPENDENT OR INDEPENDENT?                          
HETEROGENEOUS EFFECTS OF SOCIAL POLICY REFORMS                    
ACROSS LABOR MARKET CONDITIONS 
4.1 Introduction 
Throughout the 1990s, U.S. social policy underwent fundamental changes that 
realigned work incentives for low-income single mothers.  The 1996 welfare reform act 
replaced the 60-year-old Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) with the 
work-based Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program. The new 
legislation imposes strict work requirements on welfare recipients, sanctions families that 
fail to comply with those requirements, and repeals the legal entitlement to cash aid by 
placing a 60-month lifetime time limit on benefit receipt.  In addition, several other social 
policy reforms occurred contemporaneously with the onset of welfare reform.  The 1990s 
witnessed phenomenal growth in federal and state Earned Income Tax Credits (EITC), 
which provide tax-based wage subsidies to low-income families.  The federal government 
also increased funding for child care subsidy programs through creation of the Child Care 
and Development Fund (CCDF).  Finally, significant expansions to the Medicaid 
program beginning in the late-1980s enabled most single mothers and their children to 
retain eligibility for health insurance after leaving welfare.  
These policy developments, along with robust economic conditions throughout 
the 1990s, led to a steep rise in labor force participation among single mothers.  
Specifically, the share of employed single women with children under age 19 grew from 
68.3 percent in 1992 to 82.7 percent in 2000, an increase of 21.1 percent.   
An impressive empirical literature has attempted to dissect the relative 




growth among single mothers.77  While there remains strong disagreement over the 
precise contribution of each factor, recent evidence suggests a coalescence around the 
EITC, the economy, and welfare reform, in that order, as the primary determinants of the 
observed employment changes throughout the 1990s.78  Child care subsidies and welfare 
benefits consistently maintain a smaller role.  Overall, these studies find that social policy 
reforms and the economy explain between 57 percent and 93 percent of the rise in single 
mothers’ work participation. 
A drawback associated with every study in this literature is that social policy 
reforms and the economy are viewed as independent or competing explanations, thereby 
neglecting the possibility that demand conditions interact with or facilitate policy 
reforms to influence welfare and employment outcomes.  In other words, previous 
research focuses on estimating average “treatment” effects of social policy reforms, 
rather than investigating the possibility of heterogeneous policy effects across varying 
economic conditions.79  This is precisely the issue considered in this chapter.     
Although economic theory provides useful predictions for the role of specific 
social policy reforms and the economy separately, it is not clear a priori how the 
economy should influence the impact of social policy reforms.  Ultimately, this is an 
empirical issue.  However, one might reasonably assume that interactions between policy 
reforms and economic conditions take place through one of three channels.  First, a 
                                                 
77 For thorough reviews of the literature, see Blank (2002) and Grogger and Karoly (2005). 
78 There are, of course, departures from this general finding.  Not surprisingly, studies that model multiple features of states’ welfare 
reform efforts (as opposed to including a single waiver/reform dummy variable in an employment model) find a much larger role for 
welfare reform.  In most cases, the overall effect of specific reforms rivals, and even exceeds, the EITC and economic effects.           
79 In his review of Grogger and Karoly’s (2005) book on welfare reform, Gelbach (2006) argues that given the potential treatment 
effect heterogeneity, it is possible that “there is no such thing as “the” effect of welfare reform.”  While Gelbach limits his discussion 
of heterogeneous policy effects to common sub-groups defined by race and ages of children, a strong possibility exists that policy 
effects may also differ across economic conditions—not only for the average single mother but perhaps even more substantially for 
the sub-groups mentioned by Gelbach.  In addition, one also needs to note the specific use of average and heterogeneous “treatment” 
effects in this chapter.  Such phrasing is becoming more common in the welfare reform evaluation literature, but its use should not be 
confused with treatment effects obtained from randomized designs or the phrasing used in the propensity score literature.  In this 
chapter, as in all others evaluating welfare reform, the treatment is defined as single mothers’ exposure to a given policy reform, and 




policy intervention like requiring work as a condition for welfare receipt could be more 
successful in tight labor markets because new jobs are created for welfare recipients to 
fill.  In this formulation, the economy’s influence on policy reforms is reinforcing.  
Alternatively, work requirements could be less successful during periods of strong 
economic growth because many recipients would leave welfare for work even in a world 
without those requirements.  This formulation therefore implies that policy reforms and 
economic conditions are partially offsetting.  Finally, certain policy reforms might be just 
as effective (or ineffective) at increasing employment under most economic conditions.  
In this scenario, social policy reforms are invariant to the local economy. 
By matching detailed data on a large number of social policy reforms with 
Current Population Survey (CPS) samples over the period 1985-2004, I examine the 
plausibility of heterogeneous policy effects across varying economic conditions.  In doing 
so, I pay particular attention to the aforementioned channels through which such a 
relationship could be revealed.  My modeling strategy improves upon the simple state-
level coding of policy reforms that characterize most studies in the literature by 
exploiting program rules on eligibility, the timing of policy effects, and the characteristics 
of families most likely affected.  This leads to an identification strategy that takes 
advantage of policy variation not only across states and over time, but also across 
mothers within a given state and year.  In addition, this study extends the literature by 
testing for heterogeneous policy effects across three work “margins:” any work 
participation; work and no welfare; and full-time, full-year work.  Although neglected by 
previous studies, the latter two employment outcomes are important because increasing 




reforms.  Indeed, the fraction of single mothers working without welfare and working 
full-time (full-year) increased substantially throughout the 1990s.  It may also be the case 
that the impact of the economy on policy reforms operates differently depending on the 
work margin.    
 Estimates from my preferred specification imply that the bundle of social policy 
reforms considered in this study explain 38.9 percent of the employment growth among 
single mothers between 1992 and 2000.  Economic conditions, as measured by the state 
unemployment rate, account for another 13.2 percent of the employment growth.  When 
the basic model is extended to account for policy heterogeneity across economic 
conditions, fully 54.4 percent of the observed increase is explained.  Effects of policy 
reforms vary substantially across the particular policy itself, the work margin in question, 
and the economic conditions in which these policy reforms operate.  Several interesting 
patterns emerge, however.  Policy “carrots” like the EITC, child care subsidies, and 
earnings disregards reveal the greatest policy heterogeneity at low intensity work 
margins, while policy “sticks” like work requirements and welfare sanctions show 
considerably more heterogeneity at increasingly demanding work margins.  Both sets of 
policies generate the greatest employment effects when economic conditions are 
favorable, implying that a strong economy reinforces the positive incentives created by 
social policy reforms.    
 These results have important policy implications.  Social policy reforms do not 
create the same employment incentives across all economic conditions and work margins.  
Therefore, policy reforms should be carefully tailored to specific employment goals and 




goal of a given policy reform is to move welfare recipients into work, policymakers can 
reliably draw from a broad menu of policy options to achieve their objectives.  However, 
if the policy stipulates that recipients work full-time (as is the case with work 
requirements), favorable economic conditions must be present if policymakers are to 
ensure those requirements are met and recipients avoid benefit sanctions.  These results 
also suggest that economic “triggers”—in which states stop the time limit clock or adjust 
downward work participation rates when the unemployment rate exceeds a certain 
level—is a useful mechanism to help welfare recipients and states avoid financial 
penalties.  
 The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows.  Section 4.2 provides intuition 
for the plausibility of heterogeneous policy effects across economic conditions.  Section 
4.3 describes the individual and state-level social policy data and empirical strategy used 
to test for these heterogeneous effects, while Section 4.4 presents and compares estimates 
for average policy effects (hereafter called ATE models) and heterogeneous policy 
effects (hereafter called HTE models).  Section 4.5 concludes with a discussion of policy 
implications.   
4.2 The Intuition for Heterogeneous Policy Effects 
 
A sizeable empirical literature has attempted to dissect the relative contribution of 
social policy reforms and the economy to the employment growth of single mothers 
(Fang & Keane, 2005; Looney, 2005; Grogger, 2003; Kaushal & Kaestner, 2001; O’Neill 
& Hill, 2001; Schoeni & Blank, 2000; Meyer & Rosenbaum, 2001; Moffitt, 1999; 
Noonan, Smith, & Corcoran, 2005).  Most studies parameterize separately specific 




variables in an employment model along with controls for the EITC, child care subsidies, 
welfare benefits, and the unemployment rate.  A few studies use the coefficients on the 
policy and economic variables to calculate the fraction of single mother’s employment 
growth attributable to these competing factors.  Table 4.1 presents a summary of these 
results.  Overall, these studies explain between 57 percent and 93 percent of the rise in 
single mothers’ work participation throughout the 1990s.  There is, however, enormous 
variation in the precise amount attributable to each policy or economic factor.  Some of 
these differences are due to measurement issues, especially in the case of the EITC.  
Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001), for example, capture EITC effects through the income 
taxes single mothers would pay if they worked, while Fang and Keane (2005) model the 
combined federal and state phase-in rate and maximum credit.  Other measurement 
differences exist regarding welfare reform, with some studies simply controlling for “any 
statewide welfare reform” and others examining a large number of individual reforms.  
Nevertheless, the data assembled in Table 4.1 suggest that the EITC is responsible for 
approximately one-third of the employment growth, while the economy and welfare 
reform are each responsible for another 25 percent.                                               
An implicit assumption in these studies, however, is that social policy reforms act 
independently of prevailing economic conditions to influence employment.  As such, 
most of the academic and policy debate focuses on whether welfare reform or the 
economy played a larger role in lowering welfare use and increasing employment among 
single mothers.80  Of course, social policy reforms and economic conditions are expected 
to have independent effects on welfare and work outcomes, but with a few exceptions, 
                                                 
80 This was especially true in the years immediately following welfare reform.  For a sampling of early studies see, CEA (1997; 1999), 




the literature largely neglects the possibility that economic conditions also play a 
facilitative role in influencing these outcomes.  To my knowledge, three studies explicitly 
allow the effects of welfare reform to vary with the economy (Bartik & Eberts, 1999; 
Figlio & Ziliak, 1999; Hofferth, Stanhope, & Harris, 2002).  The first two studies interact 
a welfare waiver dummy variable with the unemployment rate, and the third interacts a 
work requirement dummy variable with the state median income.  All three studies use as 
the dependent variable a measure of participation in or an exit from welfare, and find that 
welfare reform is more effective when economic conditions are favorable.  However, a 
remaining issue in the literature is whether this general finding holds for a broad array of 
policy reforms and across several employment outcomes.  This study is the first 
systematic attempt to fill this gap. 
A central goal of this study is to clarify whether the strong economy throughout 
the 1990s interacted with welfare and other policy reforms to generate more favorable 
employment outcomes than if the policy reforms had been implemented in weaker 
economic conditions.  This issue has gained considerable traction in recent years, given 
the 2001 recession and the slippage in single mothers’ work participation.  Thus, a 
reasonable question to raise is how welfare caseloads or employment rates might respond 
in the event of a deep recession.  To make the question more concrete, one might posit 
whether employment levels among single mothers would have fallen more dramatically 
during the most recent recession had it not been for welfare or other policy reforms.   
It is not clear a priori how economic conditions influence the effects of social 
policies, but a number of considerations guide this study’s empirical strategy.  First, the 




reform.  Incentives created by policy “carrots,” such as the EITC or child care subsidies, 
could operate differently in an economic downturn from policy “sticks,” such as work 
requirements or welfare sanctions.  Second, heterogeneous policy effects might operate 
differently depending on the employment goal associated with a specific policy reform.  
For example, the effects of a given reform might not be sensitive to prevailing economic 
conditions if the goal is to simply move single mothers from welfare to work.  If, 
however, the employment goal is more ambitious—such as working and not receiving 
welfare or working full-time—one might expect substantially greater policy sensitivity 
across economic conditions.  A final consideration is that heterogeneous policy effects 
could themselves be non-linear; that is, policy effects are expected to reveal different 
relationships, both qualitative and quantitative, depending on local labor market 
conditions.   
In addition, interactions between policy reforms and economic conditions could 
take place through one of three channels.  First, a policy intervention like work 
requirements could be more successful in tight labor markets because new jobs are 
created for welfare recipients to fill.  In this formulation, the economy’s influence on 
policy reforms is reinforcing.  Alternatively, work requirements could be less successful 
during periods of strong economic growth because many recipients would leave welfare 
for work even in a world without those requirements.  That welfare caseloads started 
declining in early-1994, over two years before the passage of national welfare reform and 
during a period of strengthening economic conditions, lends support to an independent, 
countercyclical relationship between the economy and welfare participation.81  This 
                                                 
81 Data presented in Crouse (1999) and discussed in Fang and Keane (2005) suggest that caseloads started falling before the 




formulation therefore implies that policy reforms and economic conditions are partially 
offsetting.  Finally, certain policy reforms might be just as effective (or ineffective) at 
increasing employment under most economic conditions.  In this scenario, social policy 
reforms are invariant to local labor market conditions.  
4.3 Empirical Implementation 
 
The forthcoming discussion introduces the individual-level labor market and 
demographic data from the CPS and describes the construction of social policy and 
economic variables used in the analysis.  A key issue considered here is the identification 
of policy effects.  I then discuss the two main modeling strategies.  The first approach 
estimates the effects of policy reforms and the economy on the employment of single 
mothers over the period 1985 to 2004.  Parameter estimates from this model are 
interpreted as average effects of social policies across all mothers and economic 
conditions (average treatment effects or ATE models).  In the second approach, I allow 
the effects of policy reforms to vary across several discrete categorizations of economic 
conditions, and so the estimated coefficients are considered heterogeneous policy effects 
(heterogeneous treatment effects or HTE models).  Both models are estimated using three 
discrete-choice employment outcomes:  any work participation (AW); employed and not 
receiving welfare (WNW); and employed full-time, full-year (FTFY).   
Labor Market and Demographic Data 
 
Individual-level data on single mothers are drawn from the annual demographic 
supplement to the Current Population Survey (CPS).  The CPS is a nationally 




labor market behavior, income, and demographic characteristics for individuals ages 15 
and over.  March CPS surveys for the years 1986 to 2005 are used, yielding information 
on employment and income for the years 1985 to 2004.  Included in the sample are single 
women (widowed, divorced, separated, and never married) ages 21 to 64, who have at 
least one child ages 18 and under.  The sample is limited to children in this age range 
because it is the one most relevant to simultaneous eligibility for welfare, the EITC, and 
other means-tested programs.  Single mothers from census-defined families comprise the 
unit of analysis.  I include not only independent female-headed families (primary 
families), but also female heads of related sub-families and (unrelated) secondary 
families.  Defining families in this manner provides the closest match to a tax-filing unit, 
which is crucial for determining eligibility for multiple means-tested programs.  After 
applying a number of standard exclusions on the sample composition, the final analysis 
sample consists of 120,189 single mothers with at least one child ages 0 to 18.82     
As shown in Table 4.2, three employment outcomes are explored in this chapter, 
reflecting work margins critical to the success of social policy reforms.  I first construct a 
measure of annual employment, defined as whether a given single mother was employed 
at all in the previous year (AW).  This measure reflects the dichotomous work decision, 
or employment at the extensive margin, that has been the focus of most previous 
research.  Participation along the AW margin increased from 68.3 percent to 82.7 percent 
between 1992 and 2000.  Two infra-marginal employment measures are also constructed: 
whether the mother was employed at all and did not receive welfare in the previous year 
(WNW) and whether the mother was employed full-time (35+ hours/week), full-year 
                                                 
82 Exclusions to the sample include women in the armed services and women with negative earnings, negative non-labor income, 
positive earnings but zero hours of work, or positive hours of work but zero earnings.  Also, approximately one-fourth of single 




(48+ weeks) (FTFY).  Although neglected by earlier work, participation along these two 
work margins increased substantially throughout the 1990s, as depicted in Figure 4.1.  At 
the WNW margin, employment grew from 56.7 percent to 75.8 percent, while 
employment at the FTFY margin grew from 57.9 percent to 64.8 percent over the same 
period.                           
Table 4.3 presents summary statistics for the CPS sample of single mothers, 
organized around the three employment outcomes.  It appears that the observable 
characteristics of these mothers are correlated with the intensity of work.  Women 
participating at the FTFY margin are older, on average, than women at the AW margin.  
In addition, single mothers employed at the FTFY margin are more highly skilled, as 
measured by educational attainment, less likely to be never married and have younger 
children, and less likely to head families with greater numbers of young children.  
However, mothers across all three work margins are evenly distributed among urban-
rural areas and geographic regions.  These descriptive results are intuitively reasonable, 
given that participation at the FTFY margin is significantly more demanding, and 
therefore requires greater work experience and skills and fewer barriers.   
Social Policy Variables 
 
The following discussion describes the construction of key social policy variables 
examined in this study.83  In particular, I document changes to federal and state EITCs, 
                                                 
83 Several data sources were used to collect and corroborate these data.  I am indebted to Hanming Fang and Michael Keane for 
sharing their extensive documentation of state and federal policy changes.  Many of the variables I construct are different in important 
ways from their variable list, but these authors have substantially advanced the literature with the breadth and depth of their policy 
data.  The Urban Institute’s Welfare Rules Databook (various years) and the Welfare Rules Database were invaluable for coding many 
of the TANF variables.  Crouse (1999), DHHS (1997), and U.S. GAO (1997) provided information on states’ waiver programs.  
Federal and state EITC parameters were drawn from Fang and Keane and various publications from the Center on Budget and Policy 
Priorities.  Data on CCDF spending (and its predecessor programs) were taken from the Green Book (various years).  Finally, states’ 
earnings disregard policies were coded using the Welfare Rules Database and Characteristics of State Plans for Aid to Families with 




child care subsidies, welfare benefits and earnings disregards, several components of 
AFDC waivers and TANF policy, and Medicaid (see Table 4.2).  This study also 
considers for the first time two increasingly popular options used by states to deter 
probable welfare recipients from seeking aid: mandatory job search at the time of 
application and cash diversion programs.  I pay careful attention to creating potentially 
exogenous variation in each policy reform by exploiting not only cross-state and year-to-
year variation, but also that across mothers within a given state and year.  In doing so, I 
make two important assumptions.  First, by conditioning the sample on women being 
single and having children, I take marriage and fertility decisions to be exogenous.  
Economic models provide clear predictions that welfare and tax policy should influence 
these decisions, but the empirical evidence is mixed.84  Even if social policy reforms 
affect underlying preferences for marriage and fertility, this sample selection problem 
will produce a downward bias if marriageability and employment outcomes are positively 
correlated.  The second and related assumption is that, by “turning on” policy variables 
only for those mothers who are potentially influenced by such reforms (as opposed to 
turning them on for all mothers), I assume a partial-information-decision-making process, 
such that reforms influence women’s employment behavior only when they become 
single mothers.  Again, however, this is a conservative assumption, leading me to 
understate the influence of policy reforms.   
Federal and State Earned Income Tax Credits.  Arguably the most important 
change to work incentives faced by single mothers comes from the EITC.  Enacted in 
1975, federal expenditures on the EITC increased dramatically throughout the 1990s.  By 
                                                 
84 For an excellent review of the fertility literature, see Moffitt (1997), who concludes that “A majority of the studies show that welfare 
has a … positive effect on fertility rather than none at all…Considerable uncertainty surrounds this consensus because a sizable 
minority of the studies find no effect at all…”  Bilter, Gelbach, Hoynes, and Zavodny (2004) review the evidence on marriage, and 




2004, foregone revenue totaled $39.3 billion, up from $2.1 billion in 1985.  Claimant 
families also grew steadily over this period, from 7.4 million to 21.4 million.  Single-
parent families comprise 48 percent of all claimants, and 75 percent of EITC dollars are 
paid to these families (Liebman, 1999; Green Book, 2004).  In addition, state EITCs are 
increasingly widespread.  In 1985, two states (Rhode Island and Wisconsin) operated 
their own EITC, increasing to 16 states by 2004.  These credits simply “piggyback” onto 
the federal credit by using its eligibility rules and credit rates.  To capture EITC effects, I 
combine the federal and state maximum credits that apply to families of a given size.  
Identification of this variable comes from year-to-year changes in the federal credit 
(especially after the 1986, 1990, and 1993 expansions), cross-state variation in maximum 
credits, and the differential treatment of families with different numbers of children.  
Table 4.4 displays the large and differential growth in the EITC maximum credit between 
1985 and 2004.  By 2004, eligible families with two or more children could receive a 
credit of $4,536, compared to $2,738 among one-child families. 
Child Care Subsidies.  Child care subsidies help low-income families defray 
child care costs, thereby reducing fixed work costs and increasing the likelihood of 
employment.  The federal and state governments increased significantly child care 
funding over the past two decades by consolidating four preexisting programs and raising 
overall spending.  By 2004, approximately $9.4 billion was spent through the CCDF, 
serving 1.7 million children per month.  I parameterize changes to child care subsidy 
policy by summing federal and state expenditures through the CCDF (and its predecessor 
programs) and dividing by the number of children ages 0-12 in a given state and year.  




spending (which prior to 1991 was zero), cross-state variation in funding generosity, and 
program rules governing the age-eligibility of children who can receive subsidies.  In 
particular, mothers whose youngest child is over age 12 are ineligible for child care 
assistance, making such families a potential comparison group.  As shown in Table 4.4, 
CCDF spending per child rose from zero in 1985 to $135 by 2004.   
Welfare Benefits and Earnings Disregards.  Welfare benefits paid to non-
working women increase the utility of remaining in that state, thereby providing an 
unambiguous disincentive to work.  Over the past two decades, states took a number of 
steps to mitigate this disincentive.  First, the real value of maximum welfare benefits 
declined substantially, as shown in Table 4.4, with some states experiencing declines as 
large as 25 percent in the period following welfare reform.  Second, states altered policies 
governing earnings disregards when computing benefits for employed welfare recipients.  
Specifically, states increased the initial disregard and lowered the benefit phase-out rat.  I 
control for the generosity of states’ welfare benefits through the maximum AFDC/TANF 
benefit (for a three-person family) paid to non-working recipients.  Changes to earnings 
disregards are captured by assigning to each single mother a predicted amount of annual 
disregarded earnings, based on mothers’ own earnings and states’ disregard policies in a 
given year.85  Identifying variation for both variables comes from the large geographic 
and temporal variation in benefits and disregards.86  Moreover, disregards vary across 
mothers, depending on exogenous, individual determinants of earnings.  Between 1985 
and 2004, maximum welfare benefits declined from $592 to $420, on average, while the 
                                                 
85 This is a new approach to controlling for earnings disregard policies.  Previous research simply incorporates such parameters as the 
benefit reduction rate.   For a detailed description of how my procedure is accomplished, see Herbst (2006).   
86 An additional source of variation for these and all other welfare-related variables is that welfare benefits are paid until the youngest 
child reaches age 17.  Since my sample includes families whose youngest is age 18, these families provide a potential comparison 




phase-out rate declined from 67 percent to 46 percent, leading to a large increase in the 
amount of disregarded earnings over this period, as shown in Table 4.4.   
Mandatory Job Search and Cash Diversion Programs. Many states have 
recently begun experimenting with policies that deter potential welfare recipients from 
receiving aid.  Currently, 20 states mandate job search activities at the time of 
application.  Specifically, these policies require applicants to search for a job either prior 
to applying for welfare or while the application is being vetted.  Applicants must then 
prove that they have indeed searched for a job.  Second, 30 states operate formal cash 
diversion programs, in which eligible applicants forgo welfare receipt in order to obtain 
temporary cash payments.  States vary greatly in the amount provided to families, with 
some states providing a one-time lump sum transfer and others calculating the diversion 
payment as a percentage of the normal benefit.  In addition, states limit the number of 
times an eligible family can receive payments, and many deny eligibility for some period 
following the transfer.  I code both policies as state-level dummy variables, since they 
likely influence the behavior of a larger group of single mothers.  Therefore, 
identification is achieved mainly through the differential timing of “turning on” these 
policies.87  By 2004, over 46 percent of single mothers lived in states that implemented 
job search requirements, while 64 percent were potentially influenced by formal 
diversion programs. 
Work Requirements and Sanctions.  In 1993, Iowa became the first state to 
implement work requirements as a condition for receiving welfare.  With the passage of 
welfare reform in 1996, all states now require recipients to participate in an acceptable 
                                                 
87 Again, another source of identifying variation comes from the fact that these policies affect only those families whose youngest 




work activity within 24 months of obtaining benefits, although 42 states require work 
immediately.  States vary greatly in the type of work deemed acceptable and the number 
of hours per week one must participate in these activities, but most states require a 
minimum of 30 hours of weekly participation.  Prior to the Family Support Act (FSA) of 
1988, recipients with children under age six were exempt from work requirements.  Over 
time states lowered this age exemption, thereby exposing more mothers to work 
requirements.  Most states currently exempt only those families with children under 12 
months old.  In cases where the recipient is not exempt from work requirements and not 
complying with them, states have the option to sanction these families by reducing or 
eliminating all or part of their welfare benefits.  As of 2004, 18 states had an initial, full-
family sanction for failing to comply, and 42 states had an ultimate, full-family sanction.  
I create two dummy variables that capture the effects of work requirements and sanctions, 
as shown in Table 4.2.  First, I use states’ work requirement time limits combined with 
age exemption policies and the age structure of CPS families to code single mothers as 
potentially exposed to a work requirement.  Second, I use the policy variation noted 
above in conjunction with state-specific sanction policies to code mothers as potentially 
affected by an initial full-family sanction.88  Identification of these variables comes from 
multiple sources.  States vary dramatically in terms of when both policies were first 
implemented, and given additional variation in the work requirement time limit, when 
individuals could be subjected to them.  For example, as shown in Table 4.4, a small 
number of single mothers were potentially bound to work requirements beginning in 
                                                 
88 Specifically, I use the age of the youngest child in a given family in concert with state-specific exemption policies to determine 
whether, in principle, a family could be exempt, even if the state’s work requirement time limit exhausted.  Most studies focus on 
whether a given state implements an ultimate full-family sanction.  However, this is misspecified because it is difficult to determine 
when that sanction will be used and therefore may not be as influential.  As a result, I model the initial sanction because it is the one 




1994, increasing to 90 percent by 2004.  A second source of variation comes from 
changes to states’ age exemption polices: fully 42 percent of mothers were exempt from 
work requirements in 1985, while only seven percent were exempt in 2004.  Thus, 
women who are shielded from work requirements because their children fall within the 
age exemption range helps to identify this effect and that of sanctions.   
Time Limits.  Time limits represent the greatest departure from previous policy.  
The origins of time-limited welfare receipt are found in the AFDC waiver period, during 
which 16 states retracted the entitlement status of welfare.  With the implementation of 
PRWORA in 1996, all states have to abide by the federally mandated 60-month time 
limit.89  Two types of time limit policies are implemented: lifetime and intermittent.  The 
former deems ineligible for future benefits those families that have received welfare for 
60 months, consecutively or nonconsecutively.  The latter allows families to receive 
welfare for a certain number of months in a given period and then requires a “benefit 
waiting period” before regaining eligibility.  By 2004, 43 states implemented a lifetime 
time limit, 16 states implemented an intermittent time limit, and five states (District of 
Columbia, Maine, Michigan, New York, and Vermont) do no have either.  Time limits 
have both mechanical and behavioral effects on employment.90  Mechanical effects arise 
from the fact that individuals must work after hitting the state-defined limit, assuming it 
is enforced.  The behavioral effect incorporates the assumption that forward-looking 
women will save their stock of welfare benefits until they experience an employment 
shock.  Therefore, the hypothesized positive effects of time limits will be greater when 
                                                 
89 A critical point is that states have enormous flexibility on how to implement their time limit policies.  On the one hand, states can 
set stricter limits than 60 month time limit, but on the other hand, states can and do continue to pay benefits after the time limit as long 
as they do so with their own funds.     




women are in their early working years and will decrease as they age.91  I create three 
dummy variables to account for these mechanical and behavioral effects.  The first two 
are state-level measures designed to capture whether a state has a lifetime or intermittent 
time limit.  These variables are then interacted with the age of the mother to account for 
the age-dependence of time limit effects.  The third variable uses information on when 
states’ implemented their time limits, the amount of time allotted for welfare receipt, and 
the age of a mother’s oldest child to determine whether a time limit could be binding.  
The intuition for this variable is that mothers cannot receive welfare any longer than the 
age of the oldest child.  Therefore, it is impossible for time limits to bind for a mother 
whose oldest child is “younger” than the time limit.92  As shown in Table 4.4, time limits 
bound for the first wave of single mothers as early as 1997; by 2004, two-thirds of 
mothers were potentially bound. 
Medicaid. Enacted in 1965, the Medicaid program provides medical insurance to 
low-income families.  Prior to the mid-1980s, participation in Medicaid was linked to 
participation in AFDC, but a number of recent changes have allowed single mothers and 
their children to maintain eligibility after leaving welfare.  Arguably the most important 
change came through OBRA 1990, which required states to phase in coverage for 
children born after September 1983, until all poor children ages 18 and under were 
insured.  As shown in Table 4.4, this benchmark was met in 2002.  To capture changes in 
Medicaid generosity, I create a dummy variable to reflect whether all children in a 
working family are potentially insured.  I exploit not only year-to-year variation in 
                                                 
91 The precise relationship between time limits and employment depends on the age of the mother’s youngest child.  Beginning with 
the observation that AFDC/TANF eligibility ends when the youngest child reaches age 18, a five-year time limit does not influence 
work decisions when the youngest child is between ages 13 and 17.  However, the younger the youngest child is below age 13, the 
stronger is the incentive to “bank” welfare benefits for future use.  Another critical point is that time limits generate negative work 
incentives for some mothers and positive incentives for others, both of which depend on the age of the youngest child.   




eligibility rules, but also variation across mothers within a state and year because 
eligibility depends in part on the age structure of children.   
Estimating the Employment Models 
 
As previously stated, two basic employment models are estimated in this study: 
an ATE and HTE model.  Within each model, three employment outcomes are 
investigated: AW (any work), WNW (work and no welfare), and FTFY (full-time, full-
year work).  Given the discrete characterization of the employment outcomes, the 
decision to participate in each work state arises from the underlying utility generated by 
single mothers’ work choices.  This underlying propensity to work at a given margin is 
not observed, however, and so I express the ATE model in the following manner: 
[4.1] Pr[empist = 1 | x] = Φ{α +  Pist′β + φEist + Xist′θ + µs + νt + (trend × νt) + εist},  
for i = 1, …, Nis; s = 1, …, S; t = 1, …, N, where ε ∼ i.i.d. N(0,1).  Given the normality 
assumption on ε, I estimate this model using probit regression.  The dependent variable, 
empist, is one of three employment outcomes for the i
th single mother in state s at time t.  
The Pist represents a vector of social policy reforms, and Eist is the average, annual state 
unemployment rate.93  I also include controls for observable characteristics that are 
correlated with policy reforms and local economic conditions, and which also shift 
preferences for employment.  The Xist is a vector of demographic and human capital 
variables, such as age, race, marital status, educational attainment, number and ages of 
children, metropolitan status, and non-wage income.  The parameters µs and νt denote 
                                                 
93 I experimented with several other measures of economic conditions, with varying degrees of success.  First, I tested a measure of the 
volatility of states’ economic environment by creating the mean deviation of county-level unemployment rates from the overall state 
average, weighted by the size of the labor force.  In addition, I experimented with state-level measures of total UI covered 
employment and wages as well as employment and wages in the retail and service sectors.  Employment and wage growth rates were 
also tested.  Many of these measures were statistically significant in the ATE employment models, although at times the coefficients 




state and year fixed effects, while (trend × νt) indicates state-specific time trends.  The 
parameters of interest are β and φ, which measure the impact of social policy reforms and 
the economy, respectively, on the employment of single mothers.  Specifically, these 
parameters measure the average effect of policy and economic variables across all 
mothers and economic conditions.   
 To test for heterogeneous policy effects (HTE model), I estimate permutations of 
the following stylized model: 
[4.2] Pr[empist = 1 | x] = Φ{α + β1(Pist × EUR<26th) + β2(Pist × EUR26th–50th) + β3(Pist × EUR51st–
75th) + β4(Pist × EUR>75th) + Eist′φ Xist′θ + µs + νt + (trend × νt) + εist},                                
where empist denotes the binary work outcomes described above.  The key variables in 
this model are interactions between each social policy reform (Pist) and dummy variables 
for quartiles of the state unemployment rate (E).  The quartile dummies are created in the 
following manner.  I first average in two-year increments (over the period 1985-2004) the 
unemployment rate and then create a dummy variable at each quartile break in the 
distribution.  This leads to following four unemployment rate dummy variables: 
EUR<26th: (UR is less than the 26
th percentile) = 1; 0 = otherwise 
EUR26th–50th: (UR is between the 26
th and 50th percentiles) = 1; 0 = otherwise 
EUR51st–75th: (UR is between the 51
st and 75th percentiles) = 1; 0 = otherwise 
EUR>75th: (UR is greater than the 75
th percentile) = 1; 0 = otherwise.94 
Creating quartile distribution breaks in two-year increments ensures a large number of 
observations in each cell and accounts for cyclical movements in economic conditions.  
There is also considerable variation across the distribution breaks, as shown in Table 4.4. 
Another advantage of this approach is that it allows the effects of policy reforms to vary 
                                                 
94 Two-year incremental averages and quartile breaks are admittedly ad hoc.  However, I experimented with alternative break points 
(e.g., three and five distribution breaks) and with one-year and three-year incremental averages.  The results are qualitatively similar  




across fairly heterogeneous economic conditions, but also provides information on how 
each reform operates within a very specific environment.95  I suppress from the model the 
“main effect” associated with each policy reform, so that the coefficient on the interaction 
(β) is interpreted as the impact of a given policy reform at the specified unemployment 
quartile.96  This parameterization allows for a general test of heterogeneous policy 
effects. 
4.4 Estimation Results 
 
This section presents estimation results for the probit ATE and HTE models.  The 
ATE results are depicted in Table 4.5, and HTE results are depicted in Table 4.6.  In 
addition, I estimate the HTE model on two sub-groups: single mothers with a high school 
degree or less (Table 4.7) and non-white single mothers (Table 4.8).97  Table 4.9 contains 
results from specification tests of the equality of policy coefficients across quartiles of the 
unemployment rate.   
Results from the ATE Models 
 
Table 4.5 presents marginal effects associated with social policy reforms and the 
economy across all three work margins.  Coefficients are for the most part statistically 
significant at conventional levels and correctly signed.  Marginal effects associated with 
the EITC and child care subsidies suggest that both policies are strongly and positively 
related to employment at the AW and WNW (only subsidies) margins but negatively 
                                                 
95 Still another advantage of the dummy variable approach is that is mitigates the collinearity problem that arises when interacting each 
policy reform with the continuously measured unemployment rate.    
96 Multicollinearity was somewhat of a concern when estimating [2].  Therefore, I estimate a separate probit model for each set of 
policy-unemployment rate interactions, for a total of 12 regressions for each employment outcome (or 36 different regressions).     
97 I estimate the HTE model on several other sub-groups, including mothers with young children and never married mothers.  Results 
are qualitatively similar to those reported in the text, although given the smaller sample sizes associated with the above sub-groups, 




related to employment at the FTFY margin.  Although support for the latter result is 
somewhat less common in the empirical literature, it does in fact accord with economic 
theory.   Women at this margin are more likely to be within the phase-out range of the 
EITC and experience greater subsidy co-payment rates, both of which act as implicit 
taxes on earnings and therefore create an incentive to lower work intensity.  
 The negative job search coefficients may at first appear to be counterintuitive, but 
recall that states only require a job search as a condition for applying for welfare.  No 
requirement exists that applicants must find employment as well.  Therefore, it could be 
the case that welfare applicants simply look for a job (or at least indicate that they have) 
to fulfill the requirement, and then remain unemployed while receiving welfare.  
Additional research is needed to verify this assertion.  Formal diversion programs, on the 
other hand, are positively associated with employment at the AW and WNW margins, but 
this effect disappears at the FTFY margin.  Such a pattern of results is reasonable given 
that families must be income-eligible for TANF in order to receive a diversion grant, and 
so one would not expect the relationship to hold at the FTFY margin.   
Work requirements, benefit sanctions, and time limits are, as expected, positively 
related to employment across virtually all work margins.  Time limits display the age-
dependence predicted by economic theory, that is, this policy leads to smaller increases in 
employment as the mother ages.  Not surprisingly, binding time limits (mechanical 
effect) are associated with larger employment effects than the parameterization of 
lifetime and intermittent time limits, which capture behavioral effects.  An interesting 
pattern emerges for these policy “sticks”: the magnitude of the employment effects 




requirements and sanctions, conform to the structure of states’ TANF programs, in that 
most states require full-time participation in a work activity or risk benefit sanctions.  
Therefore, one might expect greater behavioral effects at the WNW and FTFY margins. 
Finally, economic conditions, as measured by the state unemployment rate, are 
strongly related to employment at the AW margin, but the effect attenuates across the 
WNW and FTFY margins (and is statistically insignificant at WNW).  Such results imply 
that tenuous workers are more sensitive to demand conditions—perhaps because they are 
younger and less-skilled—but that economic conditions matter less once workers become 
firmly rooted in the labor force. 
In sum, marginal effects in Table 4.5 imply a pattern of results that split policy 
“carrots” and “sticks.”  The former set of policies—including the EITC, child care 
subsidies, and Medicaid—appear to have its largest positive effects at the AW margin 
and then decline (or become negative) with increasing work intensity.  Policy “sticks,” on 
the other hand, exhibit greater positive effects as work intensity increases.  That work 
requirements and sanctions create stronger work incentives at the FTFY margin is 
reasonable given the structure of states’ TANF policies.  Economic conditions appear to 
be influential at work margins where tenuous workers are most likely located (AW), 
declining somewhat as work intensity becomes increasingly demanding. 
Results from the HTE Models   
 
Table 4.6 presents marginal effects from the probit HTE models estimated on all 
single mothers, and Tables 4.7 and 4.8 investigate sub-samples of low-skilled and non-
white mothers, respectively.  To ease interpretation of results, I suppress in Tables 4.7 




interactions.98  Given the large number of results, I focus the discussion on a few policy 
reforms. 
Marginal effects associated with the EITC and child care subsidies are positively 
associated with employment at the AW margin, and this finding holds across all quartiles 
of the unemployment rate.  Both policies, once again, become negative as the intensity of 
work increases.  However, whereas the EITC effects are relatively stable across all 
economic conditions, spending on child care subsidies is quite sensitive to the economic 
environment.  Specifically, the magnitude of positive and negative effects is greatest 
when relative economic conditions are favorable.  At the AW margin, the magnitude of 
the positive incentive introduced by CCDF spending increases threefold moving from the 
least to the most favorable economic environment, while the magnitude of the 
disincentive roughly doubles at the FTFY margin.  One possible explanation for this 
pattern is that CCDF spending is negatively correlated with the unemployment rate (ρ =  
-0.26), suggesting that single mothers’ employment decisions become more responsive to 
economic incentives as funding levels for subsidies increase. 
 The pattern of results for job search and diversion programs is striking.  States’ 
mandatory job search policies lead to lower employment rates at the AW and WNW 
margins, but become positive at the FTFY margin.  In fact, the only positive and 
statistically significant result for job search policies is found at the FTFY margin, and 
when economic conditions are favorable.  Diversion programs, on the other hand, are 
consistently positively associated with employment, but the magnitude and significance 
of the effect increases as work intensity increases in favorable economic conditions.  
Together these results imply that soft policy “sticks” require a strong economy in order to 
                                                 




produce employment gains, especially if the goal of such policies is to increase full-time 
employment.           
 Turning to such hard policy “sticks” as work requirements, welfare sanctions, and 
time limits one finds a similar pattern of results.  The case of work requirements provides 
an interesting example.  This policy does not produce consistent evidence of a positive 
employment effect across the AW and WNW margins, but there appears to be strong 
evidence of such an effect at the FTFY margin.  These results largely confirm those 
found in Table 4.5.  In addition, the magnitude of marginal effects is remarkably uniform 
across quartiles of the unemployment rate at the AW and WNW margins but displays 
greater heterogeneity at the FTFY margin, with larger positive effects in robust economic 
conditions.  In fact, moving from the least to the most favorable labor market conditions 
increases the effects of work requirements by 31 percent at the FTFY margin.  Welfare 
sanctions create stronger work incentives across increasingly demanding work margins, 
but the effects do not reveal much heterogeneity across economic environments.  Finally, 
the pattern of results for time limits, especially binding and intermittent time limits, 
follow a pattern similar to that of work requirements: one finds the largest magnitude of 
effects at the FTFY margin and when the economy is strong.  Moving from the least to 
the most favorable labor market conditions increases the employment effect by 54 
percent and 37 percent for intermittent and binding time limits, respectively.   
 With a few exceptions, the results in Table 4.6 imply some interesting patterns.  
Policy “carrots”—especially child care subsidies, disregarded earnings, and Medicaid 
generosity—create their greatest employment incentives when the economy is strong and 




diversion grants actually require strong economic conditions to produce positive 
employment effects, while hard policy “sticks” like work requirements and time limits 
produce larger effects in strong conditions.  In addition, patterns for all policy “sticks” are 
more pronounced across increasingly intense wok margins.    
 A similar pattern emerges, and in many cases is more dramatic, for sub-samples 
of low-skilled (i.e., those with a high school degree or less) and non-white single 
mothers.  Tables 4.7 and 4.8 present results for these sub-groups.  Across both types of 
mothers, the EITC leads to uniform employment effects across both economic conditions 
and work margins.  Federal and state spending on child care subsidies is associated with 
greater employment rates in favorable economic conditions, and this general pattern 
holds for the magnitude of negative effects.  States’ job search and diversion programs 
are predicted to increase employment more as the intensity of work increases, especially 
in the presence of strong labor market conditions.  While the magnitude of work 
requirement effects is fairly uniform at the AW margin, there is considerable 
heterogeneity at the FTFY margin.  In fact, moving from the least to the most favorable 
economic conditions raises the likelihood of employment by 53 percent and 235 percent 
for low-skilled and non-white single mothers, respectively.  Welfare sanctions also reveal 
the greatest heterogeneity at the FTFY margin, and the only statistically significant result 
is found for this employment outcome in favorable labor market conditions.  Similar 
patterns are revealed for the time limit policies.   
Specification Tests 
 
Table 4.9 presents results from an explicit test of policy heterogeneity across 




examine two hypotheses.  First, I test the hypothesis that all social policy-unemployment 
interactions have the same coefficient, and second, I test whether the interactions at the 
least and most favorable economic conditions are the same.  Bolded p-values imply that 
the null hypothesis of equality of coefficients is rejected at the 20 percent level or better.  
The impetus for extending the rejection region is that, in some cases, very small 
differences in coefficients nearly miss statistical significance at conventional levels (10 
percent or better), but are significant at levels just above that threshold.  However, most 
bolded p-values reveal a rejection of the null at levels of at least 10 percent. 
 Specification tests in Table 4.9 largely confirm the pattern of results described in 
the previous section.  Generally speaking, there is a great deal of policy heterogeneity 
across economic conditions.  Much of this heterogeneity is unevenly distributed across 
the three work margins, with policy-unemployment interactions revealing the greatest 
variation at the FTFY margin.  Interestingly, the specification tests show very little policy 
heterogeneity at the WNW margin, and slightly more at the AW margin.  Thus, it appears 
that most of the behavioral “action” with respect to differential policy effects is 
concentrated at the outermost work margins.  These results also confirm that policy 
“carrots” are more likely to reveal heterogeneous effects at lower intensity work margins, 
while policy “sticks” are more likely to show variation at more demanding work margins.  
In addition, it is important to note that many of these results are more pronounced for 
low-skilled and non-white mothers.  Behavioral responses to job search and cash 
diversion programs, in particular, as well as work requirements and sanctions are more 





Decomposition of Single Mothers’ Employment Growth: 1992-2000 
To summarize the results from previous sections, I use the parameter estimates 
reported in Tables 4.5 and 4.6 to decompose the contribution of social policy reforms and 
the economy to the employment growth of single mothers between 1992 and 2000.  As 
shown in 4.10, employment rates increased 14.4 percentage points at the AW margin, 
19.1 percentage points at the WNW margin, and 6.9 percentage points at the FTFY 
margin.  All decompositions are conducted separately for ATE and HTE models.   
Estimates from my preferred specification imply that the bundle of social policies 
examined in this chapter explain 38.9 percent of the AW employment growth among 
single mothers.  The EITC is the single largest contributor, explaining approximately 13 
percent of the observed increase.  Child care subsidies (9.6 percent) and work 
requirements (7.4 percent) are also important factors.  Economic conditions, as measured 
by the state unemployment rate, account for another 13.2 percent of the employment 
growth.  Overall, my model is able to explain over half (52.1 percent) the increase in 
annual employment between 1992 and 2000.  These estimates match closely recent work 
by Fang and Keane (2005) and Looney (2005), but differ in important ways from other 
authors.  Specifically, the fraction of employment growth attributed to the EITC is on the 
low end of previous estimates, diverging considerably from Grogger (2003) and Meyer 
and Rosenbaum (2001).  However, the model in this chapter incorporates many more 
policy reforms than Grogger’s analysis, which may have reduced the EITC effect, and 
this chapter conducts the decomposition using a different time period from the one in 




When the basic model is extended to account for policy heterogeneity across 
economic conditions, fully 54.4 percent of the observed increase in annual employment is 
explained by the social policy reforms.  This represents a 40 percent improvement in 
explanatory power over the model estimating only average “treatment” effects (ATE 
model).  Changes to the EITC account for a similar fraction of the increase in annual 
employment (13.1 percent).  The contribution of child care subsidies increases 21 percent 
in the heterogeneous model, and the effects of declining maximum welfare benefits rise 
substantially, by 75 percent.  In addition, heterogeneous effects of diversion grants and 
Medicaid appear to exceed their average effects, with the former increasing 92 percent 
and the latter increasing 48 percent.     
 Turning to the WNW work margin, I find that social policy reforms explain 23.6 
percent of the 1992-2000 employment increase among single mothers, significantly less 
than at the AW margin.  Improved economic conditions contribute very little to 
employment growth at this margin, explaining an additional two percentage points.  
Whereas the EITC was a primary factor at the AW margin, it explains almost nothing 
(0.13 percent) at this work level.  All other policy reforms appear to explain a similar 
fraction of the employment growth.  When the model is extended to include 
heterogeneous policy effects, its explanatory power increases to account for 30.5 percent 
of the growth.  This represents a 29 percent increase over the ATE model.  Most of this 
additional explanatory power comes from heterogeneous effects in child care subsidies, 






4.5 Conclusion and Policy Implications 
 
This chapter began with the observation that, although a substantial literature 
investigates the contribution of social policy reforms and the economy to the employment 
growth of single mothers, every study assumes that both factors act independently to 
influence welfare and employment outcomes.  Such an assumption leads researchers to 
estimate average “treatment” effects that hold across all mothers and economic 
conditions.  In this chapter, however, I relax this assumption by investigating the 
presence of heterogeneous policy effects across varying economic conditions.  
Specifically, using data over the period 1985 to 2004, I explore the effects of a broad 
menu of social policy reforms across discrete categorizations of the unemployment rate.  
This study also extends the literature by testing for heterogeneous policy effects across 
three work “margins:” any work participation; work and no welfare; and full-time, full-
year work.   
   Estimates from my preferred specification imply that the bundle of social policy 
reforms considered in this study explain 38.9 percent of the annual employment growth 
among single mothers between 1992 and 2000.  Economic conditions account for another 
13.2 percent of the increase.  When the basic model is extended to account for policy 
heterogeneity across economic conditions, fully 54.4 percent of the observed increase is 
explained, representing a 40 percent improvement in explanatory power.   
As summarized in Table 4.11, a number of interesting patterns emerge from the 
data.  First, it is interesting to note that many policy reforms do not show significant 
heterogeneity across economic conditions or work margins.   Among those that reveal 




economy is strong and the work intensity is low.  Soft policy “sticks” like mandatory job 
search and diversion grants require strong economic conditions to produce positive 
employment effects, while hard policy “sticks” like work requirements and time limits 
produce larger effects in such environments.  Patterns for all policy “sticks” are more 
pronounced across increasingly intense work margins.  Both sets of policies generate the 
greatest employment effects when economic conditions are favorable, implying that a 
strong economy reinforces the positive incentives created by social policy reforms.   
This research raises several important policy implications.  First, social policy 
reforms do not create the same employment incentives across all economic conditions 
and work margins.  Therefore, policy reforms should be carefully tailored to specific 
employment goals and take account of the economic environment in which they operate.             
 If, for example, the goal of a given policy reform is to move welfare recipients into 
work, policymakers can reliably draw from a broad menu of policy options to achieve 
their objectives.  Based on the results of this study, use of an EITC or work requirements, 
for example, can achieve similar employment results across most economic conditions.   
However, if the policy stipulates that recipients work full-time (as is the case with work 
requirements), favorable economic conditions must be present if policymakers are to 
ensure those requirements are met and recipients avoid benefit sanctions.   
These results also suggest that economic “triggers”—in which states stop the time 
limit clock or adjust downward work participation rates when the unemployment rate 
exceeds a certain level—is a useful mechanism to help welfare recipients and states avoid 
financial penalties.  Another option for states operating in a weak economy is to broaden 




are less sensitive to the economy (e.g., subsidized employment, community service, and 
education/job training programs).  Each of these strategies is increasingly important in 
light of the 2005 TANF reauthorization, which raises work participation rates for all 
welfare recipients, narrows the definition of acceptable work activities, and imposes 
financial penalties on non-complaint states.  
An open question for future research is how policy-economy interactions 
influence measures of well-being, such as earnings and poverty.  Specifically, it is 
important to determine whether the increased employment incentives associated with 
work requirements and welfare sanctions, for example, are matched with gains in 
economic well-being.  This issue is particularly crucial for policy reforms operating in 
poor economic conditions because welfare recipients could be forced to accept lower 




TABLE 4.1:The Contribution of Social Policy Reforms and the Economy to the Employment Growth of Single Mothers 
 
 
   Percent of Employment Growth Attributable to: 
Study Author(s) / (Year) Data Source Observation 
Period 
EITC CCDF Welfare 
Benefits 
Welfare Reform Economy 
O’Neill and Hill (2001) March CPS 1992 - 1996 
 

















Meyer and Rosenbaum 
(2001) 
March CPS 1984  - 1996 
 

















Grogger (2003) March CPS 1993 - 1999 33.5 -- 6.9 13.02 20.5 
 
Fang and Keane (2004) March CPS 1993 - 1999 16.8 
 
9.20 -- 20.93 45.6 
Looney (2005) SIPP 1993 - 19994 21.5 
 
0.05 11.0 18.46 12.8 
Notes:  Several measures of economic conditions are often used.  However, to maintain consistency, this table considers only the contribution of the state (or metropolitan) unemployment rate.            
1 Waivers for work requirement/benefit reduction time limits and sanctions.  2 Implementation of any statewide welfare reform and time limits, both of which are interacted with the age of the 
youngest child.  3 Time limits and work requirements.  4 Estimates are based on models explaining monthly employment, whereas the remaining studies use annual employment as the dependent 
variable.  5 Included in the employment model is the number of months transitional child care is available for women leaving welfare.  This variable non-significant in the employment regressions, and 
it does not explain any of the employment growth     6 Welfare benefit reduction rates, age-of-child exemptions from work requirements, benefit sanctions, implementation of AFDC waivers (plus 




TABLE 4.2: Variable Description and Identification Strategy
Identifying Variation  
Variable Name 
 
Description State Year Rules Kids 
Panel A: Employment Outcomes 
Work = 1 if the mother was employed in the previous year; 0 = otherwise -- -- -- -- 
Work and No Welfare = 1 if the mother was employed and did not receive welfare in the previous year; 0 = otherwise -- -- -- -- 
Full-time, Full-year  
Work 
= 1 if the mother was employed full-time (35+ hours), full-year (48+ weeks), conditional on 
being employed; 0 = otherwise 
-- -- -- -- 
Panel B: Social Policy Reforms 
EITC Maximum Credit Combined federal and state EITC maximum credit for families with 1, 2, or 3+ children √ √  
 
√ 
CCDF Spending Federal and state spending through the CCDF (and its predecessor programs) per child  
ages 0-12 
√ √ √  
Welfare Maximum 
Benefit 
AFDC/TANF maximum benefit for a 3-person family, assuming the mother is not employed √ √ √  
Disregarded Earnings Predicted amount of disregarded earnings when calculating welfare benefits for employed 









Job Search = 1 if a state mandates job search activities at the time of welfare application; 0 = otherwise √ √ √  
Diversion Program = 1 if a state operates a formal welfare diversion program; 0 = otherwise √ √ √  
Work Requirement = 1 if the mother could be subjected to a work requirement, based on states’ age-of-child work 
exemption and work requirement time limit; 0 = otherwise  
√ √ √ √ 
Welfare Sanction = 1 if the mother could be subjected to an initial full-family sanction for not meeting work 
requirements, based on states’ sanction policies, length of work requirement time limit, and 
whether the mother could be subjected to a work requirement; 0 = otherwise  
√ √ √ √ 
Lifetime Time Limit = 1 if a state has a lifetime time limit, followed by a full-family benefit reduction; 0 = 
otherwise 
√ √ √  
Intermittent Time Limit = 1 if a state has an intermittent time limit; 0 = otherwise √ √ √  
Time Limit is Binding = 1 if a state’s lifetime time limit could be binding, based on states’ time limit policy and the 
age of the mother’s oldest child; 0 = otherwise 
√ √ √ √ 
Medicaid Coverage = 1 if all children in a working family are potentially covered by Medicaid, based on states’ 
eligibility age limit policies and the age of mother’s oldest child; 0 = otherwise 
√ √  √ 
 
Panel C: Indicators of Macro-economic Conditions  
Unemployment Rate State unemployment rate, annual average √ √   
184 
TABLE 4.3: Summary Statistics for Single Mothers, 1985-2004
Variable Outcome 1:  
Work 
Outcome 2:  
Work and No 
Welfare 































































































































































Source: Author’s calculations from the 1986-2005 March CPS. 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses.  Data are weighted using the March Supplemental Person Weight.  Dollars are  
adjusted to reflect to 2004 prices.  Number of observations for Outcome 1: 90,024.  Number of observations for Outcome 2: 
79,000.   Number of observations for outcome 3: 55,045.  Number of observations for all single mothers: 120,183. 
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TABLE 4.4: Social Policy and Economic Factors Influencing Single Mothers’ Work Decisions, 1985-2004
Variable/Year 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 
Panel A: Employment Outcomes 
 Work 0.673 0.702 0.705 0.683 0.719 0.754 0.798 0.827 0.803 0.777 
 Work and No Welfare 0.567 0.588 0.586 0.567 0.587 0.637 0.697 0.758 0.752 0.730 
Full-time, Full-year Work 0.569 0.594 0.573 0.579 0.579 0.590 0.618 0.648 0.649 0.642 
Panel B: Social Policy Reforms 
EITC Maximum Credit: 
1 Child ($1000s) 































Implementation of a State EITC (%) 0.003 0.024 0.048 0.067 0.139 0.144 0.180 0.257 0.284 0.271 
CCDF Spending  ($1000s) 0 0 0 0.026 0.037 0.058 0.095 0.118 0.093 0.135 
Welfare Maximum Benefit ($1000s) 0.610 0.604 0.570 0.526 0.497 0.469 0.444 0.431 0.432 0.420 
Disregarded Earnings ($1000s) 4.459 4.390 4.450 4.505 4.822 5.154 7.578 9.873 10.085 9.792 
Job Search (%)  0 0 0 0 0 0.162 0.187 0.242 0.250 0.464 
Diversion Program (%) 0 0 0 0 0 0.053 0.295 0.620 0.642 0.641 
Age-of-Child Work Exemption (%)  0.423 0.439 0.254 0.252 0.226 0.177 0.092 0.089 0.066 0.074 
Work Requirement (%) 0 0 0 0 0.010 0.566 0.787 0.853 0.898 0.889 
Welfare Sanction (%)  0 0 0 0 0 0 0.225 0.231 0.242 0.336 
Lifetime Time Limit (%) 0 0 0 0 0 0.016 0.654 0.748 0.773 0.805 
Intermittent Time Limit (%) 0 0 0 0 0 0.214 0.408 0.399 0.376 0.373 
Time Limit is Binding (%) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.172 0.273 0.556 0.648 
Medicaid Coverage (%) 0 0.044 0.325 0.423 0.634 0.758 0.971 0.882 1.0 1.0 
Panel C: Indicators of Macro-economic Conditions 
Unemployment Rate 7.12 5.64 5.67 7.54 6.22 5.46 4.58 4.08 5.82 5.56 
Quartiles of the Unemployment Rate  
(UR < 26th) 
(UR 26th – 50th) 
(UR 51st – 75th) 



















































Notes: Dollars are adjusted for inflation to reflect 2004 prices.  Data are weighted by March CPS Supplemental Person weight.  Full-time, full-year work is calculated among 
those who worked in the previous year.  All percentages reflect the fraction of single mothers with at least one child under age 19 who live in a state with a given reform.  See 
text for additional information on how these variables were constructed.     
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TABLE 4.5: Marginal Effects from the ATE Employment Models
Variable Outcome 1:  
Work 
Outcome 2:  
Work and No Welfare 
Outcome 3:  
Full-time, Full-year 
Work 
































































































































Mean of Dependent Variable 0.744 0.647 0.606 
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
State-specific Time Trends Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 120,189 120,189 90,028 
Log-likelihood -54,994.642 -57,200.037 -53,541.574 
Source: Author’s calculation from the 1986-2005 March CPS 
Notes:  Marginal effects are shown, along with robust standard errors (in parentheses).  *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  All models include controls for age; age-squared; whether the youngest child is ages 3-5, 
ages 6-8, ages 9-12, and ages 13-17; number of children ages 0-5; educational attainment; marital status; non-white; metropolitan 
residence; and non-wage income.    
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TABLE 4.6: Effects of Social Policy Reforms Across Quartiles of the Unemployment Rate: 
HTE Model 
Variable Outcome 1:  
Work 
Outcome 2:  
Work and No Welfare 
Outcome 3:  
Full-time, Full-year 
Work 
EITC Maximum Credit 
           × (UR < 26th)  
 
           × (UR 26th – 50th)  
 
           × (UR 51st – 75th) 
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           × (UR 26th – 50th)  
 
           × (UR 51st – 75th) 
 





























ln(welfare maximum benefit) 
           × (UR < 26th)  
 
           × (UR 26th – 50th)  
 
           × (UR 51st – 75th) 
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           × (UR 51st – 75th) 
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Lifetime Time Limit 
           × (UR < 26th)  
 
           × (UR 26th – 50th)  
 
           × (UR 51st – 75th) 
 




























Intermittent Time Limit 
           × (UR < 26th)  
 
           × (UR 26th – 50th)  
 
           × (UR 51st – 75th) 
 





























Time Limit is Binding 
           × (UR < 26th)  
 
           × (UR 26th – 50th)  
 
           × (UR 51st – 75th) 
 





























           × (UR < 26th)  
 
           × (UR 26th – 50th)  
 
           × (UR 51st – 75th) 
 





























Source: Author’s calculation from the 1986-2005 March CPS 
Notes:  Marginal effects are shown, along with robust standard errors (in parentheses).  *, **, *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  Each set of policy-unemployment interaction coefficients is derived 
from a separate regression of each employment outcome on all policy variables listed in Table 4.5, as well as controls for age; 
age-squared; whether the youngest child is ages 3-5, ages 6-8, ages 9-12, and ages 13-17; number of children ages 0-5; 
educational attainment; marital status; non-white; metropolitan residence; non-wage income; and the set of unemployment rate 
quartile dummies.  The omitted category is above the 75th percentile of the distribution.  Also included are state fixed effects, 




TABLE: 4.7: Effects of Social Policy Reforms Across Quartiles of the Unemployment  








Variable Outcome 1:  
Work 
Outcome 2:  
Work and No Welfare 















EITC Maximum Credit 
           × (UR < 26th)  
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ln(welfare maximum benefit) 
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           × (UR < 26th)  




















           × (UR < 26th)  
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Lifetime Time Limit 
           × (UR < 26th)  



















Intermittent Time Limit 
           × (UR < 26th)  



















Time Limit is Binding 
           × (UR < 26th)  
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Source: Author’s calculation from the 1986-2005 March CPS 
Notes:  Marginal effects are shown, along with robust standard errors (in parentheses).  *, **, *** indicate statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  Number of observations for Outcome 1: 72,730.  Number of observations for 
Outcome 2: 72,730.  Number of Observations for Outcome 3: 49,001.  Each set of policy-unemployment interaction coefficients 
is derived from a separate regression of each employment outcome on all policy variables listed in Table 4.5, as well as controls 
for age; age-squared; whether the youngest child is ages 3-5, ages 6-8, ages 9-12, and ages 13-17; number of children ages 0-5; 
educational attainment; marital status; non-white; metropolitan residence; non-wage income; and the set of unemployment rate 
quartile dummies.  The omitted category is above the 75th percentile of the distribution.  The policy-unemployment interactions 
for the two middle quartiles are included in the models but excluded from the table, for ease of presentation and interpretation.  
Also included are state fixed effects, year dummies, and state-specific time trends.  Withheld from the models are the main effects 





TABLE: 4.8: Effects of Social Policy Reforms Across Quartiles of the Unemployment  







Variable Outcome 1:  
Work 
Outcome 2:  
Work and No Welfare 















EITC Maximum Credit 
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ln(welfare maximum benefit) 
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           × (UR < 26th)  
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Lifetime Time Limit 
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Intermittent Time Limit 
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Time Limit is Binding 
           × (UR < 26th)  
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Source: Author’s calculation from the 1986-2005 March CPS 
Notes:  Marginal effects are shown, along with robust standard errors (in parentheses).  *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  Number of observations for Outcome 1: 38,300.  Number of observations for Outcome 
2: 38,300.  Number of Observations for Outcome 3: 26,479.  Each set of policy-unemployment interaction coefficients is derived 
from a separate regression of each employment outcome on all policy variables listed in Table 4.5, as well as controls for age; age-
squared; whether the youngest child is ages 3-5, ages 6-8, ages 9-12, and ages 13-17; number of children ages 0-5; educational 
attainment; marital status; non-white; metropolitan residence; non-wage income; and the set of unemployment rate quartile 
dummies.  The omitted category is above the 75th percentile of the distribution.  The policy-unemployment interactions for the two 
middle quartiles are included in the models but excluded from the table, for ease of presentation and interpretation.  Also included 
are state fixed effects, year dummies, and state-specific time trends.  Withheld from the models are the main effects associated with 




TABLE 4.9: Specification Tests of the Equality of Policy Coefficients  













Variable Outcome 1: 
Work 
Outcome 2: 




Panel A: All Single Mothers 
EITC Maximum Credit  0.938 / 0.888 0.616 / 0.578 0.807 / 0.504 
CCDF Spending 0.015 / 0.002 0.082 / 0.021 0.479 / 0.129 
ln(welfare maximum benefit) 0.744 / 0.564 0.962 / 0.952 0.971 / 0.832 
ln(disregarded earnings) 0.026 / 0.006 0.553 / 0.176 0.135 / 0.054 
Job Search 0.872 / 0.999 0.701 / 0.877 0.039 / 0.009 
Diversion Program 0.949 / 0.700 0.144 / 0.165 0.024 / 0.010 
Work Requirement 0.782 / 0.412 0.924 / 0.919 0.305 / 0.332 
Welfare Sanction 0.102 / 0.583 0.463 / 0.421 0.710 / 0.683 
Lifetime Time Limit 0.490 / 0.441 0.701 / 0.883 0.002 / 0.039 
Intermittent Time Limit 0.400 / 0.239 0.604 / 0.419 0.290 / 0.134 
Time Limit is Binding 0.175 / 0.252 0.293 / 0.409 0.054 / 0.031 
Medicaid Coverage 0.021 / 0.073 0.016 / 0.003 0.718 / 0.496 
Panel B: Single Mothers With a High School Degree or Less 
EITC Maximum Credit  0.950 / 0.641 0.798 / 0.376 0.607 / 0.440 
CCDF Spending 0.069 / 0.014 0.271 / 0.111 0.873 / 0.445 
ln(welfare maximum benefit) 0.465 / 0.578 0.929 / 0.627 0.879 / 0.580 
ln(disregarded earnings) 0.390 / 0.393 0.117 / 0.691 0.011 / 0.003 
Job Search 0.688 / 0.511 0.367 / 0.434 0.193 / 0.071 
Diversion Program 0.772 / 0.907 0.040 / 0.326 0.042 / 0.012 
Work Requirement 0.780 / 0.610 0.291 / 0.956 0.363 / 0.190 
Welfare Sanction 0.271 / 0.567 0.920 / 0.777 0.765 / 0.610 
Lifetime Time Limit 0.947 / 0.834 0.382 / 0.975 0.005 / 0.039 
Intermittent Time Limit 0.114 / 0.112 0.713 / 0.338 0.289 / 0.087 
Time Limit is Binding 0.868 / 0.421 0.684 / 0.577 0.035 / 0.007 
Medicaid Coverage 0.057 / 0.083 0.218 / 0.086 0.362 / 0.486 
Panel C: Non-white Single Mothers 
EITC Maximum Credit  0.143 / 0.345 0.256 / 0.318 0.138 / 0.033 
CCDF Spending 0.021 / 0.002 0.150 / 0.028 0.301 / 0.425 
ln(welfare maximum benefit) 0.867 / 0.530 0.864 / 0.437 0.354 / 0.769 
ln(disregarded earnings) 0.469 / 0.474 0.570 / 0.460 0.927 / 0.759 
Job Search 0.645 / 0.434 0.884 / 0.553 0.010 / 0.000 
Diversion Program 0.875 / 0.949 0.393 / 0.622 0.062 / 0.020 
Work Requirement 0.735 / 0.635 0.752 / 0.624 0.173 / 0.053 
Welfare Sanction 0.576 / 0.961 0.673 / 0.791 0.218 / 0.152 
Lifetime Time Limit 0.977 / 0.657 0.521 / 0.518 0.021 / 0.032 
Intermittent Time Limit 0.703 / 0.823 0.415 / 0.166 0.393 / 0.093 
Time Limit is Binding 0.428 / 0.503 0.389 / 0.809 0.044 / 0.007 
Medicaid Coverage 0.062 / 0.444 0.337 / 0.138 0.360 / 0.282 
Notes:  The specification tests check the equality of the policy-unemployment coefficients reported in Tables 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8.  
Two null hypotheses are tested: (1) that all policy-unemployment coefficients are the same and (2) that the lowest and highest 
policy-unemployment-quartile coefficients are the same.  P-values from these tests are shown, and only those implying a 




TABLE 4.10: Decomposition of Factors Explaining the Employment Growth  


























Variable Outcome 1: 
Work 
Outcome 2: 
Work and No Welfare 
Outcome 3: 
Full-time, Full-year Work 
Change: 1992-2000 14.4 19.1 6.9 















13.2 13.1 0.13 -0.15 -29.9 -32.5 
CCDF  
  
9.6 11.6 7.9 9.2 -15.6 -17.6 
Welfare Benefits 
  
11.9 20.8 11.5 15.6 12.0 3.8 
Job Search 
  
-3.5 -4.3 -2.1 -2.4 2.7 3.9 
Diversion Program 
  
5.9 11.3 7.8 8.5 -1.1 0.93 
Work Requirements 
  
7.4 7.1 6.2 6.3 49.4 50.8 
Welfare Sanction 
  
1.9 0.93 2.8 2.6 10.3 11.1 
Time Limits 
 
-11.7 -12.3 -11.8 -12.4 -35.6 -34.3 
Medicaid 
 
4.2 6.2 1.2 3.2 -2.9 -0.88 
Unemployment Rate 
 
13.2 -- 2.0 -- 20.3 -- 
Source: Author’s calculation from the 1986-2005 March CPS. 
Notes: ATE = average treatment effects; HTE = heterogeneous treatment effects.  All decompositions are based on models 
estimated in Tables 4.5 and 4.6.  Percentages are interpreted as the fraction annual employment growth attributed to each 
social policy reform and the economy.  Decompositions are calculated in the following manner: the mean change in each 
policy reform (between 1992 and 2000) is multiplied by the associated coefficient, and then divided by the percentage point 




TABLE 4.11: Summary of Heterogeneous Employment Effects 



















Moving from the least to the most favorable economic environment,  
the effect of the policy reform:  
Panel A: All Single Mothers 
EITC Maximum Credit  = = = 
CCDF Spending + + + 
Welfare Maximum Benefit = = = 
Disregarded Earnings - = + 
Job Search = = + 
Diversion Program = + + 
Work Requirement = = = 
Welfare Sanction - = = 
Lifetime Time Limit = = + 
Intermittent Time Limit = = + 
Time Limit is Binding - = + 
Medicaid Coverage + + = 
Panel B: Single Mothers With a High School Degree or Less 
EITC Maximum Credit  = = = 
CCDF Spending + + = 
Welfare Maximum Benefit = = = 
Disregarded Earnings = + + 
Job Search = = + 
Diversion Program = + + 
Work Requirement = = + 
Welfare Sanction = = = 
Lifetime Time Limit = = - 
Intermittent Time Limit + = + 
Time Limit is Binding = = + 
Medicaid Coverage + + = 
Panel C: Non-white Single Mothers 
EITC Maximum Credit  + = - 
CCDF Spending + + = 
Welfare Maximum Benefit = = = 
Disregarded Earnings = = = 
Job Search = = + 
Diversion Program = = + 
Work Requirement = = + 
Welfare Sanction = = + 
Lifetime Time Limit = = - 
Intermittent Time Limit = - + 
Time Limit is Binding = = + 
Medicaid Coverage + + = 
Notes: The “=” symbol denotes that the effect of a given policy reform does not vary across quartiles of the 
unemployment rate.  The “+” symbol denotes that the magnitude of a policy reform increases as one moves from 
the least to the most favorable economic environment.  The “-” symbol denotes that the effect of a policy reform 


















































































CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
The preceding chapters were intended to shed light on several critical issues 
regarding the flurry of recent social policy reforms—particularly child care subsidies and 
the EITC—and their interactions with local labor market conditions.  In this final chapter, 
I summarize key results, discuss relevant policy implications, and offer suggestions for 
future research. 
Chapter 2 began with the observation that, despite the dramatic growth in funding 
for child care subsidies, participation among eligibles (take-up) remains comparatively 
low.  Indeed, early studies determined that 12 percent to 15 percent of eligible children 
receive subsidies, while 80 percent to 86 percent of eligible taxpayers receive the EITC.  
Therefore, the goal of Chapter 2 was to provide updated estimates on eligibility and take-
up rates for CCDF child care subsidies, and to explore factors related to why many 
eligible households do not receive such assistance.   I find that although 28 percent of 
households with children under age 13 are eligible for child care subsidies, take-up is just 
14 percent.  There is, however, substantial variation across households.  For example, 
fully 52 percent female-headed households are eligible for subsidies, with a take-up rate 
of 23 percent.  I also find important differences in the distribution of demographic, 
economic, and child care characteristics between eligible recipient and non-recipient 
households.  Eligible recipient households are more likely to be headed by young, single 
females with fewer relatives but greater numbers of young children in the household.  
Interestingly, eligible recipients are simultaneously more likely to be engaged in a work 





stamps.  Furthermore, a higher proportion of these households use paid sources of child 
care, are more likely to pay for child care, but when they do, pay less than their eligible 
non-recipient counterparts.   Finally, there is evidence to support the claim that states 
substitute some generosity in eligibility for additional generosity in benefits, and that 
financially constrained states are rationing subsidies in a way that targets specific 
household characteristics. 
 Chapter 3 began with the observation that, although there is a large empirical 
literature examining the labor supply effects of child care costs and taxes, to date these 
literatures have evolved independently of each other.  That is, no study has developed a 
modeling strategy that accounts for prices and taxes simultaneously.  Given that previous 
research demonstrates the importance of both factors for single mothers, excluding one of 
these from an employment model might lead to an omitted variables problem.  The goal 
of Chapter 3, therefore, was to join together empirical techniques from previous child 
care and EITC studies to simultaneously estimate the effects of prices and taxes on the 
labor supply of single mothers. 
 Estimates from the main employment model suggest that a one percent increase in 
costs and net-wages are associated with a 5.4 percentage point decrease and a seven 
percentage point increase in employment, respectively.  These translate to an elasticity of 
employment with respect to child care expenditures of -0.174 and an elasticity of 
employment with respect to net-of-taxes wages of 0.711.  One of the central implications 
of this finding is that child care price-effects are considerably smaller than what is 
commonly found in the literature, whereas the tax-effects are solidly within the range of 





children are moderately more responsive to child care prices and net-wages.  These main 
results are corroborated by my alternative modeling strategy: single mothers with 
multiple children became comparatively less sensitive to child care prices and more 
sensitive to net-wages over the study period, especially after expansions to child care 
subsidies and the EITC were enacted.  Finally, policy simulations imply that a system of 
generous, targeted work supports generate more employment than one that provides 
limited, universal assistance. 
 Chapter 4 argued that all previous studies evaluating the employment effects of 
recent social policy reforms suffers from a common drawback: the assumption that policy 
reforms and economic conditions are independent explanations of single mothers’ 
phenomenal employment growth throughout the 1990s.  The goal of this chapter, 
therefore, was to investigate the possibility of heterogeneous policy effects across varying 
economic conditions.  Although it is not immediately clear a priori how the economy 
should influence the impact of social policy reforms, the analysis was guided by several 
considerations.  Specifically, I focused on heterogeneity across policy reforms, work 
margins, and sub-groups of single mothers. 
 Estimates from my preferred specification imply that the bundle of social policy 
reforms considered in this study explain 38.9 percent of the employment growth among 
single mothers between 1992 and 2000.  Economic conditions, as measured by the state 
unemployment rate, account for another 13.2 percent of the employment growth.  When 
the basic model is extended to account for policy heterogeneity across economic 
conditions, fully 54.4 percent of the observed increase is explained.  Several interesting 





earnings disregards reveal the greatest policy heterogeneity at low intensity work 
margins, while policy “sticks” like work requirements and welfare sanctions show 
considerably more heterogeneity at increasingly demanding work margins.  Both sets of 
policies generate the greatest employment effects when economic conditions are 
favorable, implying that a strong economy reinforces the positive incentives created by 
social policy reforms. 
 Findings in this dissertation are important in light of the reauthorization of TANF 
and the CCDF through the 2005 Deficit Reduction Act.  This legislation introduces 
several punitive measures for welfare recipients and states, including greatly accelerated 
work participation rates, a narrowing of acceptable work activities, and the imposition of 
financial penalties on states that fail to comply with federal guidelines.  The new work 
requirements are, furthermore, matched with small increases in funding for child care 
subsidies, a TANF block grant that is not adjusted for inflation, and an economic climate 
less favorable than the one throughout the late-1990s. 
 These policy developments are projected to simultaneously increase the demand 
for child care services and subsidies, raise the pecuniary cost of purchasing care, and 
decrease the government’s ability to further defray such costs.  Results from this 
dissertation suggest that take-up rates for subsidies could decline for certain households.  
In order to control costs, states may begin to lower eligibility ceilings, curtail subsidy 
benefits, and more aggressively ration benefits according to specific household attributes.  
Single mothers, in particular, may become more responsive to the effective increase in 
child care prices, especially in the event of a deep economic recession.  With fewer 





mothers will not be able to meet the new work requirements, and hence risk welfare 
benefit sanctions.  One way to mitigate the deleterious effects of an economic downturn 
(especially in a policy environment with heightened work requirements) is to build 
economic “triggers” into states’ TANF plans.  These triggers would essentially turn off 
time limits and work requirements when the unemployment rate meets or exceeds a 
certain level.  Results in this dissertation also suggest that it might be prudent to 
reestablish even a limited countercyclical funding mechanism into TANF.      
     Based on the results from this dissertation, future research on social policy 
reforms should consider the following extensions.  First, the employment model 
estimated in Chapter 3 can be expanded to include other work margins.  Specifically, 
such infra-marginal employment outcomes as hours-of-work; work and no welfare; and 
full-time, full-year work are important markers of the success of recent policy reforms.  
However, very few studies have concentrated on these employment outcomes.  Another 
avenue for future research, based findings in Chapter 3, is to explore the extent to which 
single mothers became more or less sensitive to child care prices and taxes throughout the 
1990s.  As previously stated, funding for subsidies and the EITC increased substantially 
during the decade, and so one might expect single mothers to becomes less sensitive to 
prices and more sensitive to net-wages in the period following policy expansions, relative 
to before.  Evaluating employment effects in this way represents a departure 
methodologically from previous work, and thus would be prove valuable in either 
confirming or disputing such research.  Third, future research should concentrate on 
mandatory job search and cash diversion policies, two increasingly popular options used 





2004, over 46 percent of single mothers lived in states that implemented job search 
requirements, while 64 percent were potentially influenced by formal diversion programs.  
Yet very few studies have devoted serious attention to these policy reforms.  Finally, 
future studies should focus on indicators of economic well-being as outcomes.  
Considerably less attention has been paid to the effects of social policy reforms on 
earnings, income, and poverty.  In addition, it would be interesting to examine policy-
economy interactions in this context in order to determine whether the gains in 


































APPENDIX 2.1: ESTIMATED MARGINAL EFFECTS FROM THE  
SUBSIDY ELIGIBLITY EQUATION, INCLUDING CONTROLS  
FOR THE TYPE OF CHILD CARE ARRANGEMENT  
 Children Ages 0-4 Children Age 5 Children Ages  
6-12 
Variable ∂Pr(Eligible)/∂x  
(Robust Standard Error) 
















 (0.031)  





 (0.016)***  
Before-/After-school Program -- -0.160 
 (0.028)***  
-0.083  
(0.016)***  
Self-care -- -- -0.023 
 (0.025) 
 
Log-Likelihood -3,011.031 -602.804 -3,906.838 
Number of Observations 7,426 1,592 9,767 
McFadden’s R
2
 0.332 0.362 0.310 
Percent Correctly Predicted 0.805 0.797 0.806 
Source: Author’s calculations from the 2002 NSAF. 
Notes: These models are based on sub-samples of households (with an employed householder and/or spouse, if present) with at 
least one child in the designated age range who is using one of the listed child care arrangements.  Child care arrangements are 
mutually exclusive within an age group, since it is the arrangement that the child spent the greatest number of hours in while a 
given household member was involved in a work activity.  All models include the full set of controls displayed in the last column 
of Table 2.6.  Coefficients from these variables are omitted here to save space.  Parent care is the omitted category.  All models are 
































APPENDIX 2.2: ESTIMATED MARGINAL EFFECTS FROM THE 
 SUBSIDY RECEIPT EQUATION, INCLUDING CONTROLS 
 FOR THETYPE OF CHILD CARE ARRANGEMENT  
 Children Ages 0-4 Children Age 5 Children Ages  
6-12 
Variable ∂Pr(Receive)/∂x  




























Self-care -- -- 0.020 
(0.014)* 
Log-Likelihood -1,705.191 -315.779 -1,690.094 
Number of Observations 7,421 1,591 9,762 
McFadden’s R2 0.221 0.334 0.267 
Percent Correctly Predicted 0.913 0.914 0.942 
Source: Author’s calculations from the 2002 NSAF. 
Notes: These models are based on sub-samples of households (with an employed householder and/or spouse, if present) with at 
least one child in the designated age range who is using one of the listed child care arrangements.  Child care arrangements are 
mutually exclusive within an age group, since it is the arrangement that the child spent the greatest number of hours in while a 
given household member was involved in a work activity.  All models include the full set of controls displayed in the second 
column of Table 2.7.  Coefficients from these variables are omitted here to save space.  Parent care is the omitted category.  All 






























APPENDIX 2.3: ESTIMATED MARGINAL EFFECTS FROM THE  
SUBSIDY TAKE-UP EQUATION, INCLUDING CONTROLS  
FOR THE TYPE OF CHILD CARE ARRANGEMENT 
 Children Ages 0-4 Children Age 5 Children Ages  
6-12 
Variable ∂Pr(Take-up)/∂x  




























Self-care -- -- 0.099 
(0.055)** 
Log-Likelihood -879.442 -163.127 -882.662 
Number of Observations 2,417 512 2,878 
McFadden’s R2 0.201 0.347 0.230 
Percent Correctly Predicted 0.838 0.837 0.873 
Source: Author’s calculations from the 2002 NSAF. 
Notes: These models are based on sub-samples of households (with an employed householder and/or spouse, if present) with at 
least one child in the designated age range who is using one of the listed child care arrangements.  Child care arrangements are 
mutually exclusive within an age group, since it is the arrangement that the child spent the greatest number of hours in while a 
given household member was involved in a work activity.  All models include the full set of controls displayed in the fourth 
column of Table 2.7.  Coefficients from these variables are omitted here to save space.  Parent care is the omitted category.  All 




























APPENDIX 2.4: DATA SOURCES 
 
This appendix provides additional information about the data sources used to 
simulate eligibility for child care subsidies.  Information is given in tabular form, 
highlighting where a given piece of information comes from and its internet URL, if 
applicable.  The table also provides the year to which the data apply.  
Information Data Source and Location Applicable 
Year 
Demographic 2002 National Survey of America’s Families (NSAF), 












Child care mode 2002 NSAF 2002 
Subsidy receipt 2002 NSAF 2001/2002 
Acceptable work 
activities 







states’ child care 
subsidy regimes 









The Children’s Defense Fund: State Developments in Child Care, Early 













limits, by state and 
family size 
 




income, by family 
size 






As the table shows, survey data provided by the NSAF come from multiple years, 
with demographic and other household attributes collected for 2002 and 
employment/earnings data collected for 2001.  Therefore, the goal was to simulate 
subsidy eligibility using state rules for 2001.  This was possible for most components of 
the simulation.  The largest temporal mismatch comes from the State Median Income 
data (2000 Census), which is based on 1999 earnings.  More recent state-level data are 





APPENDIX 2.5: VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION 
 
Indicator for Child Care Subsidy Receipt 
 
For the 2002 NSAF, questions on child care use and sources of help paying child 
care costs are embedded in a larger survey on a set of “focal children.”  Families with 
children under age 13 are asked detailed questions about child care arrangements, 
including center- and family-based services, Head Start, and relative care.  Child care 
information is ascertained for up to two randomly selected focal children, one of whom is 
between the ages of 0 and 5 and the other between ages 6 and 12.  Regular, primary non-
parental arrangements—defined as the one used at least once a week over the previous 
month and for the greatest number of hours—are asked of all parents, regardless of their 
employment status.  However, if a given child care arrangement is reported as being used 
while the respondent works, looks for work, or is in school, a set of questions is then 
asked about the family’s total child care expenses.  Follow-up questions are also asked 
about sources of help in paying child care costs.  Specifically, the sequence of questions 
proceeds as follows: 
1) Now think about all the child care arrangements and programs you use regularly 
for [Focal Child 1/Focal Child 2/All your children under age 13] while you 
worked, were in school or looked for work.  How much did you pay for all child 
care arrangements and programs used in the last month?  The figure reported 
here is the total amount paid for all sources of child care, for all children under 
age 13, and for the purpose of allowing the respondent to work. 
 
2) If no child care expenses are reported in the previous question, respondents are 
then asked: What person or agencies paid for or provided child care for [Focal 
Child 1/Focal Child 2/All your children under age 13] so that you didn’t have to 
pay for it?  The answers include “welfare or social services agency,” “employer,” 
“nonresident parent,” and “relative friend.”  Follow-up questions were then asked 






3) If child care costs are reported, the following is asked: Sometimes the amount of 
money that a parent is charged for a child care arrangement or program depends 
on how much the family earns.  This is sometimes called a sliding scale fee.  Was 
the amount you were charged for the child care of [Child] determined by how 
much money you earn? 
 
4) There is an additional question on whether the government provides help paying 
child care costs, located in the Family Respondent portion of the survey and 
specifically a section covering families’ participation in welfare and other cash 
transfer programs.  The question is: In the past 12 months, did you receive 
government assistance in paying for child care?  Do not include the Dependent 
Care Tax Credit.      
 
Using the questions above, this chapter codes a household as receiving a child 
care subsidy if one or more of the following conditions are met: 
1) the household (or at least one of the families within the household, if applicable) 
reports receiving government assistance in paying for child care; or 
 
2) the household (or at lest one of the families within the household, if applicable) 
reports paying child care costs according to a sliding scale fee; or 
 
 
3) the household is using only paid sources of child care for all focal children, does 
not report any child care expenses, and does not report receiving help from a 
nonresident parent, relative, or friend. 
 
Several points regarding this nomenclature are noteworthy.  First, this measure 
builds on and extends recent work by Giannarelli, Adelman, and Schmidt (2003), who 
use the 1999 NSAF.  Apparently, earlier rounds of the NSAF did not ask whether a 
nonresident parent, relative, or friend paid for child care expenses, and so the authors had 
to infer this was not the case in constructing their indicator of subsidy receipt.  Another 
difference is due to the authors’ consideration of help from organizations such as the 
YMCA, whereas this chapter is concerned with sources of government help.  A final 





third condition.  Giannarelli, Adelman, and Schmidt (2003) incorporate only center-
based, Head Start, and before- and after-school programs, while this study focuses on the 
use of these and family-based and babysitter/nanny care. 
Second, there is likely to be some measurement error in the question on sliding 
scale fees, since the government is not the only entity that uses such a benefit schedule.  
Therefore, non-profit organizations that charge a co-payment are misclassified in this 
coding scheme.  Another source of measurement error arises because other individuals or 
organizations (non-governmental entities) could pay child care expenses, but the 
household simply did not report these sources and are therefore classified as receiving 
help from a government agency.  Finally, although respondents were asked to omit help 
from the Dependent Care Tax Credit, several high-income families still report receiving 
government assistance in paying for child care (question 4).              
Third, since the unit of analysis in this chapter is the household, subsidy receipt is 
also measured at the household level.  This means that if two or more separate families 
(or sub-families) reside in the same household and just one of those families receives a 
child care subsidy, the entire household is coded as receiving a subsidy.  Similarly, if 
child care in both families is subsidized, the household is coded as being a subsidized 
household.   
Classification of Acceptable Work Activities 
 
In most states, families must be involved in an acceptable work activity in order 
to be eligible for child care subsidies.  However, these activities differ across the states 
and by a family’s involvement with the welfare system.  Although 16 states apparently 





the fulfillment of work requirements, participation in job training programs, or formal job 
search activities.  Families with no formal attachment to the welfare system still must 
meet the requirements for an acceptable work activity, which often differs from the 
requirements for TANF families, in addition to meeting income eligibility limits.  
Therefore, this chapter simulates separately the work requirements of families receiving 
welfare and other, low-income families. 
The following are acceptable work activities for TANF families: 
1) 51 states consider formal employment an acceptable work activity, and 17 states 
require TANF families to be working for a certain number of hours per week. 
 
2) 51 states permit TANF families to look for work. 
 
 
3) 45 states consider post-secondary (college course-taking) an acceptable work 
activity, and nine of those states impose a work requirement as well in order to 
remain eligible. 
 
4) 51 states deem participation in a job training program an acceptable work activity. 
 
Below are the acceptable work activities for non-TANF families: 
1) 51 states consider formal employment an acceptable work activity, and 18 states 
require non-TANF families to be working for a certain number of hours per week. 
 
2) 16 states permit these families to engage in job search activities. 
 
 
3)  46 states consider post-secondary (college course-taking) an acceptable work 
activity, and 13 of those states impose a work requirement as well in order to 
remain eligible. 
 
4) 48 states deem participation in a job training program an acceptable work activity, 
and seven of those states impose a work requirement. 
 
Fortunately, the NSAF enables one to examine participation in all four work activities by 





1) Job searching is assessed by two questions: During the last 4 weeks, have you 
been actively looking for paid work? And: During 2001, did you take classes or 
workshops to help you look for work, like job search assistance, jobs clubs, or 
world-of-work orientations? 
 
2) Participation in post-secondary education is assessed by the following: During 
2001, did you take college courses or programs for credit toward a college 
degree, such as an AA, BA, or advanced degree? 
 
3) Enrollment in a job training program is assessed by the following: During 2001, 
did you take courses or apprentice programs that trained you for a specific job, 
trade, or occupation (excluding AA or BA degree programs, GED classes, or on-
the-job training)? 
 
It is important to note that as with subsidy receipt, participation in work activities 
is measured at the household level and only as it applies to the householder.  This 
introduces some measurement error because several states require both parents, if 
present, to be engaged in work activities.  Work participation requirements also apply 
differentially to families with young children and those with older children, but this 
nomenclature simulates work rules identically for all families.  Furthermore, this study 
does not apply state-specific hours’ requirements for participation in work activities; it 
just simulates whether a state deems a given work activity is acceptable or required and 

















APPENDIX 3.1 VARIABLE MEANS FOR THE SIPP SAMPLE OF SINGLE MOTHERS: 
1990-1993 PANELS 
SIPP Panel (Wave) 
Dates of Data Collection 
CPS “Data” Year(s) 
Number of Observations 
1990 (3) 
9/90 – 12/90 
1990 
N = 1,664 
1991 (3) 
9/91 – 12/91 
1991, 1992 
N = 875 
1992 (6), 1993 (3)  
9/93 – 12/93 
1993, 1994 
N = 2,677 
1993 (9) 
9/95 – 12/95 
1995, 1996 
N = 1,201 
Demographics     
Age 32.23 (7.48) 32.48 (7.65) 32.29 (7.63) 32.95 (7.78) 
Less than High School (%) 0.272 (0.445) 0.278 (0.448) 0.249 (0.432) 0.253 (0.434) 
High School/GED (%) 0.439 (0.496) 0.410 (0.492) 0.424  (0.494) 0.419 (0.493) 
Some College (%) 0.205 (0.403) 0.226 (0.418) 0.244 (0.429) 0.234 (0.423) 
BA+ (%) 0.082 (0.274) 0.084 (0.278) 0.082 (0.274) 0.093 (0.290) 
Widowed (%) 0.045 (0.209) 0.055 (0.228) 0.037 (0.189) 0.039 (0.194) 
Separated (%) 0.202 (0.402) 0.180 (0.385) 0.191 (0.393) 0.174 (0.379) 
Divorced (%) 0.378 (0.485) 0.389 (0.487) 0.367 (0.482) 0.373 (0.483) 
Never Married (%) 0.372 (0.483) 0.374 (0.484) 0.403 (0.490) 0.412 (0.4920 
Non-white (%) 0.394 (0.488) 0.363 (0.481) 0.383 (0.486) 0.377 (0.485) 
Non-wage Income ($) 512.87 (669.81) 539.25 (700.39) 521.05 (634.66) 500.99 (809.44) 
Child Ages 0-2 (%) 0.292 (0.455) 0.278 (0.448) 0.282 (0.450) 0.240 (0.427) 
Child Ages 3-5 (%) 0.330 (0.470) 0.339 (0.473) 0.357 (0.479) 0.372 (0.483) 
Child Ages 6-12 (%) 0.665 (0.472) 0.698 (0.459) 0.656 (0.475) 0.688 (0.463) 
Child Ages 13-17 (%) 0.196 (0.397) 0.195 (0.397) 0.214 (0.410) 0.232 (0.422) 
No. of Children Ages 0-2 0.343 (0.587) 0.316 (0.545) 0.318 (0.542) 0.259 (0.480) 
No. of Children Ages 3-5 0.378 (0.580) 0.378 (0.563) 0.414 (0.602) 0.421 (0.589) 
No. of Children Ages 6-12 0.899 (0.811) 0.995 (0.869) 0.914 (0.851) 0.991 (0.882) 
No. of Children Ages 0-17 1.86 (1.01) 1.93 (1.07) 1.92 (1.05) 1.95 (1.02) 
Unemployed Adult  (%) 0.010 (0.100) 0.010 (0.101) 0.008 (0.093) 0.009 (0.099) 
Urban Residence (%) 0.757 (0.428) 0.720 (0.449) 0.772 (0.419) 0.780 (0.413) 
South (%) 0.385 (0.486) 0.355 (0.478) 0.356 (0.479) 0.347 (0.476) 
Employment/Child Care     
Labor Force Participation (%) 0.641 (0.479) 0.643 (0.479) 0.637 (0.480) 0.662 (0.473) 
Uses Paid Child Care (%) 0.675 (0.468) 0.621 (0.485) 0.651 (0.476) 0.735 (0.441) 
Pays for Child Care (%) 0.612 (0.487) 0.604 (0.489) 0.570 (.495) 0.568 (0.495) 
Weekly Child Care Costs ($) 78.87 (53.47) 77.50 (47.08) 75.21 (51.75) 79.34 (76.49) 
Cost per Hour of Work ($) 2.08 (1.51) 2.01 (1.35) 2.06 (1.66) 2.07 (2.02) 
Share of Income Paid (%) 0.159 (0.240) 0.168 (0.167) 0.193 (0.378) 0.165 (0.201) 
Source: Author’s calculations from the SIPP Core File and Child Care Topical Module.   
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses.  All means are weighted using the final person weight from the fourth month of a 






















APPENDIX 3.1 (CONTINUTED) VARIABLE MEANS FOR THE SIPP SAMPLE OF 


















SIPP Panel (Wave) 
Dates of Data Collection 
CPS “Data” Years   
Number of Observations 
1996 (4) 
3/97 – 6/97 
1997, 1998 
N = 2,605  
1996 (10) 
3/99 – 6/99 
1999, 2000, 2001 
N = 2,015 
2001 (4)  
1/02 – 4/02 
2002, 2003, 2004 
N = 1,985 
Demographics    
Age 33.16 (8.22) 33.20 (8.33) 33.25 (8.12) 
Less than High School (%) 0.216 (0.411) 0.192 (0.394) 0.196 (0.397) 
High School/GED (%) 0.360 (0.480) 0.384  (0.486) 0.328 (0.469) 
Some College (%) 0.339 (0.473) 0.328 (0.469) 0.364 (0.481) 
BA+ (%) 0.083 (0.277) 0.094 (0.292) 0.110 (0.313) 
Widowed (%) 0.042 (0.202) 0.035 (0.185) 0.034 (0.183) 
Separated (%) 0.171 (0.377) 0.144 (0.351) 0.147 (0.354) 
Divorced (%) 0.340 (0.473) 0.344 (0.475) 0.337 (0.472) 
Never Married (%) 0.444 (0.497) 0.476 (0.499) 0.480 (0.499) 
Non-white (%) 0.388 (0.487) 0.403 (0.490) 0.370 (0.483) 
Non-wage Income ($) 448.73 (612.09) 407.85 (617.21) 406.19 (607.70) 
Child Ages 0-2 (%) 0.244 (0.429) 0.230 (0.421) 0.259 (0.438) 
Child Ages 3-5 (%) 0.356 (0.479) 0.335 (0.472) 0.329 (0.4700 
Child Ages 6-12 (%) 0.680 (0.466) 0.692 (0.461) 0.685 (0.464) 
Child Ages 13-17 (%) 0.217 (0.412) 0.208 (0.406) 0.205 (0.404) 
No. of Children Ages 0-2 0.266 (0.492) 0.252 (0.484) 0.286 (0.509) 
No. of Children Ages 3-5 0.406 (0.588) 0.373 (0.555) 0.368 (0.559) 
No. of Children Ages 6-12 0.941 (0.841) 0.973 (0.865) 0.953 (0.827) 
No. of Children Ages 0-17 1.88 (1.06) 1.86 (1.04) 1.87 (1.00) 
Unemployed Adult  (%) 0.013 (0.116) 0.013 (0.117) 0.008 (0.093) 
Urban Residence (%) 0.810 (0.391) 0.848 (0.358) 0.771 (0.419) 
South (%) 0.385 (0.486) 0.384 (0.486) 0.372 (0.483) 
Employment/Child Care    
Labor Force Participation (%) 0.743 (0.436) 0.778 (0.415) 0.777 (0.416) 
Uses Paid Child Care (%) 0.762 (0.425) 0.775 (0.417) 0.756 (0.429) 
Pays for Child Care (%) 0.573 (0.494) 0.534 (0.499) 0.541 (0.498) 
Weekly Child Care Costs ($) 81.33 (71.43) 81.90 (73.43) 85.86 (80.07) 
Cost per Hour of Work ($) 2.29 (3.28) 2.22 (2.77) 2.32 (2.99) 
Share of Income Paid (%) 0.171 (0.232) 0.207 (0.547) 0.156 (0.187) 
Source: Author’s calculations from the SIPP Core File and Child Care Topical Module.   
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses.  All means are weighted using the final person weight from the fourth month of a given wave of 





APPENDIX 3.2: CONSTRUCTION OF OTHER KEY POLICY  
VARIABLES AND THEORETICAL EFFECTS 
 
The following describes the construction of other key policy variables that appear 
in the employment models, and discusses the theoretical effect of each on the work 
decision of single mothers.   
First, to capture the effect of states’ earnings disregard policies, I assigned to 
each single mother a predicted amount of annual disregarded earnings.  This is 
accomplished by coding both the initial (fixed) component and the variable component of 
each state’s disregard policy over the study period and then applying these rules to the 
earnings of employed single mothers.  The fixed component refers to the first $30 of 
earnings, for example, while the variable component is 33% of the remainder.  I code 
only the initial earnings disregard, omitting both the work expense and child care expense 
components.   This process assumes that women are in the first four months of welfare 
receipt.  After four consecutive months, states continued only the initial  $30 disregard; 
after one year on welfare, individuals faced a 100 percent implicit tax on earnings.  To 
predict disregarded earnings for non-working mothers, I estimated for each CPS survey a 
simple OLS regression of annual disregarded earnings on several exogenous 
demographic and human capital characteristics plus a vector of state fixed effects.  
Insertion of fixed effects controls for variation in states’ disregard policies, especially in 
the period after welfare reform.  Second, I capture the effect of states’ welfare reform 
efforts through two dummy variables: enactment of any statewide welfare reform and 
time limits.  The former is defined as the first reform policy a state passed under its 
waiver authority, including expanded earnings disregards, family caps, and work 





the implementation of its TANF program to be the first welfare policy considered.  Both 
variables equal one starting in the year after the policies are executed, and they equal zero 
in the years prior to their implementation.  In the year of implementation, I follow the 
standard practice of coding both variables as the faction of the year during which these 
policies were in effect.  Finally, the AFDC/TANF participation rate was constructed by 
dividing each state’s (adult) female caseload by the total number of female-headed 
households (with children under age 18). 
Economic models suggest that every hour of work by women with children 
requires the use of substitute child care.  Child care expenditures are viewed as a fixed 
cost of employment, such that each hour of care purchased in the market reduces the 
returns to work.  A testable hypothesis is that an increase in hourly child care 
expenditures reduces the incentive to work.  This is particularly applicable in the case of 
single mothers because child care costs often represent a significant fraction of their 
earnings.  The theoretical effect of introducing an EITC is unambiguously positive.  
Eligibility for the program is confined to those with positive earnings, and EITC 
recipients experience an expanded budget set that makes work look more attractive at 
every wage level.  In other words, the increased net-of-taxes wage rate for recipients 
previously not working leads to only a positive substitution effect.  States’ maximum 
AFDC/TANF benefit is predicted to decrease the incentive to work because the income 
effect from guaranteed benefits to those not working reduces the attractiveness of 
entering the labor force.  This is particularly relevant for low-skilled workers in high 
benefit states, whose reservation wages are below the maximum welfare benefit.  





rate encourages the combination of welfare and work over pure welfare receipt (among 
those previously not working).  This is because employed recipients can keep more of 
their earnings until they reach the break-even point.  The theoretical effect of states’ 
bundled welfare reform efforts is ambiguous, since states often implemented several 
policies are the same time.  However, most of the individual policies—such as work 
requirements and benefit sanctions—are expected to increase the incentive to work.  
Finally, time limits are hypothesized to increase employment through two channels.  One 
is purely the mechanical effect experienced by those who hit a state’s time limit.  The 
other is behavioral, and incorporates the assumption that forward-looking women will 
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